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NOTES
Antitrust Law-Limitation of Actions-A Liberal Interpretation to
Save the Private Plaintiff
In accord with its emphasis on the role of the private prosecutor in
antitrust enforcement, the Supreme Court, in a recent case, Zenith Radio
Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.,' has increased the protection afforded
the private plaintiff against statutory limitations on his treble damage
action. That case, which was before the Court for the second time, was
initiated with a patent infringement action by Hazeltine Research, Inc.
(ERI) in 1959. In 1963 Zenith filed a counterclaim alleging certain
violations of the Sherman and Clayton Acts arising out of I-IRI's par-
ticipation in patent pools in Canada, Great Britain, and Australia and
claimed damages sustained during the previous four year period. The
conspiracy of which HRI was alleged to be a member had been the subject
of a government suit from November 24, 1958, to November 1, 1963, but
HRI was not named in that action.
The trial judge entered preliminary findings of fact and conclusions of
law in favor of Zenith on its counterclaim2 and at this point HRI at-
tempted to reopen the record and present evidence on its limitations
defense,3 which had not been alleged at any earlier point. The trial judge
allowed the filing of the motions but refused to modify his findings of
fact and conclusions of law concerning HRI's activities in barring Zenith
from the Canadian market. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
reversed on the ground that Zenith had failed to prove injury to its
business,4 but the Supreme Court in an earlier decision held that Zenith
had proved its damages from its exclusion from the Canadian market.5
The Court noted at that time that the trial judge either had rejected the
limitations defense on the merits or had deemed it waived, and the Court
did not consider the question of whether damages sustained during the
191 S. Ct 795 (1971).
'Hazeltine Research, Inc. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 239 F. Supp. 51 (N.D. Ill.
1965).
'The statute of limitations on antitrust actions is contained in 15 U.S.C. § 15 (b)(1964). This section provides that "[a]ny action... shall be forever barred unless
commenced within four years after the cause of action accrued."
'Hazeltine Research, Inc. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 3'88 F.2d 25 (7th Cir. 1967).
'Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969).
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statutory period that were caused by pre-period conduct could be re-
covered.6
On remand the court of appeals found that the trial judge had not held
the defenses to be waived, but rather had erroneously rejected the limita-
lions defense on the merits. This court held that the statute was not
tolled by the prior government action since HRI was not named as a
defendant and remanded the case for a determination of the extent of the
reduction of damages that would result if the defenses were sustained."
Zenith petitioned for certiorari s and this time the Court heard argument
solely on the limitations issues.
Section 4B of the Clayton Act provides that all antitrust actions will
be barred unless they are brought within four years from the accrual of
the cause of action.9 Section 5B of the Clayton Act10 gives some relief
to the antitrust litigant by providing for the tolling of the statutory period
during the pendency of a government suit based in whole or in part on
the matter involved in the plaintiff's claim. This statute of limitations has
caused considerable difficulties for the federal courts because of the complex
nature of antitrust litigation, the amorphous nature of commercial con-
spiracy, and the difficulty of showing the cause and the effect of individual
acts of the defendant.
The application of the statutory period in this case would of course
be determinative on the issue of the damages recoverable by Zenith. If
the statute were tolled by the government action from November 24, 1958,
until November 1, 1963, when a consent decree was entered against the
last defendant in the government action, Zenith would have been entitled
to recover any damages to its business occurring as a result of the con-
spiracy conduct at any time after November 24, 1954. The problem in
Zenith arose because HRI alleged that part of the damage suffered by
Zenith from 1959 until 1963 resulted from pre-1954 conduct. It was
in this posture that the Court was called upon to decide the issue of
waiver of the limitations defense by HRI, the tolling of the statute by a
government suit that neither named HRI as a defendant nor as a co-
conspirator, and the date of the accrual of the cause of action for purposes
of the statute of limitations.
0 Id. at 117 n.13.
"Hazeltine Research, Inc. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 418 F.2d 21 (7th Cir. 1969).
'Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 397 U.S. 979 (1970).
o 15 u.s.c. § 15(b) (1964).
o 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (1964).
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The entire Court agreed that the trial judge would not have abused
his discretion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 (a)" if, instead
of allowing the plaintiff leave to amend his pleadings and incorporate his
statutory defenses, the judge had held that the defenses were waived under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 (h) .2 Justice Harlan, joined by Justice
Stewart, rested his decision on this basis alone.'- The majority, finding
that the record was unclear on the waiver issue, refused to remand the
case for another round of proceedings and decided the statutory defenses
on the merits.
The court of appeals had held that tolling takes place only with respect
to the parties to a government suit. 4 The Supreme Court refused to
follow such a restrictive interpretation of the tolling provision and held
that Zenith, although suing HRI, which was named neither as a party
nor as a coconspirator in the government suit, was not barred from obtain-
ing the benefits of the tolling statute, since Zenith had shown that the con-
spiracy in which HRI participated was at least in part the same conspiracy
as was the object of the government suit. The Court cited this holding
as consistent with and a logical extension of its earlier decisions in
Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing
Co.'" and Leh. v. General Petroleum Corp.'
Once it had passed the tolling hurdle, the Court was faced with the
problem of the post-1959 damages caused by the pre-1954 conduct of the
conspiracy. The courts have devised many methods for avoiding the
harsh result of too strict an interpretation of the statute of limitations. Such
1 FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a). This rule provides that with two exceptions a party
may amend his pleadings only by leave of the court or by written consent of the
adverse party. HRI had argued before the Court that leave to amend should have
been granted in this case because justice so required.
1 FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h). Prior to the 1966 amendments rule 12(h) provided
that "[a] party waives all defenses and objections which he does not present either
by motion ... or, if he has made no motion, in the answer or reply ..
" 91 S. Ct. at 811 (concurring opinion).
"' 418 F.2d at 25 n.3.
1381 U.S. 311 (1965).
1 382 U.S. 54 (1965). In Leh the Court had held that a private litigant was
entitled to the benefit of the tolling statute even though the conspiracy he alleged
covered a different time, named additional parties, and excluded some parties named
in the prior government suit. The Court in Zenith admitted that Leh did not decide
the precise issue now before the Court, i.e., tolling of the statute against a defendant
not named as either a defendant or coconspirator in the prior government action.
91 S. Ct. at 805. See generally Korman, The Antitrust Plaintiff Following in the
Government Footsteps, 16 VILL. L. REv. 57 (1970); Comment, Section 5(b) of the
Clayton, Act: The Tolling Effect of Government Antitrust Actions on Unnamed
Parties, 34 U. CHI. L. REv. 906 (1967); 65 Micn. L. REv. 1661 (1967).
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theories as fraudulent concealment of the conspiracy,17 continuing invasion
of the plaintiff's rights,18 and an overt act occurring within the statutory
period'1 have saved private plaintiffs from the strictures of the statute.
Previous decisions on this issue have emphasized the continuing con-
duct of the defendant and the causal effect of that conduct, i.e., damages
to the antitrust plaintiff. As long as some conduct during the statutory
period that causes damages can be attributed to the defendant, the courts
have not hesitated to deny any statutory defenses. In Zenith, however,
the Court appears to take a different tack on this issue. As the basis for
its decision the Court looked to the language of the statute, specifically to
the phrase "accrual of the cause of action." The Court held that the cause
of action cannot accrue with regard to future damages until those damages
can be proved with some degree of certainty by the plaintiff. If the plain-
tiff only has speculative damages, he cannot prove those damages in court
and therefore has no cause of action with regard to such damages.20 In
the principal case, Zenith's sole proof with regard to damages was its show-
ing of a hypothetical market that it could have obtained in Canada were
it not for the conspiracy which denied Zenith entry. Moreover, in 1954
there were other factors barring Zenith's entry into the Canadian market,
including a foreign government prohibition. The Court concluded that
Zenith, as a plaintiff in 1954, could not possibly show what its damages
would be for the period from 1959 until 1963 so those damages must
have been speculative, i.e., no cause of action had accrued with regard
to those damages. The Court does not isolate the point in time that the
cause of action did accrue as to these damages, but nevertheless it con-
cluded that Zenith had filed its counterclaim well within the statutory
period.
17E.g., Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 312 F.2d 236 (2d Cir.
1962); Crummer Co. v. duPont, 223 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1955). The fraudulent-
concealment doctrine provides that the statute of limitations does not begin to run
until the plaintiff is aware or should be aware of the conspiracy. This equitable doc-
trine is generally applied to all statutory limitations.
" See Hanover Shoes, Inc. v. United States Shoe Mach. Co., 392 U.S. 481
(1968). This case involved the defendant's continuing policy of only leasing his
machines rather than offering them for sale. For a more restrictive approach,
See Manok v. Southeast Dist. Bowling Ass'n, 306 F. Supp. 1215 (C.D. Cal. 1969),
in which the court held that the original suspension of the plaintiff from the de-
fendant association started the running of the statute of limitations and that the
subsequent denials of readmittance were not overt acts and did not involve a con-
tinuing invasion of the plaintiff's rights. See also Highland Supply Corp. v.
Reynolds Metal Co., 327 F.2d 725 (8th Cir. 1964).
"8 E.g., Steiner v. 20th Century-Fox Film Corp., 232 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1956).20 91 S. Ct. at 806.
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The case raises serious problems, and a liberal interpretation of the
opinion without due consideration of the facts out of which it arose
will effectively gut the four year statute of limitations as a statute of
repose for the antitrust defendant. There are several facets of the case
missing in the opinion of the Court which might dictate a more restrictive
approach in similar but not identical situations. It should be pointed out
that the Court was dealing with only one aspect of the statute of limita-
tions, its function as a limitation on the extent of recoverable damages.
The function of the statute as a complete bar to suit is not raised by the
case and was not discussed by the Court. It was found in the lower court
that there was a continuing conspiracy after 1954 that caused damages
during the statutory period, and therefore the suit by Zenith could not be
completely barred by the statute. The continuation of the conspiracy after
1954 and any overt acts committed after that date become irrelevant in
any event since the Court focused on the plaintiff and his ability to prove
his damages rather than on the conduct of the defendant. Since some
damages could be recovered by Zenith even under traditional learning, the
real problem with the Court's rationale is not raised in Zenith.
The objection to the rationale of the Court would arise if the con-
spiracy had terminated in all respects in 1954 or before. Zenith, as a
plaintiff in 1954, would have the same difficulty in establishing its dam-
ages for future years since it could not forecast the percentage of the
Canadian market that it would lose as a result of the delayed entry caused
by the conspiracy. If the rationale of the principal case were adopted
in this situation, Zenith would not be required to bring suit until it could
prove its damages with some degree of certainty. At any point in the
future, Zenith could bring an action, establish the fact of violation, and
recover damages incurred during the previous four years along with any
future damages that it could prove. This result would not be violative of
the policy supporting the statute of limitations if the only effect would be
as it was in Zenith, an increase in the amount of damages that the
plaintiff could recover. However, the policy behind the statute of limita-
tions as a statute of repose with regard to the fact of violation would be
destroyed. The plaintiff, in the hypothetical situation, would not be
required to establish the antitrust violation until some future point which
could be ten or fifteen years from the termination of the conspiracy. All
the arguments that are normally used to justify any statute of limitations,
such as staleness of the evidence and the unavailability of witnesses, apply
with full force to this situation. The antitrust defendant would never be
19711
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free from suit arising out of his conduct so long as the possibility existed
that some plaintiff at some later point would be injured by that conduct.
This result may be justified on policy grounds because of the role of
the private prosecutor in enforcing the antitrust laws21 and the fact that
this future plaintiff has suffered real harm from the defendant's violations
of those laws. However, the reasoning of the Court breaks down when
confronted with another plaintiff in a different situation who is equally
deserving of the Court's protection. If the conspiracy in the principal
case had terminated in 1954 and at that point Zenith could have proved
its damages during the future period, then its later action would have been
barred. Such a plaintiff who can show his future damages with some de-
gree of certainty must bring his action within the four year period or be
forever barred. The distinction between this plaintiff and one who cannot
prove his damages seems dubious when one considers the fact that both
plantiffs will have suffered the same damages at the hands of the same
defendant. Such a distinction is apparently unjustified.
Future litigants should be forewarned that Zenith turns on very special
facts. Factors that may have influenced the decision of the Court include
the late assertion of the defenses by HRI. There was some evidence that
HRI may have deliberately saved its statutory defenses until after the
findings of fact and conclusions of law by the trial judge since any attempt
to raise the defenses at an earlier stage may have involved admissions of
HRI's participation in the conspiracy. The late filing by HRI had pre-
cluded Zenith from even introducing evidence on the statutory defenses,
and the Court, desiring to prevent a remand of a case already eleven years
in duration, may have concluded that Zenith could show acts by HRI that
would bring the case within the statutory period under traditional theories.
In addition, the fact of antitrust violation was clearly shown in the lower
court by Zenith.
The application of the Zenith rationale in later litigation should not be
viewed by plaintiffs' attorneys as an opportunity for delay. The attorney
must now decide if the damages that will occur to the plaintiff are provable
at the time when the violation becomes apparent. If the damages are not
provable, the plaintiff can delay his suit. This determination by the at-
torney of the speculative nature of the damages is of course subject to
review by the courts, and the lower federal judges, including the court
of appeals in the principal case, have not been quite so liberal in construing
" See Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139
(1968).
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the statutes as the Supreme Court has been. The safest course and the
one the attorney would most likely take would be to bring the action at
an early date. However, a not unusual situation can arise, as it did in
Zenith, where a litigant will await an action for infringement or similar
relief by the violating party before filing his "automatic" counterclaim
for treble damages. Such a litigant may hope to find salvation in the
Zenith decision.
Because of the unsupportable results that obtain from an application
of an expanded interpretation of Zenith, the rationale of the case should not
be extended to exempt a plaintiff from having to show the fact of violation
within the statutory period. Such a plaintiff should not be accused of
splitting his cause of action since the extent of future damages cannot be
proved at the time of the first action.' Requiring the plaintiff to prove
the fact of violation within the statutory period would not produce harsh
results since antitrust litigation is not a summary proceeding and the
plaintiff will have an extended period of trial time to show his anticipated
damages. In addition the lower courts have tremendous flexibility and
could retain jurisdiction of the case and allow the plaintiff to come in at
a later date and show the extent of his damages. Furthermore, a recovery
in the first suit should not bar later action for subsequent damages. By
requiring the plaintiff to show the fact of violation during the four year
statutory period, the interests of the defendant will be protected in that
he will not have to defend his conduct under the antitrust laws after the
expiration of the four year period. The interests of the plaintiff will be
protected in that he will not be denied recovery for any future damages
incurred as a result of the defendant's conduct.
Zenith reflects the concern of the Court over the role of the private
prosecutor in antitrust litigation. This attitude of the Court, reflected in
its abolition of the in pari delicto defense24 and the licensee estoppel de-
fense," is commendable in that the private plaintiff serves a useful if not
vital role in the enforcement of the antitrust statutes. In this process,
however, the Court should be wary of dubious distintions that only com-
" See RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS §§ 49, 65(2) (1942). A second action
should clearly be allowed in pursuit of a remedy which could not be obtained in the
first action. This may, however, require a finding by the trial court on the basis of
its decision denying future damages. Such a finding would distinguish a case where
the future damages were speculative and therefore not recoverable and one where
the trial judge finds that the plaintiff will suffer no future damages.
28 Id.
"
2Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
" Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
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plicate the already impossible task of lawyers and judges involved in
antitrust litigation. It is regrettable that the Court picked such a complex
vehicle as Zenith, which could have been decided on the issue of waiver
alone,26 to continue its policy of protection of the private plaintiff.
LANNY B. BRIDGERS
Bankruptcy-Wage Earner's Vacation Pay Held Not to Be Property
Under Section 70a(5)
In Lines v. Frederick,1 the Supreme Court has held that the accrued
vacation pay of two bankrupt wage earners does not pass to a trustee in
bankruptcy as "property" under section 70a(5) of the Bankruptcy Act.2
The referee in each case had ordered the wage earner to turn over his
vacation pay to the trustee on receipt, less an amount exempt under
applicable California law.' On appeal the district court affirmed, but the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, maintaining that the accrued
vacation pay was not "property" within the coverage of section 70a(5) .
" See the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan. 91 S. Ct. at 811.
1400 U.S. 18 (1970) (per curiam).
Bankruptcy Act § 70a, 11 U.S.C. § 110a (1964), provides:
The trustee of the estate of a bankrupt... shall in turn be vested by opera-
tion of law with the title of the bankrupt as of the date of the filing of the
petition... except insofar as it is to property which is held to be exempt,
to all the following kinds of property wherever located... (5) property, in-
cluding rights of action, which prior to the filing of the petition he could
by any means have transferred or which might have been levied upon and
sold under judicial process against him . . . . Provided, That rights of
action ex delicto for libel, slander, injuries to the person of the bankrupt...
shall not vest in the trustee unless by the law of the State such rights
of action are subject to attachment, execution, garnishment, sequestration,
or other judicial process ....
'CAL. Cry. PRO. CODE § 690.11 (West 1955) provided that the following shall
be exempt from the claims of creditors:
One-half of the earnings of the defendant or judgment debtor received for
his personal services within 30 days next preceding the levy of attachment or
execution where such one-half is necessary for the use of the debtor, or his
family supported in whole or in part by such debtor.
This California statute was repealed in 1970 by Ch. 1323, § 27, [1970] CAL. STATS.
-, but substantially the same provision can be found in CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE
§ 690.6 (West Supp. 1971). Accordingly, under California law creditors could
reach all but a small portion of the accrued vacation pay in Lines. This would
suffice to pass the nonexempt portion under section 70a(5), assuming that vaca-
tion pay would be considered "property."
400 U.S. at 18. Earlier the fifth circuit had reached an opposite conclusion
in Kolb v. Berlin, 356 F.2d 269 (5th Cir. 1966).
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In its per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court emphasized that the
basic purpose of the Bankruptcy Act is "to give the debtor a 'new oppor-
tunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the
pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt,' "I and that this basic
purpose circumscribes any judicial definition of property under section
70a(5).' The Court reasoned that since vacation pay is a part of workers'
weekly earnings, and functions "to support the basic requirements of life
for them and their families during brief vacation periods or in the event
of layoff," it is essential to bankrupt wage earners in making a "fresh
start" and should not pass to the trustee.7
Section 70a of the Bankruptcy Act enumerates different kinds of in-
terests which automatically vest in the trustee upon the filing of the
petition, unless exempt under applicable state law. Under section 70a(5),
as pertinent here, property passes if prior to the filing of the petition it
was either transferable by the bankrupt or could have been levied upon
and sold under judicial process against him.' Ordinarily, federal courts
follow local statutory or decisional law "upon the question of whether
particular property is endowed with the legal attributes and incidents of
transferability or susceptibility to sale by judicial process." 9 In Lines,
however, the Court never reached the question of whether, under California
law, accrued vacation pay is transferable or leviable. Such an inquiry,
which predominates in most cases involving section 70a (5), was obviated
by the Court's determination that the vacation pay was not "property" and
hence did not vest regardless of local law concerning its transferability
or leviability.
The traditional scope of section 70a(5) was stated earlier by the
Court in Segal v. Rochelle :10
'400 U.S. at 19, quoting Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 245 (1934).
a 400 U.S. at 19.
7 Id. at 20.
1 See note 2 supra. The proviso in section 70a(5) states that rights of action
for certain types of personal injuries will not pass to the trustee, unless subject to
judicial process.
'Annot., 16 A.L.R.2d 839 (1951). See, e.g., Taylor v. Voss, 271 U.S. 176
(1926) (state law determines whether a wife's interest in the bankrupt's prop-
erty passed to the trustee); Hewit v. Berlin Mach. Works, 194 U.S. 296 (1904)
(state law determines whether vendor's title upon a conditional sale was valid and
subject to pass to trustee) ; Danning v. Lederer, 232 F.2d 610, 613 (7th Cir. 1956)
(state law controls whether a bankrupt's interest in a spendthrift trust will pass) ;
Cullom v. Kears, 8 F.2d 437 (4th Cir. 1925) (state law determines whether a
bankrupt's interest in an estate held by the entirety passes).
"382 U.S. 375, 379 (1966).
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The main thrust of § 70a(5) is to secure for creditors everything of
value the bankrupt may possess in alienable or leviable form when he
files his petition. To this end the term "property" has been construed
most generously and an interest is not outside its reach because it is
novel or contingent or because enjoyment must be postponed.
Ordinarily federal courts have chosen to follow state court rulings on
various types of property interests. Where federal courts have not followed
local rulings, the reason has been that the state courts had defined
"property" too narrowly and had thereby prevented the passing of assets
intended to be within the reach of section 70(5)." As was observed by
the Court in Board of Trade v. Johnson,'2
Congress derives its power to enact a bankruptcy law from the Federal
Constitution, and the construction of it is a federal question. Of course,
where the bankruptcy law deals with property rights which are reg-
ulated by the state law, the federal courts in bankruptcy will follow
the state courts; but when the language of Congress indicates a policy
requiring a broader construction of the statute than the state decisions
would give it, federal courts can not be concluded by them.
The Court in Lines interposes its own definition of "property" with-
out regard to state law, but it does not do so in order to secure assets for
creditors through a "broader construction of the statute." In fact, it
is the Court itself in Lines which is narrowly defining "property" so as
to prevent the passing of assets clearly alienable or leviable under state
law.'3 Thus, the Court subverts its traditional policy of sweeping all assets
of value into the bankruptcy estate to its concern for giving the debtor
a "fresh start" after bankruptcy. Indeed, a definitional approach formerly
employed by the federal courts in furtherance of one policy is being used
in Lines to serve an entirely different objective.
In Wetmore v. Markoe,'4 which appears to be the seminal case artic-
ulating the "fresh start" rationale, the Court stated that
"See, e.g., Board of Trade v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 1 (1924) (seat on stock ex-
change passes as transferable property, notwithstanding prior state court deter-
mination that such was not "property"); Young v. Handwork, 179 F.2d 70 (7th
Cir. 1949) (bankrupt's interest in trust passes although Illinois law provided that
creditors cannot reach a debtor's interest in trusts created by others and state court
had interpreted this law to prevent passage to the trustee).12264 U.S. 1, 10 (1924) (emphasis added).
13See note 3 supra & note 26 infra.
a' 196 U.S. 68, 77 (1904) (emphasis added).
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[s]ystems of bankruptcy are designed to relieve the honest debtor from
the weight of indebtedness which has become oppressive and to, permit
him to 'have a fresh start in business or commercial life, freed from
the obligation and misfortunes which may have resulted from business
responsibilities.
It was in furtherance of such a design that the Court in Local Loan Co.
v. Hunt 5 ruled that a state court could not enforce an assignment of
future wages that a bankrupt had made before declaration of bankruptcy.
There the Court said:
The new opportunity in life and the clear field for future effort, which
it is the purpose of the Bankruptcy Act to afford the emanicipated
debtor, would be of little value to the wage earner if he were obliged to
face the necessity of devoting the whole or a considerable portion of his
earnings for an indefinite time in the future to the payment of indebted-
ness incurred prior to bankruptcy.1 6
The Court also noted that "wages earned after the adjudication became
the property of the bankrupt clear of the claims of all creditors" and that
an individual's earning capacity is not "property within the meaning of
the bankruptcy act.""lT Although it is easily seen that a wage earner in
the Local Loan Co. situation could hardly make a "fresh start" if deprived
of his earnings subsequent to discharge, to hold as the Court does in
Lines that vacation pay already accrued is not property within the
meaning of the Bankruptcy Act goes far beyond the "fresh start" rationale
as articulated in Local Loan Co. v. Hunt.
It is well-settled that compensation owed to a bankrupt for services
fully performed by the time bankruptcy is declared passes to the trustee
under section 70a(5),18 even though payment is not to be made until
after discharge. 9 In Legg v. St. John,2 ° a case arguably similar to Lines,
the Supreme Court held that the accrued right of a bankrupt to receive
disability benefits in the future under an insurance contract does pass to
the trustee. There the Court noted that
1292 U.S. 234 (1934).
1 Id. at 245. See also the concurring opinion of Judge Brown in Kolb v.
Berlin, 356 F.2d 269, 272 (5th Cir. 1966).
'1292 U.S. at 243.
"
8 In re Hannan, 127 F.2d 894 (7th Cir. 1942) ; Florance v. Kresge, 93 F.2d
784 (4th Cir. 1938). See generally 9 Am. Jun. 2d Bankruptcy § 912 (1963).
In re Leibowitt, 93 F.2d 333 (3d Cir. 1937).
.0296 U.S. 489 (1936).
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[t]he right to receive disability benefits in the future does not differ
from any other right acquired before adjudication to receive money
thereafter.... Like other property, it passed to the trustee, unless
exempted by the law of the bankrupt's domicile. The principle declared
in Local Loan Co. v. Hunt... is not applicable here.
21
This case would seem to be strong authority for the proposition that
accrued vacation pay should pass as property, since the right to the money
vests before adjudication.
In other cases involving interests similar to accrued vacation pay,
the lower federal courts have consistently arrived at conclusions different
from that reached in Lines. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has held
that both money due for annual leave2 3 and the right to receive a lump
sum payment of a retirement fund contribution 4 are "property" passing
under section 70a(5). Moreover, there are two recent federal court
decisions in California which have concluded that accrued vacation pay
does pass. In re Kuether" held that accrued vacation pay passed to the
trustee since under California law such an interest was clearly assignable."'
The bankruptcy court in In re Cohen2 found that a bankrupt school teach-
er's right to receive summer vacation pay as part of a prorated twelve
month salary, but for which no additional services were required, was
"property" within the reach of section 70a(5). These cases and others
I Id. at 495-96 (emphasis added).
2Cf. In re Wright, 157 F. 544 (2d Cir. 1907) (bankrupt insurance agent's
right to receive renewal premiums passes even though bankrupt had to continue
present employment in order to receive the payments).
" Kolb v. Berlin, 356 F.2d 269 (5th Cir. 1966).
"'Hill v. Schaefer, 221 F.2d 914 (5th Cir. 1955).
5 203 F. Supp. 223, 224 (N.D. Cal. 1962).
" The Court's conclusion that the right to receive accrued vacation pay is an
assignable interest under California law is clearly correct. CAL. Cxv. CODE § 1044
(West 1954) provides that "[p]roperty of any kind may be transferred, except
as otherwise provided by this Article." CAL. CIV. CoDE § 1045 (West 1954) adds
that "[a] mere possibility, not coupled with an interest, cannot be transferred."
The California courts have consistently held, however, that under these two sec-
tions even future wages or money to become due in the future upon the happening
of a contingency are assignable. See Baumgarten v. California Pac. Title & Trust
Co., 127 Cal. App. 649, 16 P.2d 332 (Dist. Ct. App. 1926). There can be little
doubt that had the Supreme Court in Lines considered the question, it would have
found accrued vacation pay to be assignable under California law. Note 3 supra
concludes that most of the accrued vacation pay in Lines could have been reached
by creditors. Thus the vacation pay could have passed to the trustee by satisfying
either or both of the conditions of section 70a(5).
' 276 F. Supp. 889, 892 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
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suggest that under case law prior to Lines accrued vacation pay passes as
"property" so long as it is alienable or leviable under applicable state law.
Lines can be viewed as the latest of a series of decisions in which the
Supreme Court has asserted that a bankruptcy proceeding is of an
equitable nature.2 In Pepper v. Litton 9 the Court noted that
by virtue of [section 2a of the Bankruptcy Act] a bankruptcy court is a
court of equity at least in the sense that in the exercise of the juris-
diction conferred [upon the court] by the Act, it applies the principles
and rules of equity jurisprudence .... [E] quitable powers have been
invoked to the end that fraud will not prevail, substance will not give
way to form, technical considerations will not prevent substantial
justice from being done.
Easily seen here is the Court's implicit warning that it may look increasing-
ly to equitable principles for the solution to problems arising out of the
administration of the Bankruptcy Act.
Unfortunately, the Court at times has exercised its equitable powers
at the expense of disregarding clear statutory language in the Act. In
Bank of Marin v. England,"0 a bank had honored checks drawn by a
depositor after his declaration of bankruptcy. Despite the fact that section
70d(5) specifically invalidates any transfer made by or in behalf of the
bankrupt after filing,"1 with certain exceptions not applicable in Bank of
Marin,2 the Court ruled that the trustee was liable for the amount of the
checks. The Court concluded that payment in this instance was not a
"transfer" within the meaning of the statute because "it would be in-
equitable to hold liable a drawee" under these circumstances.33 The result
here, as noted by Justice Harlan in dissent, 4 may seem equitable but none-
theless contravenes clear statutory language.
A similar criticism can be leveled at the Court's decision in Reading
218 See Aug, Recent Trends in the Application of Equitable Principles of Bank-
ruptcy, 43 REF. J. 109 (1969).
2o 308 U.S. 295, 304-05 (1939).
so 385 U.S. 99 (1966).
" Bankruptcy Act § 70d(5), 11 U.S.C. § 110d(5) (1964), provides:
A person asserting the validity of a transfer under this subdivision shall have
the burden of proof. Except as otherwise provided ... no transfer by or
in behalf of the bankrupt after the date of bankruptcy shall be valid against
the trustee ....
" For exceptions to this rule, see Bankruptcy Act §§ 2 1g, 70d(1)-(5), 11 U.S.C.
§§44g, 110d(1)-(5) (1964).
33 385 U.S. at 103.
8"Id. at 103-11.
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Co. v. Brown,35 in which a tort claimant sued a bankrupt estate on the
basis of an injury caused by the negligence of the receiver. The Court
held that the claim was an "actual and necessary" cost of administration"
and accorded the claim first priority under section 64a of the Bankruptcy
Act.3 7 The Court noted: "The Act does not define 'actual and necessary'
nor has any case directly in point been brought to our attention. We
must, therefore, look to the general purposes of Section 64a, Chapter XI,
and the Bankruptcy Act as a whole."38 Thereupon, the Court felt free
to exercise its equitable powers in defining "actual and necessary" so as
to achieve the basic objective of "fairness to all persons having claims
against an insolvent."3 9 For the Court to regard a tort claim as an actual
and necessary cost and expense of preserving the estate taxes the language
of the statute, especially in view of the effect of according such a claim first
priority status.40
This technique of reaching what the Court considers a "fair" result
by selective definition of key words in the Bankruptcy Act provisions is
applied in Lines, as it was in Bank of Matin and Reading. One problem
surrounding the application of this technique is that it tends to make the
bankruptcy court a "place for a disregard or in effect a repealing of the
express provisions of statutory law." '41 The possibilities for a complete
judicial overhaul of the entire area of bankruptcy administration in the
name of "equity," or "fairness," or to "assure the debtor a fresh start"
would appear limitless in light of the Marin-Reading-Lines line of de-
cisions.
Also in Lines, the Court, in its determination to assure the bankrupt a
"fresh start," virtually ignored the other basic purpose of the Act of
securing all of the bankrupt's assets and dividing them among his creditors.
" 391 U.S. 473 (1968).
"Id. at 476.
Bankruptcy Act § 64a, 11 U.S.C. § 104a (1964), provides:
The debts to have priority, in advance of the payment of dividends to
creditors, and to be paid in full out of bankrupt estates, and the order of
payment, shall be (1) the actual and necessary costs and expenses of pre-
serving the estate subsequent to filing the petition ....
811391 U.S. at 476.
391d.
' In Reading, because of the limited assets of the estate in bankruptcy, the effect
of according first priority status to the tort claimant was to prevent the other cred-
itors from recovering any amount on their claims. See the dissent of Chief justice
Warren. 391 U.S. at 486-91.
"' Aug, supra note 28, at 112.
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There is authority suggesting that the congressional intent in passing the
Act in 1898 to afford the debtor a "fresh start" through discharge in
bankruptcy was subordinate to that of providing a procedure for the
collection and distribution of all the bankrupt's assets among his creditors.42
But, setting the historical argument aside, the Court in deciding any close
question in bankruptcy administration should always weigh the rights of
both creditor and debtor; the Lines opinion would appear to stand as a
notable example where this has not been done, to the detriment of the
creditor.
Furthermore, in allowing the bankrupt to retain his vacation pay
accrued prior to filing, the Court goes beyond its stated objective of pro-
viding the discharged debtor with a "fresh start." The point is cogently
made by the dissenting Justice Harlan when he argued that the majority
opinion in Lines in effect gives the bankrupt a head start over his
hypothetical counterpart who begins work for the first time on the day
after bankruptcy is declared.43 The Court summarily attempts to justify
this by noting that accrued vacation pay, as a part of wages, is a" 'special-
ized type of property' ,,44 within the ambit of its decision in Sniadach v.
Family Finance Corp.45 This treatment is hardly satisfactory. In Sniadach
the Court was concerned with a state garnishment procedure whereby a
creditor could freeze all of a debtor's wages by service of a complaint
upon both employee and garnishee.46 These wages would remain frozen
until adjudication of the complaint, although the garnishee was required
under state law to pay the worker a subsistence allowance of at least
twenty-five dollars but not exceeding fifty per cent of the latter's owed
' See In re Leslie, 119 F. 406, 410 (N.D.N.Y. 1903). Judge Ray, the deciding
judge, had been a member of the House Judiciary Committee during the passage
of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 and had served as chairman of that committee during
the passage of the 1903 amendment. 1 H. REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY 18 (4th ed.
1934). Judge Ray made these comments on the spirit of the Bankruptcy Act of
1898:
The main purpose of the bankrupt law is to prevent preferences, and secure
a fair and an equitable division of the bankrupt estate among the creditors,
not to grant discharges. This end accomplished, the bankrupt is granted a
discharge from all his debts. The attainment of the first is not to be sacrificed
to the accomplishment of the last.
119 F. at 410.
" 400 U.S. at 21-22.
"Id. at 21.
"395 U.S. 337 (1969).
"Id. at 338-39. See also Note, Poverty Law-Garnishment-Protection of
Debtors' Rights, 48 N.C.L. REv. 164 (1969).
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wages.4 7 The effect of this procedure was to deprive the employee of at
least half of his earnings before he was given an opportunity to be heard.48
Emphasizing the severe hardship imposed upon wage earners by such
prejudgment garnishment and noting the special nature of wages,40 the
Court struck down the state procedure as violative of due process."0 It is
apparent in Sniadach that the procedure there could indeed "drive a wage-
earning family to the wall." 51 But there is certainly less hardship im-
posed upon the wage earner in the position of the bankrupt in Lines who
is being deprived only of his accrued vacation pay representing a small
fraction of his wages. The Court, however, makes no attempt to dis-
tinguish the compelling considerations that prompted its decision in
Sniadach from those in Lines.5"
In effect, the Court in Lines has subjected the Bankruptcy Act to the
Court's own conception of a national exemption policy with regard to
accrued vacation pay, thereby superseding applicable state exemption laws.
Moreover, by implication, no form of accrued wages would pass under
section 70a(5). This significantly overturns a long-established judicial
policy in conjunction with section 6 of the Bankruptcy Act"3 of leaving
- Ch. 507, § 1, [1965] Wis. Sess. L. -. This statute is former Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 267.18(2) (a), which was repealed and recreated by Ch. 127, § 10, [1969] Wis.
Sess. L. -. This new statute is codified as Wis. STAT. ANN. § 267.18(2) (a)
(Supp. 1970-71).
" 395 U.S. at 3,39.
"Id. at 340.
"O Id. at 342.
r" Id. at 341-42.
"The Court in Lines observed that "[w]here the minimal requirements for
the economic survival of the debtor are at stake, legislatures have recognized that
protection which may be unnecessary or unwise for other kinds of property may be
required." 400 U.S. at 20. The Court cites the Consumer Credit Protection Act
§ 301, 15 U.S.C. § 1671 (1970), as an example of such legislative recognition. 400
U.S. at 20. Section 1673 of the Consumer Credit Protection Act restricts the
garnishment of any disposable earnings of a wage-earner to the lesser amount of
twenty-five per cent of his weekly earnings or thirty times the minimum hourly
wage. Consumer Credit Protection Act § 303, 11 U.S.C. § 1673 (1970). Arguably
these restrictions on garnishment would operate to exempt from passage to the
trustee a large portion not only of a bankrupt's future wages, but also of any accrued
wages, including vacation pay. See Comment, Title to Property-Employee Bank-
rupt Vacation Pay, 45 Am. BAN R. L.J. 115, 119 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
Am. BAlxRn. L.J.]. There is nothing in the legislative history of the Consumer
Credit Protection Act, however, to suggest that Congress intended the restrictions
in section 1673 to extend beyond the creditor's remedy of garnishment.
" Bankruptcy Act § 6, 11 U.S.C. 24 (1964), provides: "This title shall not
affect the allowance to the Bankrupts of the exemptions which are prescribed by
the laws of the United States or by the State laws ...."
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the matter of exemptions exclusively to the states." The prospect of the
Court, and not the Congress, fashioning a "national, uniform exemption
policy by placing limitations on the meaning of the word 'property' as
used in section 70a(5) of the Act" 5 on a piecemeal basis is hardly ap-
pealing. Unfortunately, however, such a prospect would appear likely in
the wake of the Lines decision.
E. CADER HOWARD
Conflict of Laws-Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
in Federal Courts
In Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp.,1 a federal
court was recently called upon to decide whether to apply the state or fed-
eral rule on enforcement of foreign judgments. The court had jurisdiction
by reason of international diversity,2 held that the choice of law was
governed by Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,8 and applied the state rule.
This note will explore the issue of whether Erie should be controlling with
respect to enforcement of foreign judgments when the court has juris-
diction by reason of international, as opposed to intra-national, diversity
of citizenship.
The Somportex case has a rather complex background. Somportex
originally brought suit against Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corporation
for an alleged breach of contract. The suit was brought in England, and
the defendant was served at its offices in Pennsylvania. The defendant
made a conditional appearance in the English court and sought an order
"Am. BANxR. L.J. 117. See United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286 (1958) ;
Eaton v. Boston Trust Co., 240 U.S. 427 (1916); Dixon v. Koplar, 102 F.2d 295
(8th Cir. 1939). In the last case it was observed that
the rights of a bankrupt to property as exempt are those given him by the
state statutes; and the federal courts, sitting as courts in bankruptcy, will
determine exemptions according to those statutes, and the decisions of the
courts of last resort of the states construing and applying those statutes.
Id. at 297.
" Am. BANXa. L.J. 117.
318 F. Supp. 161 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
"The district court shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions .. .
between-(1) citizens of different States; (2) citizens of a State, and foreign states
or citizens or subjects thereof. . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1964). The first clause
provides for intra-national diversity jurisdiction, and the second for international
diversity jurisdiction.
'304 U.S. 64 (1938). In Erie, the Court held that in a diversity case a federal
court must apply the substantive law of the state in which it is sitting.
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setting aside the original writ for lack of jurisdiction,4 alleging that none
of the English grounds for extraterritorial service of process existed.
The defendant then withdrew from his own hearing and suffered a default
judgment on the issue of jurisdiction. When the defendant petitioned to
withdraw his original conditional appearance because of mistake, he won
in the lower court but lost on the plaintiff's appeal. Thereupon the de-
fendant completely withdrew from the case and suffered a default judg-
ment on the merits.' Somportex involved the plaintiff's attempt to enforce
this judgment in the federal court.
The Somportex court analyzed this situation as one in which the
default judgment was based on personal jurisdiction over the defendant
obtained through his appearance in the English court.' Therefore, the
English court's determination that the defendant made a knowing appear-
ance was given full effect.'
The court then held state law controlling as to whether reciprocity was
required for enforcement of foreign judgments,' and "found" that, were
the state court to be confronted with this problem, it would not require
reciprocityf Finding no genuine issue as to any material fact, the court
'318 F. Supp. at 162.Id. at 163.
e The court characterized the fact situation in Somportex as a hybrid of the
two usual foreign-judgment cases. The first is the case in which a defendant has
taken no action in the foreign court and is free to attack collaterally the foreign
court's determination of jurisdiction. The second arises when the defendant makes
a conditional appearance to litigate the issue of jurisdiction, loses on this issue,
and withdraws. The court reasoned that in the latter situation the jurisdictional
issue cannot be re-examined by the court asked to enforce the judgment. The
court said:
Unlike the first situation, the defendant has taken some action in England.
Philadelphia Chewing Gum entered a conditional apearance, which after
final litigation ... has since become a general appearance. However, un-
like the second situation, the defendant has not litigated the underlying
jurisdictional basis for the suit.
318 F. Supp. at 164. The court noted that "full faith and credit" would prevent
an inquiry into the issue of jurisdiction if the judgment were that of a sister state,
Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948), and that the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CoNFLICTS OF LAWS § 98 (Proposed Official Draft, May 2, 1967) called for
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. 318 F. Supp. at 164.
1 318 F. Supp. at 165. Because of some unfortunate choices on the defendant's
part, the plaintiff never had to prove even the jurisdictional aspects of his original
suit.
'In Handelsbanken v. Carlson, 258 F. Supp. 448 (D. Mass. 1966), another lower
federal court cited Erie and held that state law controlled whether a foreign judg-
ment would be enforced without reciprocity. However, in that case the state lav
concurred with the federal rule, giving the foreign judgment only prima facie weight.
' Pennsylvania had not ruled directly on the issue of whether reciprocity was
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granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.10
The court recognized that the federal rule, as stated in Hilton v.
Guyot," requires reciprocity as a condition precedent to enforcement of
foreign judgments; the United States will not enforce a foreign judgment
unless a court of the nation rendering the judgment would give like effect
to an American judgment. However, the court noted that Hilton was
decided before Erie and went on to say: "It is clear . . . that the law
governing the enforceability of foreign judgments by a federal court is the
law of the state where the court is located."'12 It does not seem entirely
"clear" that Erie requires this conclusion. Erie involved intra-national,
rather than international, diversity jurisdiction. 3 Moreover, the question
of enforcement of foreign judgments involves federal interests, and later
cases explaining Erie have tended to limit its reach in areas involving
federal interests.:4
Thus there are two important and distinct questions which the court
in Somportex could have considered but did not: first, whether Erie was
intended to apply in cases of international diversity where there is a
special federal interest involved; and second, whether enforcement of
foreign judgments is of such federal importance that it might be con-
sidered a "federal question." Although the resolution of these two issues
would involve similar considerations of the federal interest; a decision
for one or the other would bring about completely different results. If
it were found that Erie simply did not apply, the federal courts could
apply federal law but the state courts could apply different state law.
If this were held to be a federal question, then the federal decision would
be binding on the state courts as well.15
Whether Erie should have applied in Somporte% turns upon the reach
of the Erie rule and the policies behind it. At first blush, not to apply the
state law would seem to fly directly in the face of the Erie rule. In Erie,
the Court said that where jurisdiction is based on diversity, "[e]xcept in
matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the
required, so the federal court was forced to decide as it felt the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania would. Were the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to confront this
problem later and reach a different conclusion, the federal courts in Pennsylvania
would then be bound by that decision.
10318 F. Supp. at 169.
1 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
318 F. Supp. at 167.
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 65 (1938).1
"See, e.g., Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
10 C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL CouRTs § 60 (2d ed. 1970). '
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law to be applied in any case is the law of the State."" There was no
exclusion for international diversity and an examination of the policies
underlying Erie shows that such an exclusion would normally be un-
desirable." The Erie Court wanted to prevent nonresidents from having
a choice of law which they could exercise simply by bringing suit in the
most favorable forum, whether state or federal. If the court in Somportex
had not applied the state law as to reciprocity, it would have created a situa-
tion in which a nonresident could choose between a federal and state
forum and thus decide whether reciprocity would be required. 8 However,
with respect to the enforcement of foreign judgments, there may be a federal
interest sufficient to justify the application of federal law. Although in
Erie the Court felt that uniformity of the substantive law applied by
the courts located in a state was more important than national federal
uniformity,' 9 in a Somportex situation the Court might feel otherwise.
The inequities of forum shopping within a state may be outweighed by
the desire to have a uniform federal rule in international dealings.20 The
Court in Erie said that the state law "rests expressly on a local policy...
dictated by local conditions."'" A state law dealing with enforcement of
foreign judgments obviously has other than local ramifications.
Several cases decided subsequent to Erie have shed light on the
question of whether Erie should apply. Klaxon Co. 'v. Stentor Electric
Manufacturing Co., 2 cited in Somportexl, held that the federal courts
must apply state choice-of-law rules when jurisdiction is based on diversity
of citizenship. In Guaranty Trust Co. v. York24 the Court interpreted the
Erie rule very broadly and held that the federal courts in diversity cases
304 U.S. at 78.
7The fact that diversity between the parties was international rather intra-
national should not, in itself, require a different choice of law rule. In the ordinary
contracts action, as opposed to one for the enforcement of a foreign judgment, there
is no rational reason for having a different choice of law in the federal court simply
because one of the parties is an alien.
8 If the nonresident brought the suit in state court, the resident defendant could
not remove if jurisdiction was based on diversity. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1964).
19 304 U.S. at 75.
20 Reciprocity in enforcement of the judgments of the United States and a for-
eign country would best be obtained by a treaty. Then the supremacy clause of the
Constitution would require all courts in the United States to give that treaty effect.
U.S. Co Ts. art. VI. However, if state law controls both the state and federal
courts, and state laws do not require reciprocity, there will be little incentive to a
foreign country to make any such treaty.
21304 U.S. at 68.
20313 U.S. 487 (1941).
23 318 F. Supp. at 164.
2' 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
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must operate as just another court of the state in which the federal courts
are situated. Guaranty Trust introduced the "outcome-determinative" test
for deciding when state law must be applied-whenever the use of a
particular rule can significantly affect the outcome of the litigation, state
law must be applied.' Klaxon and Guaranty Trust tend to support the
proposition that Erie should apply, but later cases have defined the Erie
rule more narrowly and have expanded the situations in which federal
courts will use federal law. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Electric Cooperative' O held
that outcome is not the only consideration, and that when there is a
strong federal policy against the application of the state rule -the federal
court may apply the federal rule, even though it has an effect on the out-
come. Then, in Hanna v. Plumer,2 7 the Court held that the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure are controlling on the federal courts, even in the face
of conflicting and outcome-determinative state rules. In Hanna the Court
cited Byrd for the proposition that the Guaranty Trust outcome-deter-
minative test "was never intended to serve as a talisman,"2 and that the
choice between federal and state law can not be made by " 'litmus paper'
criterion but rather by reference to the policies underlying the Erie rule.'"
This statement and the Byrd holding (permitting the application of
outcome-determinative federal rules in some instances) indicate that in
the Court's view the Erie policies do not foreclose the application of federal
law just because to do so might encourage forum shopping between the
state and federal courts.
In Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States,"0 the Court held that federal
courts do not have to apply state law regarding liability on commercial
paper issued by the United States because, on the Clearfield facts, the
"application of state law ... would subject the rights and duties of the
United States to exceptional uncertainty,"3' and "[t]he desirability of a
uniform rule is plain."32 The jurisdiction in Clearfield was based on the
United States being a party and thus the federal interest is more readily
apparent, but Clearfield still tends to show that the Court does not mean
for Erie to apply where national uniformity is an important factor.
Therefore, if enforcement of foreign judgments were considered by the
25 Id. at 109.
2"6356 U.S. 525 (1958).
*'380 U.S. 460 (1965).8Id. at 466-67.
Id. at 467.
'° 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
'
1 Id. at 367.
82 id.
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Court to be an area of substantial federal concern, in which federal uni-
formity was an important consideration, Byrd and Clearfield could be
cited to support the contention that Erie is inapplicable in that area.
However, the fact remains that to allow federal courts to apply federal
law is an affront to the most basic policy of Erie-discouraging forum
shopping.
Finally, it must be considered whether the reciprocity issue is a federal
question. As previously noted, this inquiry involves many of the same
considerations underlying the issue of whether Erie applies at all, but it is
different in effect. If the issue of whether to require reciprocity for en-
forcement of foreign judgments is a federal question, the rule of decision
would be the same in all courts of the nation-state and federal-and
forum shopping would be eliminated entirely.
The reciprocity issue certainly does not fit the classical mold of a
federal question, since it is not controlled by the Constitution and there
is no applicable federal statute or treaty." Therefore, if federal law is to
control it must be federal common law, which the Court has applied in
several other instances. On the same day that Erie was handed down,
the Court held in Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch
Co." that federal common law must be applied to determined the rights of
two states through which an interstate stream passed. Federal common
law was used in Clearfield, in which the United States was a party and
government paper was involved. In Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson
Electric Co. 5 and Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills,"0
the Court applied federal common law in areas related to those dominated
by federal statutory law. And, in cases of admiralty and maritime law,
the Court has used federal common law to achieve uniformity8 7
The. case closest to the Somportex fact pattern in which the court
has applied federal common law is Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino.88
Therein the Court refused to be bound by Erie and made its own inter-
pretation of the "act of state" doctrine, 9 saying, "the Court did not have
" Note 20 supra. Judgment-enforcing treaties are clearly legal under interna-
tional law. France has several, though none with the United States. Lorenzen,
The Enforcement of American Judgnwnts Abroad, 29 YALE L.J. 188, 194 n.33
(1919).
304 U.S. 92 (1938).
"317 U.S. 173 (1942).
36353 U.S. 448 (1957).
"E.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 215-17 (1917).
'376 U.S. 398 (1964).
'" The "act of state" doctrine has it that "'the courts of one country will not
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rules like the act of state doctrine in mind when it decided Erie R. Co. v.
Tompkins."4 The Court also stated that "an issue concerned with a basic
choice regarding the competence and function of the Judiciary and the
National Executive in ordering our relationships with other members of
the international community must be treated exclusively as an aspect of
federal law."4' There is in this statement at least the implication that
questions concerning foreign relations are issues of federal common law.42
Arguably, Banco Nacional affords a springboard for the application of
federal common law in Somportex. The Court in Banco Nacional used
federal common law because the rule it was concerned with affected our
affairs with foreign nations, and it saw in the Constitution and federal
laws a concern for uniformity in this area.43 Somportex, too, could be
thought to have international ramifications. Encouraging nations to give
our judgments effect in their courts is a legitimate federal objective
which would be advanced by a national policy of reciprocity. In Banco
Nacional, there was no federal law directly involved nor any firm indica-
tion from Congress that federal decisions were desired in this area, but the
Court applied federal common law nevertheless.44
If the court in Somportex had considered the course indicated by
Banco Nacional, it could have decided that the issue of whether to require
reciprocity for enforcement of foreign judgments is a federal question.
The states would then be bound by the federal rule, forum shopping would
be prevented, and a uniform approach in an area of national interest would
be facilitated.
BRUCE J. DOWNEY, III
Constitutional Law-Equal Protection and Residence Requirements
The United States Supreme Court in Shapiro v. Thompson' held
that a one-year residence requirement which denied otherwise qualified
sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its own
territory."' Id. at 416.
40 376 U.S. at 425.
" Id.
"'See Comment, Federal Common Law and Article III: A Jurisdictional
Approach to Erie, 74 YATE L.J. 325 (1964).
40376 U.S. at 427 n.25.
"Id. at 416-27.
1 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
1971]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
applicants welfare benefits was unconstitutional as an impermissible
burden on interstate travel. The Court specifically left unresolved the
validity of other state residence requirements including residence for the
bar.2 Recently, however, in Keenan v. Board of Law Examiners8 a three-
judge federal court used a two-fold equal protection approach involving
"traditional" equal protection on the one hand and the Shapiro rationale
on the other to find North Carolina's one-year residence requirement for
the state bar examination unconstitutional.5 The purpose of this note
is to examine the decision in Keenan and to relate both Keenan and
Shapiro to some other North Carolina waiting periods and residence
requirements.
Keenan was a class action seeking a declaratory judgment that Rule
VI (6) of the Rules Governing Admission to the Practice of Law in North
Carolina, which required one year's residence in North Carolina prior
to the date of the bar examination, was unconstitutional., The two
successful plaintiffs were graduates of accredited law schools and had
been admitted to and had practiced before the bar in other states. Follow-
ing the order of a preliminary injunction, the North Carolina Board of
Law Examiners treated the plaintiffs' applications as though the plaintiffs
were in compliance with the residence requirements and admitted them
to the bar examination since they were otherwise qualified.8
The first standard of review used by the court9 was the "traditional"
equal protection standard which required that the distinctions drawn by
a state's classification have "some relevance to the purpose for which the
2 "We imply no view of the validity of waiting-period or residence requirements
determining eligibility to vote, eligibility for tuition-free education, to obtain a
license to practice a profession, to hunt or fish, and so forth." Id. at 638 n.21.
'317 F. Supp. 1350 (E.D.N.C. 1970).
'See text at notes 9 & 20 infra.
'Another three-judge federal court held that Georgia's one-year residence
requirement for admission to the bar was so discriminatory in light of the meager
state interest served as to deny due process and equal protection of the laws. Web-
ster v. Wofford, 39 U.S.L.W. 2382 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 31, 1970).
' Comity applicants for the bar were also required to be residents of North
Carolina for one year prior to the approval of their applications. This rule was
not challenged in Keenan but was subsequently changed to a sixty-day residence
requirement. See THE BOARD OF LAW EXAMINERS, RuLEs GOVERNING ADMISSION
TO THE PRAcTIcE OF LAW IN THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, Rule VII, § 1(4)
(1970) [hereinafter cited as LAW EXAMINERS].
"A third plaintiff failed to apply for the examination as required by another un-
challenged requirement. 317 F. Supp. at 135Z
a Id.
9 Id. at 1359. See Developments in the Law: Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L.
Rv. 1065 (1969).
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classification is made."1 0 Borrowing language from the Supreme Court
in Schware v. Bar Examiners" the court in Keenan pointed out that
[i]n licensing attorneys there is but one constitutionally permissible
state objective: the assurance that the applicant is capable and fit to
practice law and that... [w]hile a state can require high standards of
qualification... before it admits an applicant to -the bar, any qualilca-
tion must have a rational connection with the applicant's Jfitness or
capacity to practice law.12
Using this standard the court was unable to find a sufficient connection
between the reasons given for the residence requirement and "fitness or
capacity to practice law."
The first reason offered by the state in relating the rule to the proper
objective was that a residence period allowed the applicant to acquire "a
modicum of knowledge about the state's governmental structure and its
local customs."' 3 Suggesting that "legal usage and practices" are mostly
learned in active practice, the court brushed aside any relevance of
knowledge of local custom with the statement that "[n] either legal com-
petence nor ethical fitness depends upon cultural provincialism."'"
The second reason advanced by the state was that one-year local
residence gives fellow residents an opportunity "to observe the applicant
'in action' " before judging his character and moral reputation. The state
felt "that those most capable of judging and passing upon the character
of an individual are those who actually live in the community where the
1 0Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 309 (1966) (emphasis added).
12353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957).
12317 F. Supp. at 1359 (emphasis by the court). See also Konigsberg v. State
Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961).13317 F. Supp. at 1359.
1 Id. In view of the growing demand for more local control of government and
for policemen to live within their department's district, knowledge of local custom
and conditions probably has more relevance to the practice of law than the court
acknowledges. Indeed, the Hawaii Supreme Court has recently upheld a three-year
residence requirement for state legislators on these grounds and noted that at
least three states have residence requirements of five years for candidates for their
state legislatures. Hayes v. Gill, - Hawaii--, -, 473 P.2d 872, 878 (1970), appeal
dismissed as moot sub nom. Hayes v. Lieutenant Gov. of Hawaii, 91 S. Ct 1200
(1971). In another case the Supreme Court affirmed a ruling holding. Alabama's
requirement that state circuit judges reside in the circuit one year prior to their
election constitutional. Hadnot v. Amos, 320 F. Supp. 107 (M.D. Ala. 1970),
aff'd, 91 S. Ct. 1189 (1971). Nonetheless it is also true, as the court in Keenan
and the dissent in Hayes conclude, that regardless of whether or not the knowledge
is relevant, residence is not adequate as a test of whether a particular applicant
has the knowledge, 317 F. Supp. at 1359; - Hawaii at -, 473 P.2d at 884.
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applicant resides."15 The court rejected this argument and found that
there were less onerous and more effective methods of determining char-
acter. Acknowledging the nationwide investigating service of the National
Conference of Bar Examiners, and the bar examiners' power to require
the applicant's cooperation, the court concluded that a nonresident's fit-
ness to practice law "can be accurately determined in each case only by
investigation of the applicant's out of state background."1 6 Thus, since
an out-of-state background investigation would be necessary, the court
suggested that a "reasonable" fee could be charged the nonresident appli-
cant to cover the additional costs and that the date for filing applications
could be set far enough in advance of the examination to insure adequate
time for reviewY
The third reason for the one-year residence rule was that it "evidences
a bona fide intent to become a permanent resident of the community, such
permanence being desirable for an attorney."'" Here the court did not
dispute the desirability of permanence but rather discounted the value of the
requirement since "[i]n our highly mobile society, one who has lived in
a particular locale for one year may be firmly rooted in the community
or he may be ready to move on tomorrow."'
" Supplemental Memorandum for Defendant at 17.
" 317 F. Supp. at 1362. See Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117 (1961) ; Konigsberg
v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961). Viewed against the arguments of those who sug-
gest that the only purpose of such residence requirements is to protect the economic
interests of the local attorneys, the state's arguments for the rule seem even weaker.
See 317 F. Supp. at 1360 n.12; State v. Johnston, - Hawaii -, -, 456 P.2d 805,
812 (1969) (dissenting opinion); Barron, Business and Professional Licensing-
California, A Representative Example, 18 STAN. L. REv. 640 (1966); Mann, Not for
Lucre or Malice: The Southern Negro's Right to Out-of-State Counsel, 64 Nw. U.L.
REv. 143' (1969); Note, Attorneys: Interstate and Federal Practice, 80 HARv. L.
REv. 1711 (1967); Note, Admission to the Bar: By-Product of Federalism, 98 U.
PA. L. REv. 710 (1950).
"1 317 F. Supp. at 1360-61. The Board of Law Examiners has adopted both
measures. See LAw EXAMINERs Rule V, § 2 (moving filing date ahead two months
to six months before the bar examination) and Rule V, § 3 (authorizing fee).
10317 F. Supp. at 1359.
10Id. Interestingly, the best example of the problem is James Keenan, one of
the plaintiffs. After six months residence he was admitted to the bar in Texas on
May 13, 1969, but only several days later left the state to work for an OEO Office
in New Orleans. See Supplementary Memorandum for Defendant at 19. The
answer for the state is to restrain or punish those who interfere with the court
system after their admission to the bar rather than trying to anticipate which bar
applicants will become transients. See LAw EXAMINERS Rule VI(6); Mann, supra
note 16, at 154; Note, Constitutional Right to Engage an Out-of-State Attorney,
19 STAN. L. REV. 856 (1967). Sanctions against transients can be insured by
requirements of bonding and the use of long arm statutes. See, e.g., N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 85-2 (1965) (requiring bonding for resident auctioneers); N.C. GEN. STAT.
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The second standard used to review the issue of equal protection was
the more stringent rule requiring a "compelling" state interest to be shown
to justify a regulation infringing on a constitutional right.2 ° In this case
the court found that the one-year residence requirement undoubtedly
deterred attorneys from other states from exercising their right to inter-
state travel while, as noted above, it did not promote a compelling state
interest or objective.21 Indeed the residence requirement in Keenan is in
many respects a greater infringement on the right to travel than the res-
idence requirement in Shapiro. An indigent does not necessarily expect
welfare in a new state and may have other reasons for moving there which
will cause him to remain even without welfare. A lawyer on the other
hand expects to practice law and is unlikely to move to or remain where
he cannot practice.
The court in Keenan noted other residence requirements for the bar
such as residence at the time of examination, at the time of admission, or
for a short term before admission to insure personal interviews and con-
tact with the applicant, but specifically withheld an opinion as to their
validity.22 Thus the door was not completely closed on state regulation
in the form of some lesser residence requirement.
The North Carolina Board of Law Examiners meet and pass on all
of the applications during a six-to-eight-week period before the bar exam-
ination. Under their rules all applications must be complete by January
10th of the year of the examination in order that preliminary investigation
may be completed before the whole board meets.2 1 Since Keenan, a new
rule requires that a general applicant shall:
§ 84-4.1(3) (Supp. 1969) (requiring out-of-state attorneys practicing in North
Carolina to submit to service of process within the state).
-0 317 F. Supp. at 1361-62. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969);
Developments in the Law: Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1065 (1969).
211317 F. Supp. at 1361-62.
,21Id. at 1362 n.17. Residence after admission to the bar is not required by
North Carolina so it is difficult to imagine a state interest in requiring residence
at the time of admission to the bar. Residence for the bar examination or to insure
presence for interviews, in either case, serves only administrative convenience and
that only indirectly. While the Bar Examiners can clearly require in-state presence
for the exams and interviews, to require the applicant to move his residence
before he knows he will be admitted to the bar is an intolerable burden on the
applicant when compared to the meager benefit to the state. One plaintiff in
Keenan suggested that the rule requiring residence but not permitting the practice
of law was a burden not only on his family but also on his future clients. The am-
biguity of insuring the quality of attorneys in this fashion does not seem to have
occurred to the Law Examiners. Affidavit of Loren Mitchell, Plaintiff's Exhibit E.
"Supplemental Memorandum for Defendant at 11.
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Be and continuously have been domiciled and physically present in the
State of North Carolina from the 15th day of June to the 15th day of
August of the year in which the applicant takes the bar examination. 24
Obviously the Board wants the applicants available for interviews during
final consideration of their applications, and the rule is written strictly to
impress upon the applicant the importance of the interview. But while
the harshness of the rule is mitigated by the fact that those taking the bar
examination will probably be in North Carolina anyway, attending a
bar review course which begins the first week in June, the rule would
seem clearly unconstitutional. Mere domicile and presence within the state
does not necessarily make one more accessible to the Board of Examiners.
An applicant from South Hill, Virginia, is more accessible than one who
lives on the Outer Banks of North Carolina. Furthermore, no legitimate
state interest is served by preventing, for example, weekend trips to Myrtle
Beach, South Carolina. A more reasonable interpretation of the rule
would be that the Board will require the applicant to be physically avail-
able at specific times and will send notice to an in-state location where
the applicant is to be "constructively" present for the entire review period.
Whatever the Board's intent the rule should be rewritten to make its
meaning clear to all bar applicants.
Residence requirements for other professions are as suspect as those
for the bar. North Carolina, for example, has a one-year residence re-
quirement before one can take the examination administered by the Board
of Certified Public Accountant Examiners." As in all occupational
licensing, the state's interest in licensing accountants is in protecting the
public by certifying those with the "capacity and fitness" to practice as an
accountant.26 The residence requirement for accountants, like the residence
requirement for the bar, does not test the applicant's "capacity or fitness"
to practice. Indeed the Florida Supreme Court has already struck down
a similar residence requirement for public accountants in that state. 7
"'LAW EXAMINERS Rule VI (6) (emphasis added). The rule for comity appli-
cants requires only continuous residence and bona fide citizenship. LAW EXAM-
iNwEs Rule VII (4).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. §93-12(5) (1965). North Carolina also has a tvo-year
residence requirement for auctioneers, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 85-2 (1965), and a one-
year requirement for bail bondsmen, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 85A-11 (1965). Other res-
idence requirements for other occupational licenses are not statutory, but, like the
bar requirement, are set by the licensing boards.
"
6See COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING LEGISLA-
TION IN THE STATES 1-4 (1952); W. HoRowiTz, OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING IN
ARIZONA 7-10 (1966).
"'Mercer v. Hemmings, 194 So. 2d 579 (Fla. 1967) (two-year requirement).
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Other residence requirements for occupational licenses have the same
failings and should continue to be struck down.28
Most other state residence requirements are designed to prevent over-
loading of state programs by an influx of out-of-state residents. North
Carolina, for example, formerly imposed a four-month residence require-
ment before a woman could obtain a therapeutic abortionse apparently to
prevent the overloading of its hospitals. Since the Supreme Court in
Shapiro said that "a State may no more try to fence out those indigents
who seek higher welfare benefits than it may try to fence out indigents
generally,"'2 it would seem that a state cannot discriminate against those
who may have entered the state for the public benefits it offers. Indeed,
the recent decision in Corkey v. Edwards,"1 striking down the residence
requirement of the North Carolina abortion statute, pointed out that it
was an undue infringement on the right to travel that penalized those
with the bona fide intent of making the state their permanent residence,
which effect was not outweighed by a legitimate state interest. The de-
cision in Corkey was influenced by the realization that the state's abortion
statute, while being progressive, would still not draw a large number of
out-of-state patients. 2 It is nonetheless consistent with the declaration
in Shapiro that "deterrence of indigents from migrating to the state...
is [not] a constitutionally permissible state objective.""8
As state welfare benefits continue to improve at different rates and
2" State ex: rel. James v. Gerrell, 137 Fla. 324, 188 So. 812 (1939) (striking
down requirement for auctioneers); Wormsen v. Moss, 177 Misc. 19, 29 N.Y.S.2d
798 (Sup. Ct. 1941) (striking down requirement for massage parlor operators).2 8N.C. GuN. STAT. § 14-45.1 (1969).
80 394 U.S. at 631.
81322 F. Supp. 1248 (W.D.N.C. 1971).
,
2
"The state expresses a fear that has not materialized: taxation of our hospital
facilities by an influx of out-of-state patients seeking abortions. We think our law
is not so liberal." Id. at 1254. There was, however, a very liberal abortion statute
before the state legislature which would have permitted termination of pregnancy
during the first twelve weeks of pregnancy on request of the mother. The proposed
statute would have required the mother to have been a resident for thirty days before
the abortion, thereby precluding those who might have come to the state for the sole
purpose of obtaining an abortion. H. 5 (1971 Sess.) (now tabled in the Senate).
This statute would have been liberal enough to draw sufficient numbers of patients
to overburden the state's hospital facilities, in addition to adversely affecting the
abortion policies of neighboring states. The state's interests in this residence
requirement were greater than in Corkey but the statute would still have unreason-
ably discriminated against new bona fide residents as does a proposed thirty-day
residence requirement offered to replace the one struck down in Corkey. H. 626
(1971 Sess.).
" 394 U.S. at 633.
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residence requirements for different programs are struck down,8 4 the prob-
lem of new residents overloading welfare systems will continue to grow.
However, as long as the Court is willing to sustain its declaration in
Shapiro, states will have to find methods for reducing the burden other
than by imposing durational residence requirements. s 5
Another state program which has durational residence requirements
is higher education. The University of North Carolina, for example,
requires six-months residence preceding enrollment to entitle a student to
the lower in-state tuition rate."' The state's interest is to protect its
facilities from an influx of nonresidents attracted by the low tuition
costs." Here again the problem with the durational residence requirement
is that it discriminates against those residents who enter the state with
the bona fide intent of making the state their permanent residence. In
several states this discrimination is limited to one year after which the
student may present evidence that he is a bona fide resident. " In North
Carolina, however, the student must prove six-months residence "pre-
ceding the date of enrollment or re-enrollment, exclusive of any time spent
in attendance at any institution of higher education.""0
"Programs for which durational residence requirements have been struck down
include: King v. Housing Auth., 314 F. Supp. 427 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) and Cole v.
Housing Auth., 312 F. Supp. 692 (D.R.I. 1970) (public housing); Richardson v.
Graham, 313 F. Supp. 34 (D. Ariz. 1970) and Sheard v. Department of Social
Welfare, 310 F., Supp. 544 (N.D. Iowa 1969) (old age benefits); Crapps v.
Hospital Auth., 314 F. Supp. 181 (M.D. Fla. 1970) and Board of Supervisors v.
Robinson, 10 Ariz. App. 238, 457 P.2d 951 (1969) (indigent hospital care).
" The Governor of New York recently asked that state's legislature to enact
a-one-year residence requirement for welfare benefits which would be effective only
during a five-year "emergency" period. The Governor, recognizing the Supreme
Court ruling in Shapiro, asserted that the conditions that now exist in that state,
which has the highest tax burden in the country and an acute housing shortage,
constitute a "compelling" state interest for the imposition of such a requirement.
He concluded that "[t]his step is essential to protect the state's economic and
social viability." N.Y. Times, Mar. 28, 1971, § 1, at 1, col. 1.
" RECORD OF THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA AT CHAPEL HILL, SCHOOL
OF LAW 18-19 (1970) [hereinafter cited as RECORD].
"' For example, tuition for the Law School is 112.50 dollars per semester for
residents and 475 dollars per semester for nonresidents. Id. at 18.
" See Kirk v. Board of Regents, 273 Cal. App. 2d 430, -, 78 Cal. Rptr. 260,
267 (1969), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 554 (1970); CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 124-18-3 (Supp. 1967); Comment, Residency, Tuition, and the Twelve-Month
Dilemnma, 7 HousToN L. REv. 241 (1969). But see Comment, Nonresident Tuition
Charged By State Universities in Review, 38 U.M.K.C.L. REV. 341 (1970).
" RECORD 19 (emphasis added). This rule applies to students over twenty-one.
Under this rule one who comes to the state to attend Duke University undergrad-
uate and law schools would still be considered a nonresident for tuition purposes
if he then entered graduate school at the state university even though he had been
a resident of North Carolina for seven years. There is a different set of rules for
minors. Id. at 18.
[Vol. 49
RESIDENCE REQUIREMENTS 7
Since the state's main bulwark against an influx of nonresidents is
to impose quotas on nonresident students by a set percentage, or to enforce
higher admission standards for such students, it is hard to justify the
strictness of the North Carolina rule. In fact courts have generally looked
with disfavor on this kind of rule. In Newman v. Graham40 the Idaho
Court of Appeals struck down a rule nearly identical to North Carolina's
as arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable.4 While one court may have
ruled out any durational requirement for in-state tuition,4" the Supreme
Court has summarily affirmed a district court decision upholding the
residence requirement at the University of Minnesota." This rule
required one-year in-state residence to qualify for the lower tuition rate,
but did not preclude a student from attaining resident status while attend-
ing school.44 Another court has justified such a rule on the grounds that
it is a "reasonable attempt to achieve a partial cost equalization by col-
lecting lower tuition fees from those persons who, directly or indirectly,
have recently made some contribution to the economy of the state. . .."'5
However, if the holding in Shapiro that state benefits cannot be appor-
tioned on the basis of the individual's tax contribution to the state is to
be upheld,46 a durational residence requirement for tuition purposes is
difficult to justify.47
" 82 Idaho 90, 349 P.2d 716 (Ct. App. 1960).
" Id. at 95, 349 P.2d at 719. But see Landwehr v. Board of Regents, 156 Colo.
1, 396 P.2d 451 (1964). Landwehr is probably distinguishable since the plaintiff was
challenging the statute in an action for back tuition after he had already com-
pleted school.
'Unreported lower court decision in Arizona.
,Starns v. Malkerson, 91, S. Ct. 1231 (1971).
"The completion of a year's stay in Minnesota does not in and of itself estab-
lish residence for University purposes; a person who moves to Minnesota
coincident with attending school may not be able to demonstrate that he is
acquiring Minnesota residence.
The student from out of state who proposes to establish residence must
assume the burden of proving conclusively that he has been'a resident the
required time and intends to make his permanent home in the state.
UNIVERSTY OF MINNESOTA, DULUTH BULLITIN, June 30, 1970, at 29.
" Kirk v. Board of Regents, 273 Cal. App. 2d 430, -, 78 Cal. Reptr. 260, 269
(1969), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 554 (1970).
46 394 U.S. at 632.
"Indeed the Supreme Court appeared to speak directly to the North Carolina
situation when it said that there is "[n] o need for a state to use the one-year waiting
period as a safeguard against fraudulent receipt of benefits; for less' drastic means
are available and are employed, to minimize that hazard." 394 U.S. at 637. The
lack of a reported opinion in Starns 'makes it difficult to distinguish it from Shapiro.
A better solution would be to make nonresidence a rebuttable presumption. That
is, all newcomers to the state are presumed nonresidents for a period of time
unless otherwise shown to be residents. See Clark v. Redeker, 259 F. Supp. 117
(S.D. Iowa 1966). The problem with this kind of provision is that rebuttal often
1971] 61,
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The one area where residence requirements have been recognized as
relevant to the state's interests is in voting requirements. North Carolina,
for example, requires one year's residence in the state and thirty days in
the precinct preceding an election.48 Such a rule seems relevant to the pur-
poses of identifying the voter, protecting against fraud, and insuring that
the voter " '[w] ill in fact become a member of the community and as such
have a common interest in all matters pertaining to its government.' ,40
Maryland's similar requirements have so been sustained by a three judge
federal court. ° Since Shapiro and other challenges to residence require-
ments, however, such residence requirements have come under even greater
challenge. At least three courts have held that a rule setting different
requirements for interstate travelers discriminates against the interstate
travelers and therefore is unconstitutional.51 One who moves from Char-
lotte, North Carolina, to Raleigh, North Carolina, will not necessarily
understand local conditions faster than someone who moves to Raleigh
from Richmond, Virginia.5 2 Accordingly, those legitimate state interests
which are served by a residence requirement for voting can be served as
well by. a uniform requirement which does not discriminate against the
individual who moves across a state line. 8
Durational residence requirements seek to forecast future behavior on
the basis of past residence alone; yet as to this objective, they are highly
inaccurate and tend only to penalize the new bona fide permanent resident.
becomes a mere test of the applicant's ingenuity in finding ways to demonstrate
residence.
N8 .C. GENI. STAT. § 163-55 (Supp. 1970).
4 9Drueding v. Devlin, 234 F. Supp. 721, 724 (D. Md. 1964).
1Id.
Hadnot v. Amos, 320 F. Supp. 107 (M.D. Ala. 1970), aff'd, 39 U.S.L.W.
3413 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1971); Ellington v. Blumstein, - F. Supp. - (M.D. Tenn.
Sept. 9, 1970), jurisdiction noted, 91 S. Ct. 920 (1971). Canniffe v. Burg, 315
F. Supp. 380 (D. Mass. 1970), appeal filed, 39 U.S.L.W. 3229 (U.S. Oct. 6,
1970) (No. 811). Contra, Fitzpatrick v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 39 U.S.L.W.
2356 (N.D. II. Dec. 15, 1970), appeal filed, 39 U.S.L.W. 3362 (U.S. Feb. 12,
1971) (No. 1344). Compare Kohn v. Davis, 320 F. Supp. 246 (D. Vt. 1970),
appeal filed, 39 U.S.L.W. 3347 (U.S. Feb. 10, 1971) (No. 1336) (striking down
Vermont's one-year residence requirement for voting), and Bufford v. Holton,
319 F. Supp. 843 (E.D. Va.), appeal filed, 39 U.S.L.W. 3.333 (U.S. Jan. 25, 1970)(No. 1270) (holding Virginia's one-year residence requirement for voting un-
constitutional), with Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621 (1904) (upholding the con-
stitutionality of Maryland's one-year residence requirement for voting), and
Cocanower v. Marston, 318 F. Supp. 402 (D. Ariz.), appeal filed, 39 U.S.L.W.
3229 (U.S. Oct. 3, 1970) (No. 799) (upholding Arizona's one-year residence re-
quirement for voting).
" See 317 F. Supp. at 1359 & note 14 smpra.
"ee Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
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In light of the decisions in Shapiro and Keenan and the questions raised
therein, the states should re-examine all of their residence requirements,
especially those for professional licenses, to insure that they protect not
only legitimate state interests but also the rights of new residents.
ANTHONY B. LAMB
Constitutional Law-Prejudgment Attachment and Garnishment-
The Progeny of the Sniadach-Kelly Marriage
In the summer of 1969, the Supreme Court held in Sniadach v. Family
Finance Corp.1 that a prejudgment garnishment of wages under the facts
involved in the case constituted a taking of property without due process
of law unless the wage earner was afforded a hearing prior to the garnish-
ment. The Wisconsin garnishment procedure involved in Sniadach en-
titled one with a claim against a wage earner to a court order freezing
one half of the worker's wages until the merits of the claim could be
litigated.2 Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for the Court, stated that
"[s]uch summary procedure may well meet the requirements of due
process in extraordinary situations .... But in the present case no situa-
tion requiring special protection to a state or creditor interest is presented
by the facts .... -" The opinion noted that "[w] e deal here with wages
-a specialized type of property presenting distinct problems in our
economic system," 4 stressed the serious harm that wage garnishment could
cause, and concluded that the Wisconsin garnishment procedure and others
like it "may as a practical matter drive a wage-earning family to the
wall."
1395 U.S. 337 (1969).
- The statutes involved in Sniadach were Ch. 507, [1965] Wis. Sess. L. - which
were codified as Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 267.01-.24 (Supp. 1969). These statutes have
been amended and are presently codified as Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 267.01-.24 (Supp.
1970).
' Id. at 339. As examples of "extraordinary circumstances" which would justify
summary procedures, Justice Douglas cited Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc.,
339 U.S. 594 (1950) (federal statute authorizing seizure of misbranded articles
without a prior hearing); Fahey v. Mallonee, 3,32 U.S. 245 (1947) (appointment
of a conservator to take possession of a federal savings and loan association prior
to a hearing); Coffin Bros. v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29 (1928) (state statute autho-
rizing prejudgment liens on the property of stockholders of insolvent banks);
Owenby v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921) (state statute conditioning the opportunity
to appear and defend in foreign attachment proceedings upon the posting of a
bond).
'Id. at 340.Id. at 341-42.
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The vagueness of the Sniadach opinion and the summary fashion in
which Justice Douglas disposed of the problem have resulted in con-
fusion and disagreement among courts and legal commentators. Some have
argued that because of the opinion's pointed emphasis on the damaging
effects of wage garnishment and its repeated references to the possibilities
of abuse of summary garnishment procedures, the decision was in reality
based on substantive due process grounds.6 Others have contended that
since only the wages of the poor are subjected to garnishment, the opinion
must have been based in part upon the equal protection clause.7 There
is also disagreement as to the scope of Sniadach, some asserting that
Justice Douglas limited application of the decision exclusively to wage
garnishment8 and others arguing that the characterization of wages as a
"specialized type of property" was not intended to limit the scope of the
decision,9
Much of the confusion and disagreement attributable to the Sniadach
opinion can be resolved by superimposing on Justice Douglas' rather
cryptic language traditional constitutional principles developed to deal with
procedural due process problems. The Court restated and summarized
these principals in Goldberg v. Kelly,10 decided after Sniadach. Consider-
ing the question of whether due process required a hearing prior to the
termination of welfare benefits, Mr. Justice Brennan said:
The extent to which procedural due process must be afforded the
recipient is influenced by the extent to which he may be "condemned
to suffer grievous loss" . . . and depends upon whether the recipient's
interest in avoiding that loss outweighs the governmental interest in
summary adjudication."'
Thus, resolution of due process problems ordinarily requires a weighing of
the harm caused to the individual by the challenged procedure against the
"interest of society served by quick and decisive action."'"
8 E.g., id. at 345 (Black, J., dissenting).
'E.g., Note, Some Implications of Sniadach, 70 CoLUm. L. Rav. 942, 954(1970).
'E.g., Termplan Inc. v. Superior Court; 105 Ariz. 270, -, 463 P.2d 68, 70(1969).
'E.g., Larson v. Fetherston, 44 Wis. 2d 712, 718, 172 N.W.2d 20, 23 (1969).
10397 U.S. 254 (1970).
1 1Id. at 262-63, quoting Joint Anti-Facist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S.
123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). For examples of other cases em-
ploying similar language see Cafeteria Workers, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S.
886, 895 (1961) ; Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 363 (1959) ; Wasson v. Trow-
bridge, 382 F.2d 807, 811 (2d Cir. 1967).
" Hall v. Garson, 430 F.2d 430, 440 (5th Cir. 1970).
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In Sniadach, Justice Douglas followed this traditional approach al-
though he failed to articulate adequately the balancing test and to consider
fully each of the test's components. The opinion vividly demonstrated
that summary garnishment procedures might cause the wage earner to
be deprived of the essentials of life on the basis of an invalid claim, result-
ing perhaps in capitulation to the claim in order to survive. And this
harm directly results from the peculiar attributes of wages-the fact that
wages are generally used for present consumption. The opinion, how-
ever, failed to weigh against this harm to the wage earner any interests
which the state might have in summary wage garnishment.'" This failure
is perhaps due to Justice Douglas' tacit assumption that the harm was so
great that it could be outweighed only in the extraordinary situations
which he mentioned.'" At any rate, Sniadach represents neither a break
with long-established constitutional principles nor a rejection of the pro-
cedural due process balancing test. Instead, it adopts and applies that test,
although it does so inartfully.
Klim v. Jones,5 a recent example of the application of Sniadach in
a non-wage context, demonstrates more fully the operation of the balancing
test. The statutory procedure involved in the case granted to innkeepers
liens upon the personal property of tenants who failed to pay their rent and
authorized self-help tactics in seizing the property subject to the lien.'5
Pursuant to this law Jones seized Klim's belongings, including clothes,
tools, and identification papers. Klim filed a complaint seeking a declara-
tion that the law was unconstitutional, an injunction against enforcement
of the law, a return of the seized property, and certain damages. In
" One writer has suggested that the public interests in summary garnishment
statutes are (1) ensuring that valid claims will be collectible and (2) promoting
the extension of credit. He contends, however, that this second interest must be
discounted by the risk of encouraging, through facile collection devices, unwise
credit extension. Note, Attachment and Garnishment-Constitutionat Law-Due
Process of Law--Garnishment of Wages Prior to Judgment Is a Denial of Due
Process: The Sniadach Case and Its Implications for Related Areas of the Law,
68 MicH. L. REv. 986, 996-97 (1970). Unless otherwise stated, this note will
proceed on the theory that such are the public interests in all attachment and
garnishment statutes.
x, Id. at 997-98. See note 3 supra.
10315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
C0 GAL. Civ. CoDE § 1861 (West Supp. 1971). Arguably this statute and many
prehearing attachment statutes authorize constitutionally impermissible searches and
seizures. Compare Fuentes v. Faircloth, 317 F. Supp. 954 (S.D. Fla. 1970), with
Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970). In
Fuentes motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis has been granted and prob-
able jurisdiction noted. 91 S. Ct. 893 (1971). The search and seizure issue, how-
ever, is beyond the scope of this note and will receive no 'further consideration.
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granting plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the constitutional
issue, the court concluded that the lien statute imposed even greater
economic hardships than prejudgment wage garnishment. And the court
found no public interest in the summary procedure sufficient to outweigh
those hardships. The interest offered to justify the law-the use of the
lien to obtain in personam jurisdiction over transient tenants-was dis-
counted by the court because the threat of the lien provided no "iron-clad
safeguard for the California proprietor"17 against absconding tenants
and because "the danger of a non-paying transient leaving the state just
to avoid a lodging bill does not seem to be at all common"18 since many
of the establishments employing the lien device catered to lodgers who
stayed for significant periods of time. Furthermore, the court noted that
it was not abolishing the innkeeper's lien altogether but was only re-
quiring certain procedural safeguards in its use, and that the innkeeper
had an alternative protective device available-advance payment.
The due process balancing test worked exceptionally well in Klim
and resulted in a holding which seems unquestionably correct. Two other
recent cases, however, provide examples of situations where the balancing
test operates much less smoothly. In Fuentes v. Faircloth0 and Laprease
v. Raymours Furniture Co.,"0 the statutes under consideration entitled a
plaintiff in a replevin action to a writ of replevin and seizure of the
subject matter of the suit without any prior notice to the defendant and
without a hearing before the seizure."' In Fuentes a stove and a stereo set
had been seized and in Laprease the seized property included a stove, a
refrigerator, a bed, a rug, and a record player. In both cases the mer-
chandise had been purchased under conditional sales contracts.
The three-judge court in Fuentes held that the replevin procedure
comported with the requirements of due process. The court seemed to
base its holding on two alternative grounds: first, that the balancing test
of Sniadach and Kelly did not apply since the wage garnishment and
welfare situations "[are] not at all comparable to a private contract
providing for enforcement of a security interest" ;22 and second, that even
if the balancing test did apply "[t] he hardships facing the welfare recipient,
17315 F. Supp. at 124.
Is Id.
I 8317 F. Supp. 954 (S.D. Fla. 1970).
"315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970).
2The statutes involved in Fuentes were FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 78.01, .04, .07, .08
(Supp. 1971). The statute involved in Laprease was N.Y. Civ. P Ac. LAW
§§7101-02 (McKinney 1963).
2 317 F. Supp. at 958.
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like those facing one whose wages are garnished, are not present in the
instant situation where goods purchased are replevied."'
The three-judge court in Laprease reached exactly the opposite result.
The opinion stated that the factual difference between Sniadach and the
case under consideration-that one dealt with an unsecured interest while
the other involved a secured interest-"dissolves before the purchasers'
claims that there were no defaults and no right to repossession." '
Applying the balancing test, the court concluded that "[1] ack of refrigera-
tion, cooking facilities and beds create hardships . . . equally as severe
as the temporary withholding of [one-half] of Sniadach' s pay,""2 and that
no counterbalancing public interest in the summary procedure existed. 6
Neither Fuentes nor Laprease appears to be precisely correct. The
suggestion in Fuentes that the presence of a security interest will remove
a case from the operation of the Sniadach-Kelly balancing approach is
without justification. As the dissenting judge in the case noted, "when
one signs a contract which includes the words 'in the event of default of
any payment or payments, seller at its option may take back the mer-
chandise,' he does not waive his Fourteenth Amendment right to 'due
process of law.' "27 The Fuentes court likewise erred when it concluded
that seizure of the stove presented no hardships comparable to those
suffered by the plaintiffs in Sniadach and Kelly. The loss of an appliance
as necessary as a stove for the preparation of food can produce harm quite
as serious as the loss of one-half of one's wages or the loss of welfare
benefits. At any rate, since the loss of the stove obviously produced some
harm, the question with which the court should have concerned itself was
whether that harm was outweighed by the public interest in the summary
procedure.
The Laprease court avoided the errors discussed above but became so
immersed in the question of whether the replevin of essential items like
stoves, beds, etc., violated due process that it overlooked the fact that the
propriety of the summary seizure of such non-essential items as a rug
and a phonograph was at issue as well. Loss of a phonograph or a rug
causes harm much less severe than that caused by the loss of a stove or
refrigerator, and, had the court applied the due process balancing test
to the seizure of the non-essential items, it might have concluded that the
31d.
2"315 F. Supp. at 723.
2r Id. at 723-24.
.'Id. at 723.
S317 F. Supp. at 959 (Eaton, J., dissenting).
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summary procedure as applied to those items was constitutionally per-
missible.
The Fueutes and Laprease opinions, with all their imperfections,
and the Klim decision demonstrate many of the problems with the
Sniadach-Kelly balancing approach."' One of the most serious of these
problems is that where the public interest in a summary procedure and the
harm precipitated by the procedure appear to be nearly evenly balanced,
as where non-essential items are replevied without a prior hearing, any
conclusion as to which interest preponderates is no more than a highly
subjective value judgment. Not only is this intellectually unsatisfying; it
also militates against any certainty in the law on procedural due process
questions.
Most of the other problems with the due process balancing test stem
from the fact that the test must be applied on a case-to-case basis. The
type of property involved as well as the individual circumstances of the
person whose property is summarily interfered with must be considered
before any balancing can take place. This means that any procedure
authorizing interference with one's property without the normal due
process safeguards will be open to attack in every case where the procedure
is employed, and that no amount of case law can limit these attacks since
the property owner in every instance can argue that his is a special case.
It also means that state legislators will find it most difficult, if not im-
possible, to draft statutes authorizing summary attachment or garnishment
procedures which will pass muster under the balancing approach.2 9
Notwithstanding these difficulties, there is no reason to believe that
the Supreme Court will discard or modify the due process balancing test.
It is too well grounded in precedent and too well suited to the recognition
of the competing interests involved in due process questions to be tossed
aside. Prognostication in this area is wholly speculative but it is not
altogether unreasonable in this day of consumer protection to wonder if
2 One initial problem with the balancing approach is that it does not answer the
question of what type of hearing, if any, must be granted prior to the seizure. Con-
siderable controversy over this question existed after Sniadach. See, e.g., Note,
Poverty Law.-Garnishment-Protection of Debtors' Rights, 48 N.C.L. Rav. 164,
170-71 (1969). Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), seems to have resolved
this controversy by requiring that the hearing determine only the probable validity
of the claim. Id. at 266-67.
9 This problem will become especially acute if-as suggested in Sidadach, 395
U.S. at 339, and in Laprease, 315 F. Supp. at 723-any statute not narrowly drawn
to meet situations where the public interest outweighs the individual harm will be
held impermissible.
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legislatures, perhaps with a shove from the courts, might not abolish pre-
hearing attachment and garnishment procedures altogether or at least
limit their use to the "extraordinary situations" referred to in Sniadch.8"
FrED H. MooDY, JR.
Constitutional Law-Racial Imbalance in Public Schools:
The Affirmative Duty to Integrate Administrators
On May 28, 1968, the Board of Education of Newark, New Jersey
voted to invalidate a promotional list which was formerly the sole criterion
in the appointment of grade-school administrators.1 The action by the
Board of Education admittedly was motivated by a desire to promote
racial balance in the school system.2 The Negro student population in
Newark was 72.5 %, yet there were only two Negroes on the promotional
list.S Moreover, of 249 administrators in the city school system, only
twenty-seven were Negro.4 In lieu of appointments from the list, the
Board of Education appointed seven new grade-school administrators-
six Negro and one white.' As a result, ten white teachers' brought a
suit seeking money damages and injunctive relief under the fourteenth
amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1964.7 The principal issue raised
" See note 3 supra.
The contract entered into between the plaintiffs and the defendant on Feb-
ruary 1, 1967 reads in part:
The positions of principal, vice principal, head teacher, department chair-
man and counsellor shall be filled in order of numerical ranking from the
appropriate list, which ranking shall be determined by written and oral exam-
ination. Appointments to the position of teacher to assist the principal
(formerly called Administrative Assistant) shall be made annually on a
temporary basis if the Superintendent determines that such a position is
necessary or desirable, and all appointments to such positions shall be made
in order of numerical ranking from the appropriate vice principal's list if
such list exists.
Porcelli v. Titus, 431 F.2d 1254, 1256 n.2 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 39 U.S.L.W.
3486 (U.S. May 4, 1971) (No. 850).
- Record at 89, 95, 98, Porcelli v. Titus, 302 F. Supp. 726 (D.N.J. 1969).
Porcelli v. Titus, 431 F.2d 1254, 1255-56 (3d Cir. 1970).
&Id.
Id. at 1256 n.3. Since the purpose in deviating from the list was to promote
racial balance, it is curious that the Board of Education chose to make a white
appointment. No particular reason can be discovered.
'Four of the plaintiffs-Hickey, Dunne, LaRusso, and Chagnon-had taken
only the first of two stages of the examination to qualify for the list when the list
was suspended. 302 F. Supp. at 728 n.1.
742 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964). The provision reads:
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by the complaint was the constitutional limitation on the power of a state
agency to consider color in the selection and promotion of its employees.
The district court in New Jersey dismissed the complaint,' and the Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in Porcelli v. Titus, affirmed per curiam.0
Several federal court decisions have held that the mandate of Brown
v. Board of Education0 applies not only to the integration of students in
the public schools, but also to the integration of faculties11 within both a
single school and a school system, and of administrators' within a system.
In those cases, however, the courts have reasoned that the duty to integrate
arises upon a showing of past, intentional discrimination. In Porcelli the
dispute arose in the absence of proof of past, intentional discrimination,
and that absence was noted by the district court.' Nevertheless, in Porcelli
the court found a duty to integrate even if the existing imbalance was not
the result of prior discrimination.
It would therefore seem that the Boards of Education have a very
definite duty to integrate school faculties[,] and to permit a great im-
balance in faculties-as obtained on August 22, 1968, when a new plan
was proposed to the school board in Newark for the increasing of
qualified Negro administrators-would be in negation of the Four-
teenth Amendment to the Constitution and the line of cases which have
followed Brown v. Board of Education .... 14
The question of whether there is a duty in this particular situation is one
of first impression and should be examined.
The public schools, at least since Brown, have been recognized as a
peculiar area of governmental interest, and it follows that decisions in-
volving public schools will focus primarily on the effect of a particular
situation on the schools themselves. This approach finds support in the
following language:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any state or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.8 Porcelli v. Titus, 302 F. Supp. 726 (D.N.J. 1969).
9 Porcelli v. Titus, 431 F.2d 1254 (3d Cir. 1970). On May 4, 1971, the Supreme
Court denied certiorari. 39 U.S.L.W. 3486 (U.S. May 4, 1971) (No. 850).
10347 U.S. 483 (1954).
1 Smith v. Board of Educ., 365 F.2d 770 (8th Cir. 1966).
"See, e.g., Hobson v. Hanson, 269 F. Supp. 401, 429-30 (D.D.C. 1967).
"302 F. Supp. at 736.
14431 F.2d at 1257-58 (emphasis added).
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The public schools were not created, nor are they supported, for the
benefit of the teachers therein, as implied by the contention of the
appellant, but for the benefit of the pupils, and the resulting benefit
to the parents and the community at large.15
Therefore, it is appropriate to direct any examination towards the cases
in the Brown line rather than to the general run of equal employment
cases. 6 Since there have previously been no cases finding a duty to remedy
imbalance among school administrators in the absence of past discrim-
ination, the most pertinent cases are those dealing with the integration of
pupils.
There are numerous opinions indicating that schools need not be
found guilty of intentional racial discrimination before being subject to
a constitutional duty to take affirmative action to relieve the racial im-
balance.1 7 Typical of such decisions are those cases in which the courts
have been asked to resolve disputes arising from systems of neighborhood
schools.18 Perhaps the leading case in which the court found a duty to take
affirmative action is Barksdale v. Springfield School Committee.'9 In
Barksdale, the neighborhoods designated to attend particular schools were,
by chance, divided into black and white. The Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit agreed with the defendant's contention that the resulting
segregation was unintentional, yet rejected the argument that there was
therefore no duty on the part of the School Committee to correct this segre-
gated school situation. As in Porcelli, it was clear that racial imbalance
did exist, and that it was the ekistence of the imbalance, not the manner
in which it came about, which was constitutionally impermissible. Speak-
ing directly to the point of intentional discrimination, the court noted
that "[e]ducation is tax supported and compulsory, and public school
educators, therefore, must deal with inadequacies within the educational
"5 Bates v. Board of Educ., 139 Cal. 145, 148, 72 P. 907, 908 (1903).
" The major distinction between employment cases which involve schools and
those which do not is that in the school cases the court must consider not only the
parties but also the effect of its decision on the children in the school. In addition,
the history of equal employment legislation shows no anticipation of a situation
such as the one in Porcelli. See Quarles v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505
(E.D. Va. 1968).
"
TSee, e.g., Blocker v. Board of Educ., 226 F. Supp. 208 (E.D.N.Y. 1964);
Branche v. Board of Educ., 204 F. Supp. 150 (E.D.N.Y. 1962).
8 neighborhood school system is one in which the Board of Education divides
the city into school districts, and the students living within a district must attend
the school within that district.
1 237 F. Supp. 543 (D. Mass), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 348
F.2d 261 (1st Cir. 1965).
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system as they arise, and it matters not that the inadequacies are not of
their making."2 Other courts considering the same question have placed
particular emphasis on the public nature of state-supported schools, stress-
ing that they are supported with tax dollars,21 and have couched their
arguments in terms of the impermissibility of tolerating what is clearly
racial imbalance.
22
There is, of course, an opposing point of view on the necessity of
proving past discrimination before arriving at a duty to remedy it.28 This
position, concisely stated, is that if racial imbalance exists by mere chance,
the state is under no duty to remedy it. One of the most articulate explana-
tions of this position is found in Deal v. Cincinnati Board of Education.24
The court in Deal initially found, as a matter of law, that in the absence
of intentional action on the part of the state the fourteenth amendment
does not afford relief.25 The court went on to hold that
a showing of harm alone is not enough to invoke the remedial powers
of the law. If the state or any of its agencies has not adopted im-
permissible racial criteria in its treatment of individuals, then there
is no violation of the Constitution. If factors outside the schools
operate to deprive some children of some of the existing choices, the
school board is certainly not responsible thereafter 2 6
Although the court in Porcelli failed to discuss any of these competing
considerations, it is evident that the Barksdale position is now accepted by
the third circuit.
Clearly, this position in Deal is irreconcilable with the Barksdale
position. Until the United States Supreme Court chooses to rule on the
subject, the conflict among the circuits is unlikely to be resolved, with
the result that the same suit would succeed in one jurisdiction and fail
in another. Yet it appears that the Barksdale approach finds more support
in recent interpretations of Brozwn. In Kemp v. Beasley, 7 the eight cir-
cuit viewed the courts' role in school integration cases as being unique.
The court in Kemp reasoned that in the normal case the court must balance
2*237 F. Supp. at 544.21 Branche v. Board of Educ., 204 F. Supp. 150, 153 (E.D.N.Y. 1962).
Blocker v. Board of Educ., 226 F. Supp. 208, 222 (E.D.N.Y. 1964).
"See, e.g., Bell v. School City of Gary, 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963).
', 369 F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 1966).
"Action by a school board, which is a state agency, is state action. Blocker v.
Board of Educ., 226 F.2d 208, 226 (E.D.N.Y. 1964).
20369 F.2d at 59.27389 F.2d 178 (8th Cir. 1968).
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the conflicting goals of competing parties, but in school integration cases
there is only one goal-a wholly desegregated school system. Those
decisions recognizing the absolute impermissibility of racial imbalance in
schools regardless of how it was achieved more closely reflect the Kemp
position. Indeed, this attitude of looking beyond the parties to the schools
themselves seems to be the thread holding such decisions together.
In Brown, the Supreme Court based its decision largely on the
psychological effects of segregation on the school children involved, par-
ticularly the black children."8 The Court concluded that the adverse
psychological effects on the black children represented a violation of the
fourteenth amendment: the knowledge that they were forced to go to a
school that was only for their race was a serious handicap which the white
children did not have, and the blacks, therefore, were denied the equal
protection of the law. It was this kind of thought that led to the con-
clusion that segregated schools are inherently unequal. A similar argu-
ment can be made regarding the situation in Porcelli. There is ample
psychological data to indicate that black students dealing with only white
people in positions of authority tend to identify all whites with authority.-"
At the same time the black children lose respect for the black male, who
is not seen in such a position of authority.3 The result of this identifica-
tion process is a serious psychological impairment for the black child.
lie loses confidence in his race in general and also in himself.3 ' This
psychological burden, it might be argued, is as serious as the psychological
burden found in Brown, and the same equal protection argument should
apply. Viewing the problem in this way, it becomes evident that the
focus must be on the equal protection of the students, not the admin-
istrators. It is this emphasis, if not this argument, that was recognized in
both Kemp and Barksdale.
If the court in Porcelli found that the school board was under a duty
to promote racial balance in administrative positions, then clearly the
28 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.11 (1954).
"' See generaUy H. BOND, THE EDUCATION OF THE NEGRO IN THE AMERICAN
SOCIAL ORDER (1966); R. COLES, CHILDREN OF CRISIS; A STUDY OF COURAGE AND
FEAR (1967). But see I. NEWBY, CHALLENGE TO THE COURT; SOCIAL SCIENTISTS
AND THE DEFENSE OF SEGREGATION, 1954-1966 (1969).
" 
3 M. CRAMER, SOCIAL FACTORS IN EDUCATION ACHIEVEMENT AND ASPIRATIONS
AMONG NEGRO ADOLESCENTS (1966); J. Knight, The Interpersonal Values and
Aspirational Levels of Negro Seniors in Totally Integrated and Segregated South-
ern High Schools 36-40, 65, 1970 (unpublished thesis in Wilson Library, University
of North Carolina).31D. DINKMEYER, READINGS IN CHILD DEVELOPMENT 394-407 (1965); I.
SARNOFF, PERSONALITY DYNAMICS AND DEVELOPMENT 85-116 (1962).
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Board of Education was justified in taking appropriate action.82 There
are numerous holdings that the fourteenth amendment forbids the appoint-
ment of teachers, and by inference, administrators, solely on the basis
of race. 3 Yet the court in Porcelli noted that "state action based partly
on considerations of color when color is not used per se, and in furtherance
of a proper governmental objective, is not necessarily a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment."3 In Porcelli, the court concluded that the
Newark School Board was acting to promote a proper-indeed, a com-
pelling-governmental interest, and therefore properly considered color.
At least one court, however, in another case involving action by a
board of education to promote racial balance, has noted: "Only if specific
provisions of the Plan do, in fact, discriminate against plaintiffs because
of their race, could it be said to result in an infringement of their con-
stitutional rights." 5 In that case, no discrimination was found; however,
it is difficult to escape the conclusion that in Newark qualified whites were
passed over in favor of qualified blacks. It is in its almost perfunctory
resolution of this tricky problem of "reverse discrimination"8" that the
Porcelli court may well have been the most incisive. For the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit seems to recognize that the constitutional
demands, coupled with the social context in which the situation arose,
outweighed the competing considerations of the plaintiffs' harm. The
court has sensed that the most stringent demands of Brown v. Board of
Education may well fall not on the states and not on the school boards,
but on the white population as a whole. And that demand, as it appears
to be mirrored in Porcelli, is for a constitutional "leap of faith.""7 The
"leap" is a belief that the constitutional and social significance of racial
balance at this time is worth even the harm that may be inflicted in-
cidentally on other members of society.
It is in this regard that Porcelli v. Titus acts to tie together in both
legal and societal terms what should be a major movement in Constitutional
thought-the actual implementation of principles of equality under law.
Yet because so little of this reasoning is explicit, it may well be that
" There is some question as to whether the action by the Board of Education
would have been permissible even if the court in Porcelli had not adopted the
Barksdale position.
" See, e.g., Rolfe v. County Bd. of Educ., 391 F.2d 77 (6th Cir. 1968).8,431 F.2d at 1257.
8 5Fuller v. Volk, 230 F. Supp. 25, 34 (D.N.J. 1964).
"This is the popular term for those situations in which whites are passed over
in favor of blacks.
a' This term was first used by Kierkegaard in, of course, a religious sense.
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Porcelli will have little actual impact beyond the third circuit and the
situation as it existed in Newark.
STEPHEN JAY EDEILSTEIN
Consumer Protection-Credit Card Protection Under the
Truth in Lending Act
On October 26, 1970, in response to widespread complaints, Congress
amended1 the Truth in Lending Act to expand consumer protection into
the area of credit cards.2 The legislation outlaws further issuance of un-
solicited credit cards' and imposes stiff criminal penalties for the
fraudulent use of cards to charge more than five thousand dollars.' The
most important provision limits the liability of the consumer for a lost or
'Pub. L. No. 91-508, §§ 501-03 (Oct. 26, 1970), amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-64
(Supp. IV, 1965-69).
2The tremendous upsurge in credit cards has brought an increased awareness
of the abuses associated with their use. From Dec. 31, 1967, to June 30, 1969, the
Federal Research Board found that credit outstanding on bank credit cards increased
from 800 million dollars to 1.7 billion dollars. The year-to-year increase on oil
company cards is 200 million dollars. Hearings on S. 721 Before the Subcomr.
on Financial Institutions of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1969) [hereinafter cited as 1969 Hearings]. The abuses are
more often related to unsolicited cards which (1) have encouraged some consumers
to spend beyond their means possibly to the point of becoming bankrupt, (2) have
been burdensome to some consumers because they were hard to destroy, (3) have
been an unwarranted intrusion into consumers' personal lives, (4) have encouraged
crime because they were easily stolen and quite negotiable, and (5) have had a
potentially inflationary impact upon the economy. Another factor common to all
cards has been the possibility of unlimited liability in the event that the card was
lost or stolen. S. REP. No. 91-739, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3-5 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as 1970 S. REP.]. The statistical impact of this last point was measured in
Murray, A Legal-Empirical Study of the Unauthorized Use of Credit Cards, 21
U. MIAMI L. lRv. 811 (1967).
1 Pub. L. No. 91-508, § 502(a) (Oct. 26, 1970). This provision is far-reaching
because it also concerns renewals of existing credit cards. Renewals can be auto-
matic, i.e., without request by the holder, only if the card had been specifically
requested initially. Unsolicited cards that were issued prior to the act may not be
renewed unless the holder so requests. Id.; 1970 S. EP. 6. What impact will this
have upon the firms who have used both solicited and unsolicited cards in the past
and are unable to distinguish the accounts of holders using solicited cards from those
using unsolicited cards? 1970 S. REP. 13. Another argument of those opposed
to outlawing the unsolicited card is that this prohibition makes it impossible for new
enterprises in the credit card field to get off the ground and compete since the
sending of unsolicited cards is the only practical way to build up a large backlog of
customers. 1969 Hearings 24-26.
'Maximum of ten-thousand-dollar fine and five years in prison. Pub. L. No. 91-
508, § 502(a) (Oct. 26, 1970).
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stolen card to fifty dollars if the use of the card occurred after January 24,
1971.5
Prior to the act, according to the terms on most cards, the cardholder
was to be liable for unauthorized use unless he notified the company of
the loss or the theft of the card in advance of the unauthorized use.' In a
typical case,7 a holder of a Texaco credit card was assessed with liability
for 570 dollars in automotive bills which had been charged to his card
without his knowledge or consent. The first time that he used the card
he neglected to retrieve it from the service station attendant. He failed to
notify the company of the loss and four months later was billed for the
unauthorized use. The court reasoned that the sending of the card to the
individual by the oil company was an offer to contract according to the
terms printed on the card, and the individual's retention and subsequent
use of the card constituted an acceptance of the offer and its terms.8
Hence, the holder was contractually9 bound to pay the bills.'
'Id. §§ 502(a), 503(2).
'The data of notice would vary depending on the specific wording of the contract
and interpretations of notice appearing in state law. Several possibilities are the
date notice is sent, the date notice is received, or some artificial date such as ten
days after receipt, if the contract terms so specified.
Texaco, Inc. v. Goldstein, 34 Misc. 2d 751, 229 N.Y.S.2d 51 (Mun. Ct. N.Y.
City 1962), aff'd per curiat, 39 Misc. 2d 552, 241 N.Y.S.2d 495 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
834 Misc. 2d at -, 229 N.Y.S.2d at 56. Although the initial use of the card
would normally be the act of acceptance, under some circumstances retention of the
card without use might be sufficient. See Comment, The Tripartite Credit Card
Transaction: A Legal Infant, 48 CALIF. L. Rnv. 459, 481 (1960). Generally, for
acts of acceptance in this context see RESTATEmENT OF CONTRAcTS §§ 21, 72 (1932) ;
1 A. CoRmi , CONTRACTS §§ 62, 70, 72 (1963). In situations where the acceptance
of the instrument containing the terms constitutes acceptance of the contract, the
weight of authority holds this to be assent to all the terms printed therein, whether
or not they are actually read. Kergald v. Armstrong Transfer Express Co., 330
Mass. 254, 113 N.E.2d 53 (1953), and cases collected therein. Nonetheless the
language of the terms should be conspicuous and understandable. See Macauley,
Private Legislation and the Duty to Read-Bsiness Run by IBM Machine, the
Law of Contracts and Credit Cards, 19 VAND. L. Rv. 1051 (1966).
' Some courts analyze the credit card transaction using theories of guaranty and
assignment. The holder is a guarantor for others using his card while the issuer
is the assignee of the merchant for collection of the claims. This preserves defenses
which the holder has against the merchant, such as for defective goods, when the
issuer attempts to collect on his assignment. Gulf Refining Co. v. Williams Roofing
Co., 208 Ark. 362, 186 S.W.2d 790 (1945). For difficulties with the assignment
theory see South, Credit Cards: A Primer; 23 Bus. LAW. 327, 331-32 (1968).
"
0Accord, Read v. Gulf Oil Corp., 114 Ga. App. 21, 150 S.E.2d 319 (1966);
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Duke, 441 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. 1969). There has been a
tendency in some jurisdictions to exact a standard of due care upon the merchant
and the issuer if the holder is to be held liable. Allied Stores of N.Y., Inc. v.
Funderburke, 52 Misc. 2d 872, 277 N.Y.S.2d 8 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. City 1967) (issuer
violated standard of due care by permitting 237 sales slips bearing false signatures
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The new federal legislation does not change the basic cause of action
when the card issuer seeks to collect on unpaid bills. State courts"1 will
try to ascertain the exact contractual obligations of the holder in deter-
mining what, if anything, he must remit to the issuer. These obligations
are now, however, limited by the new law, and the card issuer is induced
to change its tactics in order to minimize the limitations. It can allege
that the use of the card was authorized, carry the burden of proof on this
issue, 2 and avoid the limitation on the amount of liability. Unauthorized
use is defined in the act as "a use of a credit card by a person other
than the cardholder who does not have actual, implied, or apparent
authority for such use and from which the cardholder receives no benefit."':
Clearly, the initial test for authorized use is agency, and state law 4 must
be consulted in order to resolve the issue.
Under traditional agency concepts, the cardholder is the principal and
the merchant is the third party; the issuer is superimposed in the mer-
chant's place as the collector of the account. The issuer must show that
the person who used the card had the authority to bind the cardholder
to obligations with third parties. Actual authority is created by a man-
ifestation of consent to the agent by the principal that he may act for the
principal. 5 When the act is' specifically mentioned, there is express
to accumulate in thirty days because of inadequate data processing procedures);
Union Oil Co. v. Lull, 220 Ore. 412, 349 P.2d 243 (1960) (question for jury on
due care of merchant when address on card was in one state and the license plates
on the car of user indicated another). See Note, Contracts-Credit Cards-
Liability of Holder for Unauthorized Use-Issuer's and Merchant's Duty of Due
Care in Accepting Charges, 43 N.C.L. REv. 416, 422 (1965), and Note, Credit-
Issuer's Recovery from Bona Fide Credit Card Holder for Purchases Made by
Unauthorized Person Requires Showing That Due Care Was Exercised in Honor-
ing Card, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 266, 268 (1960), for competing policies behind such
decisions.
"' State courts handle lawsuits based on contract. Conceivably it could be tried
in federal court in the event of diversity of citizenship, but a case in which the
liability alleged is in excess of the ten-thousand-dollar jurisdictional amount would
be unusual. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1964).
" This burden of proof is required by the statute. Pub. L. No. 91-508, § 502 (a)
(Oct. 26, 1970).
Id. § 501 (emphasis added).
" If the case were tried in the federal courts, a problem could arise, at least
theoretically, in the choice of federal or state law. It is highl unlikely'that federal
law would be applied since there is no substantial federal interest involved. See Erie
R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); C. WRIG r FEDERAL COURTS §§ 55-60 (2d
ed. 1970).
RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) o AGEN cY § 7 (1957) ; W. SEAVEY, LAW OF AGiNcY
,§8A (1964) [hereinafter cited as SEAvEY]. The term "actual authority" is
generally shortened to "authorit' for purpoges of clarity. E.g., SEAVEY § 8A.
Contra, e.g., Coblentz v. Riskin, 74 Nev. 53, 57, 322 P.2d 905, 907 (1958).
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actual authority to do that act; when the instructions state the general
nature of the status of the agent, there is implied actual authority to
do acts consistent with this instruction."0 There is no distinction in the
powers bestowed by express and implied actual authority-the legal effect
is the same.17 In the credit card context the former is demonstrated by
the principal's command to his agent "take my card and fill the car with
gasoline." An example of the latter is the situation where an employee who
travels for a firm is allowed the use of a company car with a gasoline credit
card in the glove compartment.
Apparent authority differs from actual authority in that it depends
on manifestations by the principal to the third party rather than to the
agent.18 This authority arises when the principal leads the third party to
reasonably believe that the professed agent is acting in his behalf. 19 The
usual application of apparent authority is where a prior relation of prin-
cipal and agent is terminated and the principal has made no effort to
repudiate the status after it has in fact ceased."0 This failure to reveal is
conduct which might cause third parties to reasonably believe that the
agency relationship still exists. Thus, a discharged employee might con-
tinue to use the firm's misappropriated credit card at businesses with which
he had formerly dealt, and apparent authority would bind the former
employer absent notification that the employee had been discharged.
Implied actual authority and apparent authority are often confused
despite being based upon different types of behavior on the part of the
principal. The sufficiency of the manifestations made to either the agent
or to the third party is the chief concern of the court, but this is not
determined through strict rules; rather, it depends upon the exact conduct
of the principal and upon present and prior relations between all parties.
Both doctrines might operate on the same fact situation. For example,
opponents of the new law were concerned about the situation where the
holder "purposely refrained from informing the issuer of misuse about
which he had actual knowledge."'" Yet this could be considered apparent
authority if the card user had previously possessed actual authority, the
revocation of which had not been communicated by the principal to con-
cerned third parties such as the issuer. This behavior, might also be
1 0 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 7, Comment c (1957) ; SEAvEY § 8C.
1T SEAVEY § 8C.
'
8 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8 (1957) ; SEAVEY § 8D.
'RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8, Comment c (1957) ; SEAVEY § 8D.
2
oRESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8, Comment a (1957).
21 1970 S. REP. 11.
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classified as implied actual authority if the card user knew of the prin-
cipal's continued failure to object to the misuse, since he could infer con-
sent from the principal's actions. Liability would be premised on the idea
that "a reasonable person in the position of the principal knowing of un-
authorized acts and not consenting to their continuance would do some-
thing to indicate his dissent." However, it remains for the courts .to
backlog a large number of such situations upon which the presence or
absence of liability is predicated before clarity will emerge.
Other doctrines, such as estoppel and inherent agency power,2 might
also be utilized by the court in identifying an agency relationship. In
addition, even though agency cannot be found, the use is still characterized
as authorized if it is beneficial to the holder,24 and this possibility should
not be overlooked.
In the event that the card issuer fails to establish that the use was
authorized, the fifty-dollar limitation on liability becomes effective.
Yet even to assure this lessened recovery the issuer must prove compliance
with other parts of the act. The issuer must show that the use preceded
any notification from the cardholder of the loss or theft, that it had pro-
vided the holder with a prestamped, self-addressed notification form which
would be mailed if there were loss or theft, that it had provided adequate
notice to the holder as to potential liability, and that the card was not an
unsolicited card. 6 As of January 24, 1972, there will be added the require-
ment that there be a method of identifying authorized users incorporated
into the transaction.2 7
It should be noted that the issuer is required to carry the burden of
proof as to lack of notification prior to unauthorized use. Normally, the
party taking the position that notice was given must produce evidence on
this point and a showing, for example, that a correctly addressed letter
was put in the mail creates a presumption in his favor.2" The other party
' ESTATEMENT (SECOND) or AGENCY § 26, Comment d (1957).
's Id. §§ 8A, B; SEAvEY §§ 8E, F.21Pub. L. No. 91-508, § 501 (Oct. 26, 1970).
" Id. § 502(a).
26 Id.2 7 Id.
8 Henderson v. Carbondale Coal & Coke Co., 140 U.S. 25, 36 (1891). If the
evidence which creates the presumption is not disputed by, the other party, then,
depending on its strength, either a prima facie case is established for: the jury o'r
the presumption is transformed into a conclusion as a matter of law. C. McCoRMIcK,
EVIDENCE § 308 (1954). -When a presumption arises in favor of notice, it is cOn-
clusive when evidence to the contrary is not introduced. 9 3. WIMORE, EVIDmECE
§2519(B) (1940). . - .
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then presents evidence showing lack of receipt, and the issue becomes one
for the jury.2 However, the statute puts the onus on the party alleging
no receipt to carry the burden of proof on the issue. Ideally, there will be
a jury instruction to this effect and the ultimate result will be that it will
become easier for the sender to estabilsh notice. The precise issue, accord-
ing to regulations30 promulgated by the Federal Reserve System, is
whether the holder took "such steps as might be reasonably required in
the ordinary course of business to provide the card issuer with the per-
tinent information .... 31 The notice is "considered given at the time
of receipt or, whether or not received, at the time ordinarily required for
transmission, whichever is earlier.""2  This definition plainly anticipates
:the situation where the issuer claims not to have received notice but the
finder of fact disagrees.
The issue of notice is simplified if the issuer can show the second of
the requirements-the fact that the holder had been provided with the pre-
stamped notification-form. The expectation is that the holder will use this
form in event of loss or theft, and thus the possibility of misaddressed
letters is minimized. The presumption of receipt operates in favor of the
issuer if he presents evidence such as a mailing list containing the holder's
name and the testimony of an employee to the effect that all the members
of the list were sent the notification form.38 The same presumption exists
-on similar evidence when the issuer attempts to show compliance with the
third requirement that the cardholder is to be given adequate notice 4 of
his pptential liability. This might have been printed on the billing state-
ment or on the credit card; if it were sent as a printed notice then it must
"be followed by another notice each succeeding two years. 85
"
2 Henderson v. Carbondale Coal & Coke Co., 140 U.S. 25, *37 (1891).8o FEDERAL RESERVE SysTEm PREss RELEASE (Jan. 20, 1971) contains amend-
ments to Regulation Z, Part 226, the present version of which appears in 12 C.F.R.
.§ 226 (1969) [these amendments hereinafter will be cited as Reg. Z, § 226.13].
"Reg. Z, § 226.13(f).
1d.
88 See discussion in note 28 supra.,
8 The act requires that the notice must set "forth the pertinent facts clearly and
conspicuously so that a person against whom it is to operate could reasonably be
expected to have noticed it and understood its meaning." Pub. L. No. 91-508, § 501
,.Oct. 26; 1970).
,,. "Reg. Z, §226.13(c) (3). The recommended form, assuming the italicized
-hypothetical- facts, is et out in the regulations: "You may be liable for the un-
,authorized rise of your credit card. You will not be liable for unauthorized use
-which occurs after you notify Plastic Card Company at Windborn, N.Y. 00000,
:orally or in writing of loss, theft, or possible unauthorized use. In any case liability
shall not exceed $50." Id. § 226.13(e).
[Vol. 49
1971] CREDIT CARDS ....... 781
To satisfy the fourth requirement, the card issuer would simply pro-
duce the request of the cardholder in order to show that the card was
requested. If the card were previously unsolicited but changed in. status
by a requested renewal, then this renewal form would be presented as
evidence. To comply with the requirement of an identification procedure,
the issuer should have no difficulty in showing that his system had been
revamped in order to produce a signature card or a card with the picture
of the holder appearing on it.36
The overall scheme of legislation reveals that Congress has erected
many hurdles in order to frustrate the card issuer who is seeking recovery
when the card has fallen into the hands of an unauthorized user. The
strict limitation to a maximum fifty-dollar recovery obviously deters
litigation when the issuer weighs the expenses of a lawsuit against ex-
pected recovery. Since arguably "[m] ore strict or complicated identifica-
tion procedures ...will discourage cardholders and merchants,"'3 it is
questionable whether issuers will bother to comport with the standards
necessary for even the limited recovery, for fear of losing business. The
end result, perhaps justifiable, is to shift the burden of risk to the card
issuer. The issuer charges interest on its accounts and assesses a collec-
tion fee against the merchant; as a matter of economics it would appear to
be the party on whom the risk should fall.8 Since in the future issuers
might charge an issuance fee to offsetthe risk, consumers might think
twice before requesting cards, thus leading to a more respofisible decision
on their part. Consumer costs for liability insurance are virtually wiped
out by the limited liability provision, 9 although one who possesses
numerous cards might seek insurance due to the increased risk factor.
40
"These are the suggested methods. 1970 S. REP. 8. The regulations add finger-
print and electronic or mechanical confirmation to the possibilities. Reg. Z,§ 226.13 (d).
"Note, Credit Cards: Distributing Fraud Loss, 77 YALE L.J. 1418, 1429
(1968).
" The interest figure is set at eighteen per cent on bills not paid within thirty
days and experience has shown that roughly one-half of the accounts are paid
within this time. 1969 Hearings 121. The average cost to retailers runs five per
cent of purchase price. Id. at 138. The loss on accounts had been set at four per
cent prior to the act, although some issuers had much better records. Id. at 120.
Even with a shift in risk for unauthorized use, a carefully run credit card system
would still appear to be a very profitable operation.
"Id. at 85.
'Q Obviously the fifty-dollar limitation is in effect for each card rather than for
the whole lot. The term "unauthorized use" is defined as "a use ... by a person
who does not have... authority .... " Pub. L. No. 91-508 § 501 (Oct. 26,
1970). The appearance of the article "a" as a modifier of "use" is unfortunate since
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In short, it must be expected that very few cases will arise under the
act, with the card issuer being content to bear the losses,4 ' though passing
them on in part to the consumer and the merchant through increased costs.
JOHN WOODWARD DEs
Criminal Procedure-Double Jeopardy: In the Interest of
Public Justice
The "universal maxim of the common law,"' that no one should be
twice vexed for the same cause, was elevated to a position of constitutional
.dignity by the adoption of the fifth amendment.2 Today, it is among the
most fundamental guarantees of the Bill of Rights.3 However, before a
man can "be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb"" there must have been
initial jeopardy. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in United
States ex rel. Somerville v. Illinois,5 recently considered the problem of
when and under what circumstances jeopardy is deemed to have attached
so as to bar a subsequent prosecution. Petitioner Donald Somerville was
indicted for theft on March 19, 1964. On November 1, 1965, his case
the immediate implication is that the definition can apply to only one transaction
and not to a series of transactions. From a pragmatic point of view, this is un-
tenable since it would wipe out effective limitation of liability and destroy the intent
to protect the cardholder which is the basis of the act. Testimony before the com-
mittee that entertained the bill reveals that the spokesman for the American Bankers
Association assumed the limitation to apply to a series of unauthorized uses rather
than to each unauthorized use of the card. His statement was not contradicted.
1969 Hearings 107. If this assumption is not borne out in the courts, the need for
liability insurance will be renewed.
"According to a representative of the Federal Trade Commission, earliest
indications under the act point to this result since most companies are not bothering
to meet the requirements. Raleigh News and Observer, Jan. 28, 1971, at 35, col. 3.
14 W. BLAcKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *335.
"nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put injeopardy of life or limb ... ." U.S. CONST. amend. V. See J. SIGLER, DOUBLE
JEOPARDY, THE DEVELOPMENT OF A LEGAL AND SOCIAL POLICY 1-37, 226 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as SIGLER].
'Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 793-96 (1969). This case applied the
double jeopardy provision of the fifth amendment to the states through the fourteenth
amendment.
'U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
'429 F.2d 1335 (7th Cir. 1970). The Supreme Court has recently vacated
the seventh circuit's decision in Somervile and remanded the case for reconsidera-
tion in light of the decisions in United States v. Jorn, 91 S. Ct. 547 (1971), and
Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963). 39 U.S.L.W. 3436 (U.S. Apr. 6,
1971). These cases are discussed generally infra.
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came to trial, and twelve jurors were duly impaneled and sworn. The
following day the state's attorney moved for a mistrial and to nolle
prosequi on the ground that the indictment did not allege a crime and was
therefore void.6 The motion was granted over the defendant's objection.
On November 3, a corrected indictment was returned under which Somer-
ville was subsequently convicted, his claim of double jeopardy having been
rejected.7
Somerville filed a petition for habeas corpus asserting that jeopardy
had attached upon the selection and swearing of the jury and that retrial
after the discharge of the jury subjected him to double jeopardy in viola-
tion of the fifth amendment. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit affirmed the dismissal of the habeas corpus petition by the district
court, holding that the discharge of a jury impaneled and sworn under
an invalid indictment did not bar reprosecution on the ground of double
jeopardy."
Confusion has consistently surrounded the double jeopardy proscrip-
tion of the fifth amendment. Although it is one of the most litigated por-
tions of the Bill of Rights, it is extremely difficult to predict with precision
the outcome of any defense predicated upon double jeopardy.9 One of the
major areas of uncertainty is that which is concerned with the attachment
of jeopardy. While the Supreme Court has not yet ruled upon the ques-
tion raised in Somerville, an examination of prior double jeopardy de-
cisions may serve to reveal the ultimate outcome of any appeal on the issue.
A statement of what has been characterized as "the general rule" notes
that "a person is not in jeopardy until he has been arraigned on a valid in-
dictment.., and a jury has been impaneled and sworn. .. ."" Decisions
'The indictment failed to alleged intent to deprive the owner permanently of
the use or benefit of the property, an essential element of the offense sought to be
charged, and its omission rendered the indictment invalid. 429 F.2d at 1336 & n.2.
"People v. Somerville, 88 Ill. App. 2d 212, 232 N.E.2d 115 (1967), leave to
appeal denied, 37 Ill. 2d 627, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 823 (1968).
3United States ex rel. Somerville v. Illinois, 429 F.2d 1335 (7th Cir. 1970).
0 SiGLER 226.
10 McCarthy v. Zerbst, 85 F.2d 640, 642 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 610
(1936). See also Amrine v. Times, 131 F.2d 827, 834 (10th Cir. 1942). The rule
is different in a nonjury trial. There jeopardy is not deemed to have attached until
the court has begun to hear evidence. McCarthy v. Zerbst, 85 F.2d 640, 642 (10th
Cir. 1936). See also 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 241 (1961). These rules as to the
time of the attachment of jeopardy have been supported as well-founded:
By the time the jury has been sworn or evidence introduced, the accused has
been put to substantial trouble and expense and there has been considerable
investment of judicial resources. To delay attachment of jeopardy to some
later trial stage maximizes the risk of harassment of the accused and en-
ables the prosecution to escape a particular jury. On the other hand, to
19711
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of the Supreme Court, however, tend to discount the importance of a valid
indictment. In United States v.. Ball," the defendant was tried and ac-
quitted under an indictment later adjudged "fatally defective."' 2 A new
indictment was returned against him, and he was found guilty, the court
denying his plea of former jeopardy. The Supreme Court recognized that
to allow a public officer, whose business it was to, draw a correct indictment,
to allege his own inaccuracy or neglect as a reason for a second trial was
"'like permitting a party to take advantage of his own wrong,' "18 and it
held that the verdict of acquittal was conclusive notwithstanding the in-
validity of the indictment. This view was recently reaffirmed in Benton
v. Maryland,14 in which the state's argument that one cannot be placed in
jeopardy by a void indictment was characterized as "strange . . . since
petitioner could quietly have served out his sentence under this 'void'
indictment had he not appealed .... ."15
Downum v. United States" represents a Supreme Court decision that
is factually similar to Somerville. A jury had been selected and sworn
when the prosecution hsked that it be discharged because of the absence of
a key witness. This was done over the objection of the defendant. Two
days later a second jury was impaneled, and the defendant was found guilty.
The Court reversed the conviction, holding that the defendant's retrial
subjected him to double jeopardy. The majority in Somerville made no
attempt to distinguish Downum. The dissent, however, carefully noted
the similarities and criticized the majority's departure from precedent:
Both cases were dismissed on motion of the Government because of its
own fault. In Downum, it was the failure of the Government to pro-
cure the attendance of a material witness; in the instant case, it was an
allegedly defective indictment for which it was responsible.17
advance attachment of jeopardy to an earlier point in the proceeding ...
unduly discounts the state's legitimate interest in bringing offenders to trial.
Note, Double Jeopardy: The Reprosecution Problem, 77 HARv. L. REv. 1272, 1275(1964). The Model Penal Code suggests that jeopardy attach in all cases upon the
swearing of the first witness, evidencing the belief that there should be no distinc-
tion between jury and nonjury trials. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.08(4) (Proposed
Official Draft 1962); MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.09, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 5,
1956).163 U.S. 662 (1896).
'
2 Id. at 664. The indictment had been attacked on appeal by Ball's two co-
defendants, who had been found guilty.
'a Id. at 668.
1,395 U.S. 784 (1969).
1 Id. at 796.
'1 372 U.S. 734 (1963).
429 F.2d at 1338.
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The "valued right [of an accused] to have his trial completed by a
particular tribunal""' is well recognized, and a recent decision stressed
this consideration, emphasizing "the importance to the defendant of being
able, once and for all, to conclude his confrontation -with society through
the verdict of a tribunal he might believe to b& favorably disposed to his
fate."'" Nevertheless, it is clear that in some instances a trial must be
discontinued after the jury is impaneled and sworn but before a verdict is
ieached without double jeopardy barring reprosecution. United States v.
Perez0 enunciated a rule in 1824 that has since been scrupulously fol-
lowed by the courts:
We think, that in all cases of this nature, the law has invested Courts
of justice with the authority to discharge a jury from giving any
verdict, whenever in their opinion, taking all the circumstances into
consideration; there is a manifest necessity for the act, or the ends of
public justice would otherwise be defeated.21
This, termination prior to the verdict is no bar to retrial where the jury
is unable to agree,22 where there is a possibility of juror bias' or one of
the jurors is disqualified,2 where necessary for tactical reasons in a mili-
tary campaign,25 or where the mistrial was declared in the sole interest
of the defendant.20
I It seems clear that where the termination is due to "a breakdown in
judicial machinery"2 7 there is no constitutional bar to reprosecution. 28
•18Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689 (1949).
1United States v. Jorn, 91 S. Ct. 547, 558 (1971).
2022 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824).
21Id. at 580.
-Keerl v. Montana, 213 U.S. 135 (1909); Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71
(1902); Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263 (1892); United States v. Perez,
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824).
2 Simmons v. United States, 142 U.S. 148 (1891).
"Thompson v. United States, 155 U.S. 271 (1894).
" Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 (1949). A court-martial was convened by a
division of the Third Army, but rapid advancement into Germany rendered the
distance of the witnesses so great that its continuation became impractical. The
charges were then withdrawn and transmitted to the Fifteenth Army which con:
ducted a second court-martial. This was held not to violate the double jeopardy
provision of the fifth amendment.
2" Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364 (1961). The trial judge, on his own mo-
tion and for reasons not entirely clear, declared a mistrial. The Supreme Court,
inferring that the action was taken to forestall improper questioning by the prosecu-
tion, said that it was "unwilling, where it clearly appears that a mistrial has been
granted in the sole interest of the defendant, to hold that its necessary consequence
is to bar all retrial." Id. at 369.
"' Id. at 372 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
"
8See Note, 77 HAv. L. R-v., supra note 10, at 1276-81.
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Somerville represents a much more difficult situation because the mistrial
was declared at the request of the prosecution-due to its error-and over
the objection of the accused. It seems doubtful that this termination would
qualify under the "manifest necessity" rule outlined in Perez, especially
when the rule is taken with Justice Story's admonition: "[T]he power
[to discharge the jury] ought to be used With the greatest caution,
under urgent circumstances, and for very plain and obvious causes ....,,9
The foregoing indicates that the Supreme Court could easily hold
Somerville's reprosecution invalid as an unconstitutional abridgment of
the fifth amendment double jeopardy prohibition. But to do so would over-
look the interest of society in the fair administration of justice. Though the
double jeopardy doctrine has been justified as safeguarding interests of
society, the accused, and the judicial system, 0 it is most often char-
acterized as a measure for the protection of the defendant:
The underlying idea ... is that the State with all its resources and
power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an
individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrass-
ment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing
state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility
that even though innocent he may be found guilty.31
Despite this emphasis, the Supreme Court recognized from the be-
ginning that the interests of public justice should be the determining factor
as to whether premature termination of a trial is permissible.3 2 "Where...
the ends of substantial justice cannot be attained without discontinuing the
trial, a mistrial may be declared.., and [the defendant] may be retried
consistently with the Fifth Amendment.133 United States v. Tateo4 dear-
ly recognizes that society has an interest in determining guilt and punish-
ing the guilty. 5
29 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 580. This view was reiterated in Downum in which the
Court quoted from an earlier opinion by Justice (then Judge) Story holding that
the power to discharge the jury before it reached a verdict was to be exercised
"'only in very extraordinary and striking circumstances."' 372 U.S. at 736,
quoting United States v. Coolidge, 25 F. Cas. 622, 623 (No. 14,858) (C.C.D. Mass.
1815).
"
0 See Comment, Statutory Implementation of Double Jeopardy Clauses: New
Life for a Moribund Constitutional Guarantee, 65 YALE L.. 339, 340-41 (1956);
Note, 77 I-Hav. L. REv., supra note 10, at 1274.
,' Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957).82See text accompanying note 21 supra.
'
3 Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364, 368 (1961).
'377 U.S. 463 (1964).
" Id. at 466. "It would be a high price indeed for society to pay were every
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Once the need to consider the interests of both parties is recognized,
a balancing of these interests must inevitably follow. It is submitted that
the exact point of the attachment of jeopardy is of no moment and that
the controlling consideration when determining whether or not reprosecu-
tion of the defendant is permissible should be the overall interest of public
justice, properly evaluated, giving due consideration to both the rights
of the accused, and the interests of society. In a sense a defendant is
prejudiced from the moment suspicion focuses, and our heritage of sensi-
-tivity for the rights of the individual demands an acute awareness of this,
but the value of an adjudication of guilt on the merits must not be under-
estimated.Y
The policies underlying the double jeopardy provision of the Constitu-
tion were not sufficiently implicated in Somerville to preclude his re-
prosecution. Only two days had elapsed between the beginning of the first
trial and the reindictment. This was not a case of "repeated attempts
to convict... enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may
be found guilty," 37 nor was it a harassing maneuver. The prosecutor acted
in good faith at all times.
A holding that the discharge of a jury impaneled under an invalid in-
dictment automatically erects a double jeopardy bar to reprosecution could
force a useless proceeding at the expense of all concerned. Any attempt
by the prosecution to correct an indictment the validity of which came
under doubt after the seating of the jury would be discouraged, and any
doubts of the defense would be reserved as a ground upon which to seek
a new trial in the event of an unfavorable verdict."8 The result would be
a wasted initial effort in the event a later challenge to the validity of the
indictment was sustained. Many of the fears the double jeopardy protec-
tion seeks to shield the defendant from would be realized, i.e., the addi-
tional expense of an unnecessary proceeding and unduly prolonged em-
barrassment, anxiety, and insecurity.
The rule that jeopardy attaches when the jury is impaneled and sworn
accused granted immunity from punishment because of any defect sufficient to
constitute reversible error in the proceedings leading to conviction." Id. See also
United States v. Jorn, 91 S. Ct. 547, 554 (1971); Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684,
689 (1949).
" The defendant himself, in addition to society in general, has a positive interest
in having the question of his guilt settled by a determination on the merits.
' See text accompanying note 31 supra.
"Retrial would clearly have been permissible had the trial proceeded to its
conclusion and the defendant's challenge of the validity of the indictment been
sustained. See United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896).
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.cannot, by necessity, preclude retrial in every instance where the jury
.is discharged prior to the verdict.3 9 If the rule is retained, as it appears
that it will be, there remains the necessity of determining under what
circumstances retrial is precluded.4" Under Perez, anytime the discharge is
necessary in the interest of public justice reprosecution is constitutionally
permissible. But society's interest in determining the guilt of an accused
"on the merits may be too easily subordinated to the rights of the accused
by a protective court. Care must be taken to see that these competing in-
terests are recognized and properly evaluated. Courts must see that re-
-trial following a discharge of the jury does not violate policies under-
girding the double jeopardy provision of the Constitution, but this deter-
mination must be made in light of the competing interests of society and
the accused, and in the overall interest of justice. Overzealous concern for
the rights of the defendant must not be allowed to present an "obstacle to
the administration of justice in many cases in which there is no semblance
of the type of oppressive practices at which the double-jeopardy prohibi-
tion is aimed."'
JoHN E. HODGE, JR.
Criminal Procedure-State Hearsay Exception for Co-conspirator's
Statement Held not to Violate Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause
The hearsay rule,' because of its many exceptions,2 abounds with con-
troversy more than any other area in the law of evidence.' A particularly
"See United States v. Jorn, 91 S. Ct. 547, 554-55 (1971); SIGLER 74.
° 'See United States v. Jorn, 91 S. Ct. 547, 554-55 (1971). It has been sug-
gested that the problem of attachment of jeopardy could be eliminated by the
adoption of the English rule which requires a final judgment of acquittal or con-
viction to constitute prior jeopardy. SIGLER 223.
" Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 688-89 (1949).
1 The hearsay rule has been defined as the exclusion "of testimony in court or
written evidence, of a statement made out of court, such statement being offered
as an assertion to show the truth of matters asserted therein, and this resting for
its value upon the credibility of the out-of-court assertion." C. McCORMICK, LAW
oF EVDIDECE § 225 (1954).
Historically there are several rationales for the rule, the most significant ones
being that the adversary should have full opportunity for cross-examination; that
testimony should be given under oath; that the trier of fact should have an
opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witness; and that errors in transmission
are nonexistent when the declarant is in court. Id. § 224.
2 Under the hearsay exceptions the courts have admitted into evidence out-of-
court statements to prove the truth of what was asserted. 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 1420 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE].3It has been estimated that the hearsay rule accounts for at least one third of
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acute problem in this area stems from the conflict between the goals of the
hearsay-rule exceptions and those of the confrontation clause of the sixth
amendment.4 The Supreme Court has cogently stated the purposes of the
confrontation clauseP as being
to prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits . . . [from] being used
against the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and cross-exam-
ination of the witness in which the accused has an opportunity, not only
of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness,
but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order that
they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and
the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of
belief.6
On the other hand, the hearsay-rule exceptions-grounded in theory upon
shifting combinations of necessity and circumstantial trustworthiness--
frequently have been invoked to admit evidence of the out-of-court state-
ments of declarants not present in court and thus a fortiori not available
for confrontation.' The Supreme Court recently analyzed this obviots
conflict in Dutton v. Evans,9 but left the ultimate resolution of the issue
unclear. -
Evans, the petitioner in Dutton, along with Truett and Williams were
jointly indicted in a Georgia court for the murders of three police officers,
but Evans pleaded not guilty and exercised his right under Georgia law
to a separate trial."0 He was convicted of murder and-sentenced to death.-
'Evans then brought a habeas corpus proceeding in a federal district court,
alleging that he had been denied the constitutional right of confrontation
all evidentiary problems in the courts today. Note, Erosion of the Hearsay Ride,
3 U. RicH. L. Raw. 89, 92 (1968).
'"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him .... U.S. CoxrsT. amend. VI. This clause
applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S.
400, 403 (1965).
The similarity of the goals of the confrontation clause and the hearsay rule
might suggest that the two can be equated. However, the Supreme Court does not
accept this view. "While it may readily be conceded that hearsay: rules and the
Confrontation Clause are generally designed to protect similar values, it is quite a
different thing to suggest that the overlap is complete .... " California v. Green,
399 U.S. 149, 155 (1970).
' Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895).
5 WIGmORE §§ 1421-22.
8 Mattox v United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895) ; Tracey v. State, 97 Ill. 101,
106 (1880).
- 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
10 Id. at 76.
* I d.
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at his trial by the admission into evidence of a statement allegedly made
by Williams to a fellow prisoner named Shaw.'2 Williams never appeared
at Evans' trial. However, at the trial Shaw was permitted to testify that
he had asked Williams the result of Williams' arraignment proceeding,
whereupon Williams had remarked: "If it hadn't been for that dirty
son-of-a-bitch Alex Evans, we wouldn't be in this now."' 8 The Georgia
Supreme Court upheld the admission of Shaw's testimony under a Georgia
statute permitting the admission into evidence against a defendant of state-
ments made by the defendant's co-conspirators, provided the conspiracy is
first prima facie established. 14 The court held the statement admissible
even though it was made during the concealment phase of the criminal
project.' 5
The "co-conspirators" hearsay exception applied in federal courts
allows admission of only those statements made by co-conspirators "in
the course of and in the furtherance of the conspiracy."1 6 The federal rule
is thus narrower than the Georgia statutory hearsay exception,1 7 but in
Dutton the Court held this fact insufficient to invalidate the Georgia statute
under the confrontation clause.' 8 In reaching this result the Court stated
2Id. at 79.
13Id. at 77.
"After the fact of conspiracy shall be proved, the declarations by any one of
the conspirators during the pendency of the criminal project shall be admissible
against all." GA. CoD ANN. § 38-306 (1954 rev.).
"5Evans v. State, 222 Ga. 392, 396-97, 150 S.E.2d 240, 244-45 (1966). The
Georgia court found a conspiracy to exist because at the time the statement was
made by Williams, Evans and Williams "were still concealing their identity, keep-
ig secret the fact they had killed the deceased, if they had, and denying their guilt.
There was evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie case of conspiracy to steal
the automobile... ." Id. at 402, 150 S.E.2d at 248. However, a more accurate view
seems to be that of Justice Marshall, dissenting in Dutton: "It is difficult to
conceive how Williams could be part of a conspiracy to conceal the crime when all
the alleged participants were in custody and he himself had already been arraigned."
400 U.S. at 106 n.8.
26400 U.S. at 81.
"As was stated by the plurality in Dutton:
It is settled that in federal conspiracy trials the hearsay exception that
allows evidence of an out-of-court statement of one conspirator to be admitted
against his fellow conspirators applies only if the statement was made in the
course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy, and not during a subsequent
period when the conspirators were engaged in nothing more than conceal-
ment of the criminal enterprise .... The hearsay exception that Georgia
applied in the present case, on the other hand, permits the introduction of
evidence of such an out-of-court statement even though made during the
concealment phase of the conspiracy.
Id.
Is When used in the discussion of the Dutton case, "the Court" refers to Justice
Stewart's plurality opinion. This was a four-one-four decision; Justice Harlan,
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that it "has never indicated that the limited contours of the hearsay excep-
tion in federal conspiracy trials are required by the Sixth Amendment's
Confrontation Clause. To the contrary, the limits of this hearsay exception
have simply been defined by the Court in the exercise of its rule-making
power in the area of the federal law of evidence."' 9 In so holding, the
Court has deviated from its position in earlier cases, and a brief survey
of recent cases concerning confrontation and hearsay problems illustrates
the shift which the Court has made.
In Pointer v. Texas20 the Court held that the sixth amendment rights
of defendants in criminal trials to confront and cross-examine adverse wit-
nesses extended to state trials."' Pointer was accused of robbing one
Phillips. At a preliminary hearing, witnesses were examined by an
assistant district attorney. Among those questioned was Phillips, who
identified Pointer as the robber. Pointer was not represented by counsel
at the preliminary hearing, and he did not avail himself of his opportunity
to cross-examine the witness. Before the trial Phillips moved to another
state, and the prosecutor offered the transcript of Phillips' testimony into
evidence against Pointer. The Court held that Pointer had not been
afforded a realistic opportunity to cross-examine Phillips, and that the
introduction of the evidence was a denial of the defendant's right to
confrontation guaranteed by the sixth amendment.' The facts in Dutton
are somewhat similar to those in Pointer, although Dutton involved an
out-of-court statement rather than a formal transcript from a preliminary
hearing. However, this factual difference, if justifying different results
in the two cases at all, would seem to dictate results contrary to the actual
holding. Preliminary hearing testimony, given in defendant's presence,
representing the "one," concurred in the result but not the means of achieving it.
He did not see the sixth amendment as being well suited for taking into account the
many factors involved in weighing the appropriateness of evidentiary rules, and
thought that application of the due-process-of-law mandate was the correct procedure
for the adjudication of such issues. Id. at 97. One writer has sharply disagreed
with justice Harlan's view, noting that "[a] certain notion of fairness has already
pervaded the courts' general treatment of evidence in criminal trials," and assert-
ing that to suggest that the accused is "sufficiently protected by the due process
clause would be to regard the confrontation clause merely as a constitutional
anachronism." Note, Preserving the Right to Confrontationt-A New Approach
to Hearsay Evidence in Criminal Trials, 113' U. PA. L. REv. 741, 74-3 (1965).
" 400 U.S. at 82 (emphasis added).
9O380 U.S. 400 (1965).
I1 1d. at 403.
22 If a federal standard could be gleaned from this and similar cases discussed
infra, it would be that the right of confrontation gives a criminal defendant a
chance "to face and effectively cross-examine the witness testifying against him."
Note, 113 U. PA. L. Rxv., supra note 18, at 745.
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obviously presents a stronger case for admission than the simple extra-
judicial statement involved in Dutton. This seems true even if the latter
statement was in fact made-a matter which is open to considerable
doubt.23
In Douglas v. Alabama2 4 the court followed the Pointer reasoning.
Douglas had been convicted in a state court of assault with intent to
murder." Loyd, Douglas's alleged accomplice who had been convicted in
a prior trial, invoked the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrim-
ination when called as a witness by the prosecution in Douglas's trial.20 The
prosecutor, examining Loyd as a hostile witness, read from Loyd's con-
fession-which implicated Douglas-in order to "refresh" Loyd's mem-
ory 27 After reading each sentence the prosecutor asked the witness
if the statement was his. Loyd firmly declined to answer these questions,
even when ordered to do so by the trial judge and faced with a contempt
citation.28 The Court held that the lack of opportunity to cross-examine
Loyd denied Douglas his constitutional right to confrontation. 29 On the
facts 'Douglas and Dutton, are strikingly similar-yet the Court reached
different results. In both cases the state charged two defendants with a
crime and tried them separately. In both the state first prosecuted one
defendant and then used the first defendant's out-of-court statement in the
trial of the second defendant. In Douglas the Court disapproved such
use because the declarant, though in court, could not be cross-examined on
the statement imputed to but not admitted by him. In Dutton the pros-
ecution did not even call the declarant to the stand. 0 If the right to
cross-examine is a standard in this context, as some writers have argued, 81
it was inexplicably denied in Dutton.
After Douglas was decided the Court developed the proposition that
while the confrontation clause and the basic hearsay rule are analogous
in numerous respects, it is still, possible for hearsay to be admissible in
exceptional circumstances, pursuant to established rules of evidence,
'3 See note 39 infra.
, 380 U.S. 415 (1965). Douglas and Pointer were decided on the same day.
25 Id. at 417.
20 Id. at 416. At the time of Douglas's trial, Loyd had an appeal pending and
decided not to testify in order not to compromise his own case.
2 Id.
" Id. at 416 & n... The judge did not in fact hold Loyd in contempt, but he
interrupted Dbugla's trial to sentence Loyd to twenty years in prison. Id.
'2Id. at 419.
so 400 U.S. at 102.
" See note 22 smpra.
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despite the resultant departure from the most stringent possible inter-
pretation of the confrontation clause."2 Barber v. Page33 is a striking
example of this development. Barber and Woods were charged jointly
with armed robbery in a state court, Woods having given the testimony
that incriminated Barber at a preliminary hearing. By trial time Woods
was in prison in another jurisdiction, and his statement was admitted in
Barber's trial because Woods was not available to testify. 'Barber was
convicted and sought habeas corpus, claiming that the use of the transcript
of Woods's testimony deprived him of his right of confrontation. The
Supreme Court agreed that Barber -was entitled to a new trial but did not
hold that the confrontation requirement barred the testimony in any event.
It decided only that unavailability was not sufficiently shown in the absence
of a good faith attempt to secure the presence of the witness."4
If Woods was "not unavailable," one wonders why Williams was
"available" in Dutton. In Dutton the state made no attempt to call
Williams, and it is possible that he would have testified had he been
called. He had already been convicted and possibly would not have
asserted his right against self-incrimination as did Loyd in Douglas.
Pondering the result of the state's calling Williams to the stand is a
purely academic exercise, but the fact remains that under the earlier cases
the state either had to confront the defendant with the witnesses against
him, or (at the least, under Barber) prove frustration of a good faith
effort to procure his presence, In Dutton the state was permitted to in-
troduce damaging evidence 5 without bearing the risk of trial confronta-
tion. By Barber standards, which require a showing of ample opportunity
to cross-examine at a prior stage of the proceedings and also, of a good
faith effort to procure the presence of the declarant at the trial, apparently
Dutton was decided incorrectly. Arguably, unavailability-the require-
ment of the hearsay rule exception-was established in Barber;3 6 yet the
"Note, Constitutionai Law-Witnesses-The Confrontation Clause of the
Sixth Amendment Requires State Authorities to Make a Good Faith Effort to
Produce Out of State Witnesses at Trial, 47 TEX. L. ZEv. 331, 335 (1969).
"390 U.S. 719 (1968).
"Id. at 724-25.
"For a contrary view of the quality of the evidence in question, see justice
Blackmun's concurring opinion in Dutton, 400 U.S. at 90.
" Various courts and commentators have in the past assumed that the mere
absence of a witness from the state was sufficient grounds for dispensing with con-
frontation. See the cases collected in 5 WIGMoR § 1404, at n.5 (Supp. 1970).
See also, e.g., McCoRmick, supra note 1, § 234. However, this is now a questionable
theory because of the increased cooperation among the states themselves and
between the states and the federal government. When a prospective witness is in
federal custody, 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c) (5) (1964), gives federal courts "the power
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Court again recognized that the hearsay exceptions must be applied in the
context of constitutional limitations.87
In Dutton the question arises why the prosecution even used the con-
troversial evidence. Arguably it was crucial and damaging evidence, for
under Georgia law Evans could not have been convicted on the uncorrob-
orated testimony of his accomplice, Truett." Corroboration was a key
element in Evan's conviction, and that corroboration could well have been
Shaw's questionable testimony. However, there were eighteen other wit-
nesses besides Shaw and Trutt, the eyewitness. Surely one of the eighteen
could have supplied the required testimony. The Court of Appeals noted
that there was grave doubt that Williams had made the statement attribu-
ted to him, 9 and stated that Shaw's account of his conversation with
Williams was notable for "its basic incredibility."40 In addition, the
veracity of the statement, if made, was at best dubious.4 It is clear that the
statement was neither necessary nor reliable, and the prejudice to Evans
was in fact real. Indeed, the dissent in Dutton questioned whether "Wil-
liams' accusation relate[d] to Evans as a man with powerful and un-
scrupulous enemies, or Evans as a murderer." 42 The plurality apparently
to issue writs of habeas corpus ad testificandum at the request of state prosecutorial
authorities." Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724 (1968).
" The doctrinal distinction between Dutton on the one hand, and Pointer,
Douglas, and Barber on the other, seems tenuous at best. In the latter cases there
was no mention of a conspiracy. Therefore, the hearsay exception involved was
not that of a co-conspirator's statement as in Dutton. The sixth amendment in those
cases was held to exclude the questionable evidence in issue. However, in Dutton,
where the facts were similar-the only difference of any significance being the
hearsay exception involved-the evidence in issue was admitted. Should different
results obtain merely because of the co-conspirator label? The results of an affirma-
tive answer would be startling, for if the state only has to establish a conspiracy
(often an easy thing to accomplish), and if upon such a finding hearsay evidence
can be admitted on the tails of the co-conspirator exception, then the constitutional
right of confrontation can be effectively abrogated.
38 400 U.S. at 108.
S'In the court's words,
Shaw's testimony was somewhat incredible. He testified that Williams was
talking to him in a normal voice through a ten-by-ten plateglass window in
a prison hospital door, while Williams was lying on a bed in the room and
Shaw was standing in the hall. Shaw had stated in the Williams trial that
the window was covered only by wire mesh. The fact that it was covered
by a pane of plate glass was brought out in Evans' trial. Moreover, evidence
was submitted but rejected by the trial court which tended to show that
Shaw's testimony may have been compensation for a respite from the dull
routine of prison life.
Evans v. Dutton, 400 F.2d 826, 828 n.4 (5th Cir. 1968).
"° Id.
'" See note 39 supra.
42400 U.S. at 104.
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adopted the latter interpretation, but the fact remains that without cross-
examination of Williams himself, "the jury was left with only the un-
elucidated, apparently damning, and patently damaging accusation as told
by Shaw."4
The Court has labored to discover the reach of the confrontation clause
when measured against conflicting demands of the hearsay exceptions.
One solution to the dilemma, wholly consistent with the decision in
Barber, would be to read the confrontation clause as a canon of pros-
ecutorial conduct. So read, the confrontation clause would require
prosecutors to make good faith attempts to procure people to testify, and
to allow hearsay only when necessity, trustworthiness and fairness-
arguably absent in Dutton-are present. Interpreted in this fashion, the
confrontation clause would bind the prosecutor, notwithstanding that an
exception to the hearsay rule would permit admission of the questionable
statement.44 A confrontation clause construed as a standard of pros-
ecutorial conduct might reasonably have resulted in a contrary holding in
Dutton. In addition, such a construction would afford improved pros-
ecutorial behavior and more ascertainable standards.
ROBERT D. Rizzo
Criminal Procedure-Voluntariness of Guilty Pleas in Plea
Bargaining Context
One of the basic purposes of our system of justice is to separate the
guilty defendant from the innocent.' The formal trial process and the
guilty plea process are the only means used to accomplish this end. The
formal trial process is laced with procedural, evidentiary, and other safe-
guards to protect against conviction of the innocent and to ensure that the
accused are better able to defend against the power and the resources of
the state.2 However, the guilty plea process contains far fewer safeguards,
and the safeguards that do exist vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.3
'8 Id.
"Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724 (1968).
1 D. NEWMAN, COIvcTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOcENCE
WITHOUT TRIAL 10 (1966).
'See L. MAYERS, THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 11-150 (rev. ed. 1963) for
a general discussion of the safeguards available at all stages of the procedure.
'D. NEw MAN, supra note 1, at 10.
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In the recent case of North Carolina v. Alford,4 the United States Supreme
Court significantly expanded the instances in which a guilty plea may be
determined to be voluntary while upholding the constitutionality. of the
plea bargaining process.
On December 2, 1963, Alford was indicted for first-degree murder,
a capital offense in North Carolina.5 Eight days later, on the recommenda-
tion of his court-appointed counsel, he pleaded guilty to a charge of second-
degree murder, a: noncapital offense." Before accepting the plea, the trial
judge heard incriminating testimony from three witnesses. Alford him-
self testified that he had not committed the murder but that he had pleaded
guilty because "they said if I didn't they would gas me for it ..... - While
Alfo'rd was on the stand his attorney established by questioning that Alford
V d been informed of his rights and of the alternatives available to him.0
Af this point in the proceedings, Alford stated, "I'm not guilty but I plead
guilty."'1 Then the court asked Alford if, in light of his denial of guilt,
le still wished to plead guilty, and Alford replied in the affirmative.
Tiereupon the trial court sentenced him to thirty years imprisonment for
second-degree murder.'1 At the state post-conviction hearing in 1965,
Alford's attorney testified that Alford had told the attorney that he was
innocent,' 2 but the state court found that the guilty plea was "willingly,
knowingly, and understandingly made on the advice of competent coun-
sel."' 3 Alford's subsequent petition for a writ of habeas corpus was
denied in both the district court and the court of appeals on the basis that
the plea was voluntarily and knowingly entered. 4 On Alford's second
petition for a writ of habeas corpus' 6 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit, relying on Untited States v. Tackson,'5 held that Alford's guilty
" 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (1969).Id.
The general testimony of the witnesses was that on the day of the killing when
Alford took his gun from his house he stated that he intended to kill the victim
and when he returned home he stated that he had carried out his purpose. 400 U.S.
t 28.M"., Id at n.2:
' Brief for Appellee at 4, North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
10400 U.S. at 28 n.2.11This was and remains the maximum penalty available for second-degree murder
in North Carolina. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (1969).
"Brief for Appellee at 4.
18400 U.S. at 29.
"Id. at' 29-30.
390 U.S. 570 (1968). See discussion pp. 797-98 infra.
'
0 Alford v. North Carolina, 405 F.2d 340, 347 (4th Cir. 1968).
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plea was involuntary because its principal motivation was the fear of death.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Jackson had not established
a new test for the validity of guilty pleas, and that a guilty, plea accom-
panied by protestations of innocence constitutionally may be accepted if
an inquiry into the factual basis for the plea discloses strong evidence of
actual guilt.
In Jackson the Court held that the death penalty clause of, the Federal
Kidnaping Act' 7 constituted an impermissible burden on the assertion of
the constitutional rights to trial by jury and against self-incrimination.'"
Under the Act a person accused of kidnaping, and failing to release the
victim unharmed, could avoid the possibility of capital punishment only
by pleading guilty or by pleading not guilty and waiving his right to a
jury trial. This choice arose as a result of a section of the Act that allowed
only the jury to impose the death penalty. 9 The Court reasoned that
since the death penalty could apply only to those defendants who contest
their guilt before a jury, the statute had a chilling effect on the exercise
of the sixth amendment right to a jury trial."0 The Court further found
that the statutory scheme encouraged guilty pleas and in doing so in-
fringed upon the fifth amendment right against self-incrimination. The
court of appeals evaluated the North Carolina statute and found that it
does not permit an accused who pleads not guilty to waive a jury trial.
The accused may avoid a jury trial only if he pleads guilty and, by
statute, a plea of guilty may not result in a punishment more severe than
life imprisonment. Thus a person accused of a capital crime in North
Carolina is faced with the awesome dilemma of risking the death
penalty in order to assert his rights to a jury trial and not to plead
guilty, or, alternatively, of pleading guilty to. avoid the possibility of
capital punishment.21
The court of appeals concluded that though the Jackson doctrine did not
require the automatic invalidation of guilty pleas, entered under the North
Carolina statutes, a prisoner is entitled to relief if he can demonstrat that
his plea was in fact a product of impermissible burdens of the statutory
scheme.2 2 However, the Court's own interpretation of Jackson does not
1718 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1964).
18390 U.S. at 572.
19 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (a) (1) (1964).
20 "[T]he evil in the federal statute is not that it necessarily coerces guilty pleas
and jury waivers but simply that it needlessly encourages them." 390 U.S. at 583.
-1 405 F.2d at 344.
-
2Id. at 347.
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go that far. In Brady v. United Statesm the Court determined that
Jackson does not require the invalidation of every guilty plea induced by
a fear of the death penalty. By inference it appears that some guilty pleas
induced by fear of the death penalty may be invalidated as coerced. The
Jackson rationale would seem to support the court of appeals' holding
that Alford's plea was the exceptional, coerced type. Since the Court in
Jackson held the statute unconstitutional because it may tend to coerce
guilty pleas, it is reasonable to conclude that the Jackson doctrine must
apply where the plea was in fact coerced by the presence of the statute.
However, in Alford the Supreme Court limited Jackson to its exact
facts and stated that the standard applied by the Fourth Circuit would
result in the invalidation of all guilty pleas entered on the fear of a death
sentence without regard to the statutory scheme involved.25
Having determined that the court of appeals had misconstrued the
scope of Jackson, the Court found it necessary to inquire into the effect
of Alford's contemporaneous protestations of innocence. After noting that
state and lower federal courts were divided on the isssue of whether a
guilty plea can be accepted when it is accompanied by protestations of
innocence and hence contains a waiver of trial but no admission of
guilt, 6 the Court gleaned "relevant principles" from two prior dissimilar
decisions. In the first case, Lynch v. Overholser,7 a trial judge refused
to accept a defendant's guilty plea because the judge had in his possession
a psychiatric report which indicated that the defendant possibly was not
guilty by reason of insanity. At the subsequent trial, though the de-
fendant did not rely on the defense of insanity, he was found not guilty for
that reason and committed to a mental institution. The Supreme Court
ordered his release and implied that the judge could have accepted the
plea even though he was aware of a defense. The second case relied on by
28397 U.S. 742 (1970).
"Id. at 747. Brady is distinguishable on the facts from Alford since Brady ex-
pressly admitted guilt.
S400 U.S. at 31.8 The cases cited by the Court do not support this conclusion. In no case in
which a guilty plea was allowed did the defendant declare that he was not guilty as
in Alford. The true split of authority occurs when the accused is unwilling to
deny guilt or assert innocence because of total lack of recall as to the events sur-
rounding the act of which he is accused. Compare Hulsey v. United States, 369 F.2d
284, 287 (5th Cir. 1966), and State v. Levba, 80 N.M. 190, 453 P.2d 211 (1969),
with State v. Martinez, 89 Idaho 129, 403 P.2d 597 (1965), State ex rel. Crossley v.
Tahash, 263 Minn. 299, 116 N.W. 666 (1962), and Commonwealth v. Cottrell,
433 Pa. 177, 249 A.2d 294 (1969).27 369 U.S. 705 (1962).
[Vol. 49
VOLUTARINESS OF GUILTY PLEAS
the Court, Hudson v. United States,2" established that federal courts have
the power to impose a prison sentence after accepting a -plea of nolo con-
tendere. In Alford, the Court reasoned that since a prison sentence
may be imposed under a plea of nolo contendere an express admission of
guilt is not constitutionally required even though a guilty plea normally
consists of both a waiver of trial and an express admission of guilt.29
Thus, the two cases appear to establish that even though a defendant is
unwilling to admit guilt he may be sentenced to prison by a judge who is
aware of an available defense. However, Afford did more than acquiesce in
the entrance of a guilty plea; he affirmatively denied committing the crime
of which he was accused. Stating that there is no material difference be-
tween refusing to admit commission of a criminal act and affirmatively
denying it, the Court held that, in view of the overwhelming evidence
against Alford, he had made an intelligent choice between a trial for first-
degree murder and a plea of guilty to second-degree murder."0
It appears that both the trial court and the Supreme Court placed too
much reliance on the presentation of facts at the trial. In a situation such
as that in Alford where there is real doubt as to the voluntariness of the
plea, it is at best questionable to allow the balance to tip in favor of
acceptance of the plea on the basis of unchallenged testimony, when the
counsel for the defense neither cross-examined the witnesses nor presented
a rebuttal of their testimony. The primary purpose for the evidentiary
inquiry is to determine if there is a factual basis for the plea of guilty."1
It is suggested that the defendant's denial of guilt should negate any pro-
bative value of the testimony received. A contrary conclusion results in
a determination of guilt when there is a genuine dispute between the
state and the accused without the constitutional and procedural safeguards
inherent in a formal plenary trial.
It is submitted that the cases from which the Court derived its guide-
lines are distinguishable not only in fact but also in principle. Lynch is
" 272 U.S. 451 (1926).
" 400 U.S. at 37. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970).
" 400 U.S. at 37. See note 7 supra.
"
t FE. R. Cnint. P. 11. The term "factual basis" is ambiguous. It could possibly
be held to mean that the factual situation is clear in the mind of the accused. How-
ever, the broader and more generally accepted definition is that it is the relationship
between the acts and the law and the determination that the accused's conduct falls
within the charge. Compare McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 467 (1969),
with Griffin v. United States, 405 F.2d 1378, 1380 (D.C. Cir. 1968). See also Note,
Criminal Procedure-Requirements for Acceptance of Guilty Pleas, 48 N.C.L. REv.
352 (1970).
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'qualified by the fact that the defendant did not want to rely on the defense
of which the judge was aware, whereas Alford appeared to have been
willing to assert any defense available. Hudson means simply that if a
defendant is unwilling to admit guilt, but does not desire to contest the
assertions of the state, he may be treated as though he is guilty.8 2 Alford,
too, was unwilling to admit guilt, but his contemporaneous statements
indicate that he did, in fact, wish to contest the assertion of the state that
he was guilty. It is difficult to accept the Court's conclusion that there
is no difference between a plea which refuses to admit guilt and a plea that
expressly denies guilt. If there were in fact no difference, there would have
been no reason for the development of the plea of nolo contendere. 88
Assuming that there is sufficient precedent to justify acceptance of a
guilty plea accompanied by protestations of innocence, the question of
the voluntariness of the guilty plea in Alford remains. Under the North
Carolina statutory scheme as it existed at the time of the plea, Alford had
a choice of going before a jury under what his counsel called "aggravated
circumstances" and receiving what Alford considered a certain death
penalty"4 or pleading guilty and facing a maximum penalty of life im-
prisonment.35 The added influence of an apparent promise by the
'prosecutor that he would accept a plea to a lesser offense and the constant
urgings by counsel combined to create an irresistible decision by Alford
that if he did not plead guilty he would face certain death.8 6
82 It should be noted that the Court in Hudson did not consider whether a plea
of nolo contendere would be accepted if accompanied by protestations of innocence.
The same arguments that apply to not allowing a plea of guilty in those circum-
stances also apply to a plea of nolo contendere. Under the Federal Rules of Crim-
inal Procedure the judge need not determine if there is a factual basis for a plea
of nolo contendere. FED. R. Clm. P. 11. However, North Carolina does require
that the trial judge examine an accused and insure that he is aware of the con-
sequences of his plea. State v. Payne, 263 N.C. 77, 138 S.E.2d 765 (1964).
88 City of Burbank v. General Elec. Co., 329 F.2d 825, 835 (9th Cir. 1964)
(dictum). For a discussion of the development of the plea of nolo contendere see
Lenvin & Meyers, Nolo Contendere: Its Nature and Implications, 51 YALE L.J.
1255 (1942).
" The alleged killing took place after an argument over a white woman who was
accompanying Alford at the time. Since both Alford and the decedent were Negroes,
Alford's attorney advised him that a jury in the southern city where the incident
took place could include prejudiced persons. Supplemental Brief for Appellee at 3,
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). See L. MAYERS, supra note 2, at
117.
88 Ch. 616, [1953] N.C. SEss. L. 461, which allowed a plea of guilty to capital
offenses, was repealed by ch. 117, [1969] N.C. Snss. L. 104.
8 Alford did have considerable knowledge of the sentencing process based on his
long criminal record, which included one conviction for murder, nine for armed
robbery, and various other convictions. 400 U.S. at 29 n.4.
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The Court did not specifically mention the apparent promise by the
prosecutor. However, it did, through its language to the effect that Alford
had a choice of alternatives, recognize that the agreement probably was
made. Apparently the Court assumed that the widespread practice of
plea-bargaining3  is constitutional and was concerned merely with the
extent of its application.3 It is unquestionably sound policy that allows
a person accused of a crime to plead guilty after rationally considering the
alternatives available to him."9 However, it is submitted that the Court
should have considered all of the elements affecting this rationality in
combination as an aggregate force instead of weighing each one sep-
arately. This mode of analysis would have provided a realistic appraisal
-of whether the accused's plea was in fact voluntary. The combination
of a questionable statute, constant urgings of counsel, and a tempting
offer of a lesser charge with the constant, unequivocal assertions of
innocence should convince a court that a plea was not voluntarily rendered.
It is submitted that the Alford decision is due at least in part to the
crowded-docket anxiety, the fear that the courts will be overwhelmed
unless the instances in which the plea of guilty is allowed are increased.
But the cure for the problem of the crowded docket is legislative 'and admin-
istrative reform, not an undermining of the very rights that the courts
are designed to protect. The logical result of Alford is that in the future
it will be virtually impossible for a defendant to show coercion. It will
be of no avail to show that he was forced by statute to face a death penalty
in order to receive a jury trial. It will do him no good to show that he
did 'not want to plead guilty and that he protested his innocence from
the outset. If an accused is told by his counsel that there is a possibility
of a death sentence, that the situation is aggravated, and that the pros-
ecutor is willing to accept a guilty plea to a lesser charge and he is com-
pelled by this to plead guilty, he will have no recourse in the courts of
the United States.
TIMOTHY J. SIMMONS
See generally Comment, Guilty Plea Bargaining: Compromises By Prosecu-
tors to Secure Guilty Pleas, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 865 (1964).
" For a thorough discussion of the major objections to plea bargaining and the
alternatives available, see Comment, The Unconstitutionality of Plea Bargaining,
83 HARv. L. REv. 1387 (1970). A discussion of the broader ramifications of
bargain justice appears in Newman, Pleading Guilty for Considerations: A Stutdy
of Bargain Justice, 46 J. Cim. L.C. & P. 780, 790 (1956).
" Note, Criminal Procedure-Requirements for Acceptance of Guilty Pleas,
48 N.C.L. REv. 352, 359 (1970).
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Evidence-Good Cause and the Attorney-Client Privilege
in Shareholder's Suits
The applicability of the attorney-client privilege to corporations has
long been taken for granted.' Surprisingly, however, few cases have ex-
pressly considered the merits of the availability of the privilege to corpora-
tions, and it was not until 1962 that the first major case 2 presenting the
issue was decided. In Garner v. Wolfinbarger,8 a shareholder's derivative
suit, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit took advantage of the
flexibility afforded by the paucity of weighty precedent and declined an
automatic extension of the privilege-originally created for the protection
of individuals-to the modem corporation.4
In Garner, several stockholders of First American Life Insurance
Company of Alabama brought a class action against the corporation,
various directors and controlling persons alleging violations of federal and
state security laws and common law fraud.' The plaintiffs sought to
recover the purchase price which they and others had paid for their stock
in First American." Schweitzer had served as attorney for the corpora-
tion in connection with the first issuance of First American stock, and later
'United States v. Louisville and Nashville R.R., 236 U.S. 318, 336 (1915);
Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855 (8th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S.
833 (1956); Belanger v. Alton Box Board Co., 180 F.2d 87, 93-94 (7th Cir.
1950); CAB v. Air Transp. Ass'n, 201 F. Supp. 318 (D.D.C. 1961).
' Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 207 F. Supp. 771 (N.D. Ill.),
rev'd, 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963). The lower
court's decision denying absolutely the assertion of the privilege against the share-
holders brought a flurry of criticism. See, e.g., Note, 48 CORNELL L.Q. 551 (1963);
Note, 51 GEo. L.J. 399 (1963); Note, 76 HAv. L. Rav. 655 (1963); Note, 37
N.Y.U.L. Rnv. 955 (1962).
'430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970).
'There are two other interesting questions involved in this case not dealt with
in this note: first, whether state law dealing with privilege is substantive for
purposes of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (see Wright, Procedural
Reform: Its Limitations and Its Future, 1 GA. L. REv. 563, 571-74 (1967); Com-
ment, California Law as to Scope of Attorney-Client Privilege Held Applicable I
Federal Non-Diversity Proceedings.-Baird v. Koerner (9th Cir. 1960), 49 CALiF.
L. REv. 382 (1961)); and second, assuming that state law is applicable, should
English common law control instead of state statutes dealing with attorney-client
privilege (see Comment, Attorney-Client Privilege in Shareholders' Suits, 69
CoLum. L. REv. 309, 314 (1969)).
'430 F.2d at 1095.
'The shareholders also claimed damages derivatively on behalf of the corpora-
tion, but the district court apparently made no distinction between the two types of
action. 280 F. Supp. at 1018. Arguably, the capacity in which the shareholders sue
is irrelevant to the issue of whether the privilege should be available.
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had become its president. On deposition, Schweitzer was asked several
questions concerning advice given by him to the corporation about various
aspects of the issuance and sale of the stock and related matters.7 All
questions related to times at which Schweitzer acted as attorney, before he
became an officer of the company, and before the suit was filed." Both the
corporation, through its counsel, and Schweitzer himself asserted that the
attorney-client privilege barred him from revealing the communications
between him and the corporation. The court of appeals vacated the dis-
trict court's summary disallowance of the privilege claim and held that
the attorney-client privilege is available to a corporate client-subject,
The shareholders also sought discovery of several related documents, and the
attorney-client privilege was claimed as to them. 430 F.2d at 1096. Assuming the
attorney-client privilege were not made available to corporations, one possible
area of confusion would involve distinguishing what is "work product" from what
would have been privileged under the attorney-client rule. This distinction would
gain a new significance since "work product" would be available only if the require-
ments of the Hickman v. Taylor rule were met, while other communications would
be available without restriction. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947). Judge
Campbell, in his decision in Radiant Burners, recognized a need to distinguish
between "work product," which he felt was legitimately protected, and material sub-ject to the attorney-client privilege. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n,
207 F. Supp. 771, 776 (N.D. Ill. 1962).
In view of the fact that Schweitzer soon became president of First American,
some question is presented as to whether he was acting in the capacity of business
adviser rather than counsel. The privilege does not exist, for example, where the
attorney was acting in capacity of corporate director. United States v. Vehicular
Parking, Ltd., 52 F. Supp. 751, 753-54 (D. Del. 1943). The line is not easily drawn,
particularly when, as often happens, the attorney performs duties in both capacities.
Whether to approach the communication between the corporation and the lawyer
as an individual communication or to determine if the preponderance of his
duties is the giving of legal advice has been the choice confronting the courts in
attempting to establish a rule for deciding in which capacity the attorney acts.
United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950);
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 121 F. Supp. 792 (D. Del.
1954); American Cyanamid Co. v. Hercules Powder Co., 211 F. Supp. 85
(D. Del. 1962). Approaching each communication individually and allowing the
judge to decide, on the facts of each case, in which capacity the attorney was
acting is to be preferred. See Simon, The Attorney-Client Privilege as Applied to
Corporations, 65 YALn L.J. 952, 969 (1955); Annot., 98 A.L.R.2d 228, 247-53
(1964). The court in Garner did not deal with this issue, however, stating in the
facts that all communications involved were made to Schweitzer in his capacity
as counsel before he became a director.8 The fact that Schweitzer was serving as house counsel rather than an in-
dependent practitioner complicates the decision on capacity due to the routine assign-
ment of both business and legal tasks to one in such a position. The court expressly
refused to find this determinative, which is probably the better view. Georgia-
Pacific Plywood Co. v. United States Plywood Corp., 18 F.R.D. 463 (S.D.N.Y.
1956). Not to allow this privilege would be to discriminate against the larger corpo-
rations, since they alone have the resources and work load necessary to retain house
counsel.
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however, to the right of the stockholders to show cause why it should not
be invoked.
The attorney-client privilege as applied to individuals is one of the
most favored of all privileges. Although some commentators are taking a
long, hard look at this privilege in its modem context, 10 it is generally felt
that the impediment to fact finding is outweighed by the benefits of franker
disclosure in the lawyer's office." Nevertheless,
the privilege remains an exception to the general duty to disclose. Its
benefits are all indirect and speculative; its obstruction is plain and
concrete.... It is worth preserving for the sake of a general policy but
it is nonetheless an obstacle to the investigation of the truth. It ought
to be strictly confined within the narrowest possible limits, consistent
with the logic of its principle.12
It was with these considerations in mind that the court in Garner ap-
proached the attorney-client privilege. Previous decisions dealing with
the availability of the privilege to corporations were concerned largely
with various legalistic and somewhat conceptual arguments.3 Thus it has
been asserted that since the corporation is a legal entity, it should be able
to claim the privilege; however, it has been argued in retort that since the
corporation is a creature of the state, rather than an individual for whom
the privilege was historically designed,' 4 it must be given the privilege
by statute. The attorney-client privilege has also been analogized to the
privilege against self-incrimination, 5 which is denied to corporations
' One commonly used statement of the requirements for the attorney-client
privilege is found in Professor Wigmore's treatise:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional
legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to
that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his in-
stance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal
adviser, (8) except the protection be waived.
8 J. WIGMoP, EVIDENCE § 2292 (rev. ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as WiaMonm].1
°See, e.g., C. McCoRMIcK, EVIDENCE § 91, at 182 (1954). "If one were legis-
lating for a new commonwealth, without history or customs, it would be hard to
maintain that a privilege for lawyer-client communications would facilitate more
than it would obstruct the administration of justice." See also Gardner, A Re-
Evaluation of the Attorney-Client Privilege, 8 VILL. L. Riv. 279 (1963). Radin,
Lawyer and Client, 16 CALIF. L. REV. 487 (1928).
" C. McCoRMIcK, EVIDENCE § 91, at 181 (1954).1 8 W ORE § 2291, at 554, cited by the court in Garner. 430 F.2d at 1100.8 The most notable of these is Judge Campbell's decision in Radiant Burners,
Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 207 F. Supp. 771 (N.D. Ill. 1962).1
"Id. at 773.
The bases of the attorney-client privilege and the privilege against self-
incrimination are completely different. Briefly, while the former is to encourage
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because of its personal nature." A further, example of th mechanistic,
conceptual approach concerns the confidential nature of privileged com-
munications. To be privileged, communications must have been made in
confidence. The directors of a corporation, who usually are* the agents
claiming the privilege for it, often have business interests outside the
corporation. Thus they are not likely to preserve the confidentiality of a
communication if disclosure would benefit their outside interest. There-
fore, it has been argued that since few communications are confidential, the
privilege should be disallowed as to all.'1 Furthermore, it also has been
asserted that when a public corporation is formed, confidentiality should
be surrendered in favor of giving the stockholders access to communica-
tions relating to the management of the corporation.,
All these approaches, however, serve only as a peg upon which to hang
a decision after the judge has balanced the circumstances involved. But
as Judge Godbold said in Garner, "[6] onceptualistic phrases .. .are not
useful tools of analysis."'" And even though many of these ingenious
arguments are indicative of the basic problems involved in an extension
of the privilege, it would be preferable to deal straightforwardly with those
problems. In Garner the conflicting policies are set forth, as are the
particular circumstances to be appraised in striking a balance between a
corporation's right to invoke the privilege and the stockholder's right to
reach the information.
Certain policies historically set forth as justifications for granting the
privilege to individuals readily lend themselves to application within the
corporate setting. Due to the complexity of guiding the corporation
through the growing maze of state and federal regulations, the corporation
as directed by management is in need of legal counsel.2" It is in the interest
of all concerned that management be encouraged to seek counsel without
free disclosure between the attorney and client, the latter is a personal right granted
by the constitution. Thus the analogy is quite imperfect. See Comment, The
Lawyer-Client Privilege: Its Application to Corporations, the Role of Ethics, and
Its Possible Curtailment, 65 Nw. U.L. Rnv. 235, 241 (1961).10United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
1*Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 207 F. Supp. 771, 774 (N.D.
Ill. 1962).
's Id. at 775.
° 430 F.2d at 1101.
."American Cyanamid Co. v. Hercules Powder Co., 211 F Supp. 85, 88 n.12
(D. Del. 1962); A.B. Dick Co. v. Marr, 95 F. Supp. 83, 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1950);
Comment, Evidence: Federal Rides of Civil Procedure: Attorney-Client Privilege
as Applied to Corporations: Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 207 F.
Supp. 771 (N.D. Ill. 1962) ; Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp.
483 (E.D. Pa. 1962), 48 COZNELL L.Q. 551, 564 (1963).
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hesitation.21 Therefore, the encouragement of freedom of disclosure, the
main justification for the availability of the privilege to the individual,
should also be the main justification when a corporation is involved. 1
A second justification for the extention of the privilege is also related
to the effectiveness of corporate operation. Management should be free
to exercise their sound judgment without being harrassed by a few dis-
satisfied shareholders, who in bad faith seek to disrupt the smooth opera-
tions of the company at the expense of the other shareholders. 2 The cost
of litigating or settling these "strike suits" is, of course, born by all the
shareholders of the corporation. A strong public policy dictates that the
dissident few should not be given an added incentive to initiate such actions
by allowing them to discover what has been disclosed in confidence to
counsel in an effort to manage the corporation more effectively. This con-
sideration is not found in the situation involving an individual and lends
strong support to those who advocate that the privilege be made available
to corporations.
Nevertheless, the policy of allowing full discovery of essential facts
weighs heavily against the granting of the privilege to corporations, per-
haps even more so than in the individual attorney-client situation." Man-
agement already has the ability to obscure much of what they do and yet
remain within legitimate managerial practices.24 Allowing this privilege
gives the corporation an additional method to effectuate this zone of
silence.25 Although it is true that the mere presence of an attorney at a
board meeting, for example, would never shield what transpired there,"
the corporation nevertheless would have considerable leeway in which to
conceal important information under the guise of privilege.
21See text at note 11 supra.
2As the court in Garner said:
Due regard must be paid to the interest of nonparty stockholders, which may
be affected by impinging on the privilege, sometimes injuriously (though not
necessarily so--in some situations shareholders who are not plaintiffs may
benefit). The corporation is vulnerable to suit by shareholders whose in-
terests or intention may be inconsistent with those of other shareholders,
even others constituting a majority.
430 F.2d at 1101 n.17.
• See text at note 12 supra.
By utilizing complicated organizational structures, vast number of agents, and
advantageous accounting procedures, management can be very successful in hiding
from the lay investor exactly what it is doing.
" See Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 207 F. Supp. 771, 774
(N.D. Ill. 1962), quoting Simon, The Attorney-Client Privilege as Applied to
Corporations, 65 YALE L.J. 953, 955-56 (1956).
" With regard to privileged written communications, see Radiant Burners, Inc.
v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314, 324 (7th Cir. 1963).
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A further consideration not present in the individual attorney-client
privilege situation involves the special relationship of corporate manage-
ment to the stockholders.27 As Judge Godbold said in Garner, "it must
be borne in mind that management does not manage for itself and that
the beneficiaries of its action are the stockholders."2' This fiduciary
relationship has been the basis of attempts to apply the joint-client excep-
tion to the attorney-client privilege to corporations.2 The basis for this
exception is that parties jointly seeking legal advice have a common in-
terest, and therefore do not intend the communication to be privileged
in a suit by one against the other. It is arguable that this exception does
not apply in the corporate situation because the identity of interest is
missing. As the court in Garner recognized, the corporation and manage-
ment may have interests adverse to the shareholders.30
The special duty that management owes to the shareholders has
ramifications broader than its use merely as a basis for applying the joint-
client exception. It is, in fact, the most compelling argument against
making the privilege available to corporations. In view of management's
general fiduciary capacity, perhaps it would be preferable as a matter of
public policy to allow the decisions as well as the information upon which
they were based to stand on their merits instead of permitting manage-
ment to hide behind the attorney-client privilege. 1 This is particularly
applicable in the Garner case since the communications with counsel dealt
with what possibly was criminal activity. "To grant the corporate man-
agement plenary assurance of secrecy for opinions received is to encourage
it to disregard with impunity the advice sought.
'3 2
'See H. HENN, CoRponATIONS § 235 (2d ed. 1970).
28430 F.2d at 1101.
'When "the same attorney acts for two parties having a common interest,
and each party communicates with him [,] .... they are not privileged in a con-
troversy between the two original parties." 8 WIGMoaM § 2312.
0430 F.2d at 1101. One problem resulting from this fiduciary relationship is
that funds of the corporation are used to compensate counsel utilized by management.
At first blush, it appears that the shareholders are bearing the burden of com-
pensation, yet are denied access to the information thereby attained. This seem-
ingly unjust result is easily understood by viewing these expenditures as necessary
for the effective operation of the business. The alternative would be to force
management to obtain private counsel, but that would be unduly burdensome and
the cost would ultimately be borne by the shareholders in the form of increased
salaries. See Comment, The Attorney-Client Privilege in Shareholders' Suits, 69
CoLUm. L. Rlv. 309, 319 (1969).
31430 F.2d at 1101.
32 430 F.2d at 1102. "It has been agreed from the beginning that the privilege
can not avail to protect the client in concerting with the attorney a crime or other
evil enterprise. This is for the logically sufficient reason that no such enterprise
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. In Garner, the court applied Professor Wigmore's test requiring a
balancing of "injury" against "benefit derived"31 8 to determine whether the
privilege should be granted. Under that test a balance already delicate
when the client is an individual is made even more so because of the danger
of abuse34 in the corporate setting and the special fiduciary role of
corporate management. 5 The presence or absence of a single fact or cir-
cumstance may be crucial when the balancing test is used. On the other
hand, a rigid rule either allowing or disallowing the privilege in the
corporate situation would foreclose taking the crucial fact into considera-
tion and might well lead to an inequitable result. Obviously this criticism
is mollified to a certain extent by judicially imposed restrictions on the
application of ari absolute rule. 6 But even with these restrictions, neither
absolute rule has the flexibility necessary to deal effectively with this
delicate balance. It is here-as well as in the refusal to base the privilege
falls within the just scope of the relation between legal adviser and client."
8 WIGM oE § 2298, at 572. The shareholders' complaint alleged that the First
American Prospectus--carrying Schweitzer's name, and about which Schweitzer
had been consulted-failed to disclose the price actually paid by one of First
American's directors for shares of stock and take-out agreements guaranteeing
certain directors a profit. Reply Brief For Appellants-Petitioners and Cross-
Appellees at 6, Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970). Arguably
then, the court could have-found that the privilege was not applicable because
Schweitzer was consulted as to illegal acts or fraud. Instead, the court used this
merely as one factor to be considered in deciding whether the privilege should
apply.
"The court cited Wigrnore's four requirements for the establishment of any
privilege: -
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that will not be
disclosed. (2) This element of confidentiality 'must be essential to the full
and satisfactory maintenance of the relationship between the parties. (3)
The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to
be sedulously fostered. (4) The injury that would inure to the relation by
the disclosure of the communications must be be greater than the benefit
thereby gained for the correct disposal ,of litigation.
As applied to the attorney-client privilege, "all four conditions [were] present
with the only condition open to any dispute being the fourth." 430 F.2d at 1100,
citing 8 WIGMORE § 2285, at 527-28.
" See text at note 25 supra.
or See text at note 28 supra.
"E.g., Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 207 F. Supp. 771, 775-76
(N.D. Ill. 1962) ("trade secrets" as well as "work product" should be privileged);
United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 360 (D. Mass. 1950)
(strict confidentiality requirement); Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa. 1962) (only those in a control position may claim the
privilege for the corporation); Grant v. United States, 227 U.S. 74, 79 (1913)
(regular business documents not privileged); see Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio
Corp. of America, 121 F. Supp. 792 (D. Del. 1954); see Comment, The Lawyer-
Client Privilege: Its Application to Corporations, The Role of Ethics, and It.
Possible Curtailment, 56 Nw. U.L. REv. 235, 241-44 (1961).
[Vol. 49
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
on a conceptual, mechanistic argument-that the court in Garner strikes
out on a new approach.
3 7
[W]here the corporation is in suit against its stockholders oi charges
of acting inimically to stockholder interests, protection of those interests
as well as those of the corporation and of the public require that the
availability of the privilege be subject to the right of the stockholders
to show cause why it should not be invoked in the particular instance.38
That the attorney-client privilege in the corporate setting is still viable is
expressly accepted by the court. Furthermore, the court rejected the
argument that the fiduciary relationship is in itself a sufficient basis for
denial." More is needed, and it is expressed in terms of "good cause."
It is the utilization of "good cause" that gives the Garner decision
its flexibility. The decision sets out several largely self-explanatory factors
necessary for "good cause." 4 The general import behind the major cat-
egory is the prevention of the "strike suit." If many shareholders are in-
volved in a suit, and a large percentage of stock is represented, it is un-
likely that the suit is for nuisance value only. The nature of the claim of
the shareholders is also relevant. If the claim is obviously colorable, a
court will be less likely to refuse the privilege than if fraud or criminal
conduct is involved. In the latter situation public policy would also dictate
that the privilege not be granted. Furthermore, the burden should be on
the shareholder to show that the information is necessary and its avail-
ability from other sources is limited. One of the main justifications for
granting the attorney-client privilege is that only the attorney is silenced;
the client is still available for questioning on all matters other than the
communication itself.4" However', in Garner, for example, several of the
people involved in the alleged wrong-doing exercised their privilege against
" The court does try to deemphasize the originality of its approach by com-
paring it to the approach prescribed for inspection of corporate records by stock-
holders. 430 F.2d at 1104 n.21. The main reason for requiring good cause in record
inspection is to prevent nuisance and harassment; this reason is also involved in
the privilege situation, but the main justification for the attorney-client privilege is
the promotion of freedom of disclosure. Thus allowing good cause to be shown to
prevent the invocation of the attorney-client privilege goes further than requiring a
showing of good cause in record inspection and is a new approach.
38 430 F.2d at 1103-04.
30 430 F.2d at 1103.
,0 430 F.2d at 1104.
"' Usually, the allowance of the attorney-client privilege would cause a rela-
tively small loss of relevant information, since the party claiming the privilege
could be called under oath and freely interrogated. Assuming that the claiming
party will not perjure himself, very little could be added by questioning the attorney
as to what was said. See 8 WIGM RE § 2291, at 554.
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self-incrimination, and were unavailable as sources of information. 2 The
final factor in this category deals with whether the information is
identifiable and not just the object of a fishing expedition.
The second and third categories concern the protection of an at-
torney's "work product" and communications with respect to trade secrets.
"Work product" is protected by the decision in Hickman v. Taylor,4"
and trade secrets by the trial judge's use of discretion; nevertheless, the
court in Garner makes it abundantly clear that its decision does not in-
fringe upon these areas. Therefore, communication and advice concerning
the litigation itself will not be made available even if the privilege is held
not to apply. The court in Garner suggests the use of in camera in-
spection to facilitate the examination of the above factors in order to
prevent harm to the interests of the corporation.
As in the application of any flexible rule, the court involved will be
called upon to make a case-by-case application. It has been argued that
to require a court to make this judgment would place an additional burden
on our already overburdened court system,44 whereas an absolute rule
could be easily administered. However, an absolute rule-disallowing
the privilege, for example-could lead to even more of a burden, since
it might encourage stockholders' suits motivated solely by curiosity. It
could also be argued persuasively that a flexible rule would lead to erratic
decisions.4 5 Nevertheless, the benefit of having a flexible rule arguably
outweighs this potential harm. Finally there is the question of whether
management's knowledge that communications made to counsel may later
" Reply Brief for Appellants-Petitioners and Cross-Appellees at 9, Garner v.
Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970).
" 329 U.S. 495 (1947). The court noted that documents in the possession of the
attorney can be beyond the reach of the opposing party either because of the in-
vocation of the attorney-client privilege or because it is a product of the attorney's
preparation for the litigation. Id. at 508-10. The latter is protected for reasons
wholly different from the policies behind the attorney-client privilege. "Work
product" can be obtained by the showing of the good cause, but privileged docu-
ments were formerly unobtainable regardless of good cause. Comment, The
Attorney-Client Privilege in Shareholders' Suits, 69 CoLUM. L. REv. 309, 315 n.29
(1969). The decision in Garner could well be read to put privilege and "work
product" on an equal footing.
"'Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 10, Garner v. Wolfinbarger, - U.S.L.W.
- (U.S. 1971).
"' FED. R. Civ. P. 34 was amended in 1970 to exclude the requirement of good
cause for the production of documents. When the deletion was originally proposed,
one of the reasons given was to elimnate uncertain and erratic protection to the
parties from whom production was sought. Advisory Committee on the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, Proposed Amendments to The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure Relating to Discovery, 48 F.R.D. 487, 526 (1969) (Advisory Commit-
tee's Note).
[Vol. 49
STATE STREET TRUST DOCTRINE
be divulged will curtail freedom of consultation with legal advisers.4" The
Garner decision should have limited impact, since the privilege would be
denied only when a corporation is involved in a suit with its shareholders
and the shareholders can show "good cause" why it should not be ex-
tended. Since the need for counsel is still eminent, full disclosure by
honest management should not be affected.
MICHAEL D. MEEKER
Federal Estate Taxation-The State Street Trust Doctrine,
1959-1970: R.I.P.
In March, 1970, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit buried one
of the most vexatious concepts in the field of estate taxation. The court,
in Old Colony Trust Co. v. United States,- specifically overruled State
Street Trust Co. v. United States' by holding that "no aggregation of
purely administrative powers"8 would cause the corpus of a trust to be
included in the settlor's estate under sections 2036 (a) (2) and 2038 of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.4 In State Street the court held that
when a decedent-settlor had retained as trustee broad powers of admin-
istration which permitted him to exchange trust property without reference
to value, to invest in securities yielding either high income or no income
at all (specifically including wasting investments) and to allocate assets
to income or principal in all cases (whether state law as to proper alloca-
" See Comment, The Lawyer-Client Privilege: Its Application to Corporations,
The Role of Ethics, and Its Possible Curtailment, 56 Nw. U.L. REv. 235, 256-59(1961).
1423 F.2d 601 (1st Cir. 1970).
263 F.2d 635 (1st Cir. 1959).
3 423 F.2d at 603.
'N T. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 2036(a) (2), 2038. Section 2036 of the Code in-
cludes in a decedent's estate property transferred to another in which the decedent
retained a life estate. Specifically included is property with respect to which the
decedent retained "the right, either alone or in conjunction with any person, to
designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the property or the income there-
from." This section is only applicable to transfers made after March 3, 1931.
Section 2036 includes the total amount of the property transferred. Section 2038
includes within a decedent's estate transferred property subject to the power of the
decedent to "alter, amend, revoke, or terminate, or where any such power is
relinquished in contemplation of decedent's death." It makes no difference under
section 2038 whether the decedent ever owned the property subject to the power;
it is only necessary that the decedent had the power on the date of his death or
had transferred it in contemplation of his death. Both sections 2 036(a) (2) and
2038 include property even if the power is exercisable only in a fiduciary capacity.
Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2036-1(b) (3), 20.2038(a) (1958).
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tion was in doubt or not), then the settlor-trustee had retained the right
to "designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the property or the
income therefrom" under section 2036(a) (2) and the power "to alter,
amend, revoke, or terminate" under section 2038.'
The State Street trust was administered under the laws of Massachu-
setts subject to the supervision of the state courts of equity. The first
circuit felt that although these state courts would intervene should the
trustee act in utter disregard of a beneficiary by putting "all, or nearly
all, of the trust assets in wasting investments [or] in a property yielding
little or even no income,"' nonetheless, a trustee who possessed broad
management powers could substantially shift the benefits of such a trust
between the life tenants and remaindermen.7 The decision was grounded
in the idea that the state courts had no ascertainable standard by which
to enforce the rights of beneficiaries with adverse interests.' The effect of
this holding was to throw considerable doubt on the tax consequences of
irrevocable inter vivos trusts incorporating wide administrative powers.9
Sound drafting practices until State Street had called for broad dis-
cretionary powers in the trustees to prevent the trust from being crippled
by delay and expense of frequent court approval.'0 It was not surprising
therefore that, at the next opportunity, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court launched an attack on the decision and began to demonstrate the de-
gree of supervision that the state courts would impose over fiduciaries. The
newly militant posture was evident in Boston Safe Deposit & Triest Co.
v. Stone,"1 which involved the power of the trustees to determine reason-
ably the value of assets for distribution. 2 The supreme court, in finding
that the trustees had valued the assets reasonably, pointed out that " 'a
court of equity may control a trustee in the exercise of a fiduciary dis-
cretion if it acts beyond the bounds of a reasonable judgment or unreason-
ably disregards usual fiduciary principles, or the purposes of the trust, or
5263 F.2d at 637-39. Both sections 2036 and 2038 are applicable regardless of
whether the settlor-trustee holds the power alone or with another as long as the
cotrustees do not have substantial adverse interests. It is necessary that the settlor
hold the power in a fiducial capacity either as trustee or by implication from the
trust instrument.
6 Id. at 638-39.
7 Id.8Id. at 639.
'See Barrett, The Marital Deduction, 50 MAss. L.Q. 18 (1965).
" See geerally Note, 45 IOWA L. REv. 426 (1960).
1 348 Mass. 345, 203 N.E.2d 547 (1965).
"
2The facts found by the lower court indicate that this was a clear case of
reasonable and impartial determination of value.
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if it fails to observe standards of judgment apparent from the applicable
instrument.' "13 The court pointedly asserted that it disagreed with the
suggestion to the contrary by the majority in State Street.14
The Massachusetts court made an even more telling attack in Old
Colony Trust Co. v. Silliman.Y The trust in this case was set up to benefit
an intervening life estate with a charitable remainderman and included the
power of the trustee to decide whether to treat accretions and expenses as
income or principal. The court held that the power to allocate accretions
as disbursements between income and principal would defeat the intent
of the trust if the trustee could substitute his uncontrolled discretion for
the established rules and, as in Boston Safe, Massachusetts courts would
hold a fiduciary to "reasonable regard of usual fiduciary principles"
when applying discretionary powers. 6 "Reasonable regard" was inter-
preted to mean that established rules would be applied. 17 Boston Safe and
Silliman both cited with specific approval Judge McGruder's dissent in
State Street and substantially clarified the degree of supervision that
Massachusetts courts would exercise over fiduciaries.'"
The United States Tax Court, which at the time of State Street was
not obligated to consider the holdings of other federal courts,'" supported
the position of the Massachusetts court in two significant decisions.
1" 348 Mass. at 351, 203 N.E.2d at 552.
" As Chief Judge Magruder indicated ... in his dissent [in State Street]
.... a Massachusetts Court of Equity will 'supervise the administration of
. . trusts so as to control any attempt to shift the incidence of their en-
joyment.' Even broadly expressed administrative and management powers
. . . 'are limited by standards which the Massachusetts court of equity could
and would apply to supervise effectively... [proper trust] administration.'
We disagree with any suggestion to the contrary... in the majority opinion
in that case ....
Id. at 351 n.8, 203 N.E.2d at 552 n.8.
" 352 Mass. 6, 223 N.E.2d 504 (1967).
1 Id. at 10, 223 N.E.2d at 507.
3.7 Id.
18 See also Briggs v. Crowley, 352 Mass. 194, 224 N.E.2d 417 (1967) (trust
provisions purporting to relieve trustees from duty of accounting except to donor
ineffective as against public policy to deprive beneficiary standing to compel
accounting); Holyoke Nat'l Bank v. Wilson, 350 Mass. 223, 214 N.E.2d 42 (1966)
(trustees are required to exercise power to invade corpus for beneficiary's com-
fort, maintenance, and support with proper regard to accepted fiduciary principles);
Copp v. Worcester Co. Nat'l Bank, 347 Mass. 548, 199 N.E.2d 200 (1964) (dis-
cretionary power of the trustee to invade corpus of trust to the extent of five hun-
dred dollars for the proper maintenance of the settlor's wife had to be exercised
in accordance with fiduciary standards).
'
0 The Tax Reform Act of 1969*changed the United. States Tax Court from an
administrative agency to a court deriving its powers from article I of the Con-
stitution. Tax Reform Act of 1969, 26 U.S.C. § 7441 (Supp. V, 1965-69).
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Estate of Edward E. Ford0 involved in inter vivos trust administered
under the laws of New York. The settlor had named himself sole trustee
and had retained the power to invade the corpus "for the purpose of de-
fraying expenses occasioned by illness, infirmity or disability, either mental
or physical, or for his support, maintenance, education, welfare and
happiness."'" He also had retained the administrative powers to allocate
receipts, losses, and expenses to either income or principal and to invest
in such classes of property as the trustee might in his discretion select. The
classes of property specifically included investments not normally con-
sidered appropriate for trusts.22 The court held as to the invasion power,
that although "happiness" does not normally provide an ascertainable
standard, in this case the power was circumscribed by the requirement
that the beneficiary be in "need" of funds. This requirement so limited
the definition of "happiness" that a New York court of equity would be
able to find the requisite external standard to enforce the beneficiaries'
rights.23 The court rationalized the administrative powers as being "com-
monly included in trust instruments," noting that abuse of discretion
"would be subject to equity court of review. ' 24 Further, the majority spe-
cifically found that since each of these powers was subject to supervision
by the equity court, the State Street rule that the powers, when viewed in
the aggregate, would require inclusion under sections 2036 and 2038, did
not apply.'
Ford was decided by a split court with five judges dissenting, but in
the following year a united court decided the case of Estate of Phyllis W.
McGillicuddy" on similar grounds. This case involved the validity of a
charitable deduction from the taxable estate. The Commissioner's posi-
tion was that the trustee's powers were so broad that he could shift the
beneficial interests between the income beneficiary and the charitable
remainderman, thus rendering the value of the remainder interest un-
ascertainable.2 The powers involved were the trustee's right to invest in
regulated securities companies and to determine all questions of income or
principal. The latter power was not restricted to those areas of the law
20 53 T.C. 114 (1969).
21 Id. at 121.
22 Id. at 128.
23 Id. at 126-27.
2 Id. at 127-28.
'11Id. at 127-29.
2- 54 T.C. 315 (1970). This trust was also administered under the lavs of
Massachusetts.
2 Id. at 320-21.
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in doubt.28 The court simply relied on the statement of Massachusetts
law contained in Sillinwe that the power to allocate accretions and ex-
penses between income and principal was primarily a management power
allowing the trustee to use good faith in instances of doubt and that the
granting of such power would not authorize the favoring of either the life
beneficiary or the remainderman. 30
The principal case, Old Colony Trust Co. v. United States,3 involved
an inter vivos trust administered under the laws of Massachusetts for the
benefit of the son of the settlor-trustee. The settlor had retained the power
to decrease payments of income to the beneficiary when "the stoppage of
such payments is for his [the beneficiary's] best interests."32 The trustee
also had broad administrative powers including the power to make in-
vestments not normally considered safe for trustees, and to "determine,
what was to be charged or credited to income or principal."'3 Here again
the government sought to include the entire corpus of the trust in the
decedent's taxable estate on the basis that both the power of distribution
and of management gave the settlor-trustee the right to designate who
should enjoy the property under section 2036(a) (2). 4 Turning first to
the management powers, the first circuit made short work of -the govern-
ment's argument. Citing the chain of cases discussed above, the court
came to the conclusion that State Street was wrong in concluding that
even though each individual power would be subject to control by a
Massachusetts probate court, the aggregate of the powers gave the trustees
such control over the corpus as to be equated with substantial owner-
ship.3 5 The mere existence of purely administrative powers was deemed
insufficient in itself to work an inclusion under either section 2036 (a) (2)
or 2038 (a) (1) for trusts administered in Massachusetts.
The inquiry into the power over distribution centered on a search for
an ascertainable standard in the body of the trust instrument. 6 Words
authorizing distribution as needed to maintain the beneficiary's way of
life would have provided such a standard.3 7 However, the authorization
28 Id. at 318-19.
" See p. 813 supra.80 54 T.C. at 323.
01423 F.2d 601 (1970).
2 Id. at 602.
38 Id.8
' Id.
1 Id. at 603.86 Id. at 603-04.
87 Id. at 604.
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to withhold payments when in the "best interests" of the settlor's son was
clearly an unascertainable standard; this result was reinforced by the
parent-child relationship between the trustee and beneficiary.88 Although
the absence of "best'interests" criteria resulted in the taxpayer losing his
case, he did nonetheless establish an important change in existing tax law.
The undeniable effect of Old Colony is to prevent the corpus of a trust
from being included in a decedent-trustee's estate under sections 2036(a)
(2) aid 2038(1) (b) solely because of broad discretionary administrative
powers. But since the decision was based on the degree of supervision over
fiduciaries by Massachusetts courts, the government's position is not
entirely vitiated as to other jurisdictions. It is appropriate therefore to
consider the probable result of such an argument in light of the super-
vision provided by North Carolina courts.
Unfortunately, it is not clear that North Carolina courts of equity will
exercise their jurisdiction to control the discretionary powers of trustees
under circumstances that would prevent a State Street inclusion. When
the powers are restricted by a court, the two most commonly employed
means are by finding an abuse of discretion 9 and by finding protection for
remaindermen and/or beneficiaries in interpretation of the settlor's in-
tent The scope of control exercised by courts with respect to abuse of
discretion depends upon judicial definition of terms such as "improper
motive" and "reasonable judgment." Interpretation of intent often does
not give such leeway, however, since in many cases the plain wording of
te instrument makes clear the settlor's intent to provide unbridled dis-
cretion in the trustee in administration of the trust.41 In any event, the
Id. The parent-child relationship between the trustee-settlor and the bene-
ficiary makes the "best interests" requirement even more vague since each parent
has his own opinion as to what is in the best interest of a child.
" The courts find abuse of discretion of the trustee "if he acts dishonestly, or if
be acts with improper even though not dishonest motive, or if he fails to use his
judgment, or if he acts beyond the bounds of reasonable judgment." Woodward
v. Mordecai, 234 N.C. 463, 471, 67 S.E.2d 639, 644 (1951); RESTATEMENT OF
TRUSTS § 187 (1935) ; 65 C.J. Trusts § 539 (1933).
"' Little v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 252 N.C. 229, 113 S.E.2d 689 (1960);
Carter v. Kempton, 233 N.C. 1, 62 S.E.2d 713 (1950); Hester v. Hester, 16 N.C.
328 (1829).
"See, e.g., State Street Trust Co. v. United States, 263 F.2d 635 (1st Cir.
1959). In order to find an intent that is contrary to the plain words of the instru-
ment, the court would have to find ambiguity in the mere existence of classes of
beneficiaries with adverse interests. It is entirely possible for the court to conclude
that the scope actually intended by the settlor was uncontrolled discretion and then
the question is clearly put as to where the external standard of control is that will
provide guidance to both trustee and the courts.
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key is an external standard of control that will prevent the corpus from
being included in the decedent-settlor's taxable estate.
The North Carolina Supreme Court in Lichtenfels V. North Carolina
National Bank42 determined that where the trustee had broad investment
powers, including specifically the power not to diversify, the court would
not surcharge the trustee for failure to diversify. The court stated that
"the directives of a Will are honored and given effect unless some over-
riding and compelling reason requires deviation."4 The court on several
occasions has expressed a willingness to intervene in the management of
a trust but these have been, by and large, cases of gross abuse of dis-
cretion amounting to bad faith or fraud.-4 There are no cases dealing
squarely with court supervision of powers as broad as those granted in"
State Street or as would be available if the trust incorporated the statutory
powers of the North Carolina Powers of Fiduciaries Act.45 In short there'
does not appear to be a judicially enforced external standard other than
one for gross abuse of discretion.
Nonetheless, the supreme court on occasion has expressed an attitude
towards discretionary powers that is strongly reminiscent of the language
used by the Massachusetts Court in Silliman.46 An excellent example,
Campbell v. Jordan,47 dealt with the discretionary power to distribute trust
principal. This case held that where the trustee has the power to distribute
to lifetime beneficiaries limited by the requirement that the distribution be
"necessary and best" for the beneficiary and consistent with th, welfare of
the trust estate and the testator's family, the trustee could not distribute un-
42268 N.C. 467, 151 S.E.2d 78 (1966).
Id. at 479, 151 S.E.2d at 85.
"Kuykendall v. Proctor, 270 N.C. 510, 155 S.E.2d 293 (1967) (trustee was the
guardian of the incompetent life beneficiary and was also the remainderman under
the terms of the trust); Erickson v. Starling, 233 N.C. 539, 64 S.E.2d 832 (1951)(self-dealing for profit on part of trustee) ; Lightner v. Boone, 222 N.C. 205, 22
S.E.2d 426 (1942) (trustee accused of using trust funds to speculate in his own
xiame).
N.C. GExr. STAT. §§ 32-25 to -27 (1966 & Supp. 1969). This statute includes
a variety of specific powers but the following are those commonly considered to
have adverse estate tax consequences: the power to sell and exchange property
[§ 32-27 (2)], to invest [§ 32-27(3)], and to allocate receipts and expenses between
income and principal [§ 32-27(29)1. For these adverse consequences to occur the
trust must, of course, be inter vivos with the settlor retaining the condemned powers
to himself personally or as a fiduciary. If there is a possibility that the settlor may
become a trustee, the powers may also result in adverse consequences. Treas. Reg.
§ 20.2036-1 (b) (3).
"See p. 813 supra.
'"274 N.C. 233, 162 S.E.2d 545 (1968).
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less the beneficiary could show that these conditions were met.48 After
holding the trustee's powers so limited on these facts, the opinion cited a
Maine case49 defining discretion "as deliberate judgment,-the discernment
of what is right and proper. It implies soundness of judgment-judgment
directed by circumspection." The court in Campbell then quoted the Re-
statement of the Law of Trusts for the proposition that where a trust is
created for sucessive beneficiaries, the trustees must act with due regard
for their interests.50 Kemp v. Paterson,51 a New York case which restricted
the power of the trustee to invade the corpus for the best interests of the
beneficiary, also found favor with the North Carolina court. The Kemp
decision held that best interest of the beneficiary meant " 'best interests'
... within the framework of the status bestowed upon her by the settlor,
the status of a life beneficiary, not of a recipient of the entire trust res."5 2
Such language, if applied to broad administrative powers, would probably
be sufficient to remove them from tax liability even under State Street.
This position is anything but certain, however, since the language in
Campbell is only dicta.
The first circuit in State Street, whether by design or not, was recog-
nizing that a trustee with broad management powers is in fact able to shift
the benefits of a trust between life beneficiaries and remaindermen. These
shifts can be significant to parties with adverse interests even if not for
tax purposes. Yet the trend today continues toward broad trustee discre-
tion in the interest of sound estate management 3 despite the possibility,
or even probability, of a corresponding loss of fiduciary responsibility and
loyalty. 4 The holding in Old Colony presents an opportunity to the North
Id. at 241; 162 S.E.2d at 551.
"In re Murray, 142 Me. 24, 30, 45 A.2d 636, 638 (1946). The power involved
in this case was the power to invade for the comfortable support and maintenance
of the life beneficiary. The court held that the trustee's discretion was not
absolute and that he must act with due regard to the interests of successive
beneficiaries.10 274 N.C. at 242, 162 S.E.2d at 551.
"14 App. Div. 2d 153, 163 N.Y.S.2d 245, aff'd, 6 N.Y.2d 40, 159 N.E.2d 661,
188 N.Y.S2d 161 (1959).2 Id. at -, 163 N.Y.S.2d at 248. "Best interests" in this case amounted to
terminating the trust to avoid a fifty-six per cent British estate tax. It was clear
that the trustees were acting honestly and in good faith. The remaindermen were
the children of the life beneficiary. This case represents protection with a ven-
geance of remainder interests from trustee discretion. As a practical matter, the
infant remaindermen would have benefited by the termination of the trust.
" Fratcher, Trustees' Powers Legislation, 37 N.Y.U.L. Rv. 627 (1962);
Horowitz, Uniform Trustees' Powers Act, 41 WAsH. L. REv. 1 (1966).
" Note, Trusts-The North Carolina Fiduciary Powers Act and the Duty of
Loyalty, 45 N.C.L. Rnv. 1141 (1967).
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Carolina General Assembly to achieve the dual objective of insuring that
trustees maintain a high standard of responsibility and at the same time
assist North Carolina taxpayers in contests with the government.
The General Assembly has demonstrated its awareness of the possible
tax consequences to the settlor who incorporates all of the powers in North
Carolina General Statutes section 32-27. But the admonition that "[n] o
power . . . shall be exercised by such fiduciary in such a manner as,
in the aggregate, to deprive the trust or the estate ... of [a] tax exemp-
tion, deduction or credit ... ,"' is probably totally ineffective as a tax
avoidance device because it not only provides no standard by which the
trustee may govern his conduct but also provides no standard by which
the courts may supervise a fiduciary's management of a trust.
Any statute that would limit the discretionary powers of a trustee to
compliance with usual or common law fiduciary principles or which would
impose active supervision of trusts by the courts is bound to negate part of
the freedom that many estate planners seek in setting up trusts with broad
management powers. Yet when one considers the need for continued
fiduciary responsibility and the added incentive of protection from tax
liability, the price may not be high at all.
MIKE CRUMP
Federal Jurisdiction-The Property Eights Exception to Civil Rights
Jurisdiction Under Section 1343(3)
Section 1343 of Title 28 of the United States Code vests the federal
district courts with
original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to be
commenced by any person:
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or
immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by
any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all
persons within the jurisdiction of the United States .... 1
Section 1343(3), available regardless of the amount in controversy, is
important to potential litigants who desire a federal forum for the
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32-26(b) (1966).
128 U.S.C. § 1343 (1964).
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resolution of constitutional issues but are unable to meet the threshold
jurisdictional amount requirement of the general federal question juris-
dictional grant.2 The most problematical aspect of section 1343(3) is the
restriction, spawned by Justice Stone in Hague v. CIO,8 excluding suits
to redress deprivations of "property rights."' That restriction, not found
in the language of the statute, has plagued the federal courts since its
inception in 1939; 5 has driven some courts to great lengths to avoid deal-
ing with the issue;' and has led to directly contradictory results.7 This
note examines the origin and development of the "property rights" excep-
tion.
Although originating in the Civil Rights Act of April 20, 1871,8
section 1343 (3) was first subjected to meaningful scrutiny by the Supreme
Court in Hague, in which jurisdiction was sustained under that statute
in an action brought to enjoin interference by city officials with dis-
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000 ex-
clusive of interest or costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws or treaties
of the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1964). Section 1331 (a) is derived from the Act of March 3,
1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470. For a general discussion of the Act of 1875, see
Aycock, Introduction to Certain Members of the Federal Question Family, 49
N.C.L. REv. 1, 23 (1970).
307 U.S. 496 (1939).
'See p. 821-22 infra.
'In Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1969), after reviewing the cases in
the area, judge Friendly remarked: "We must confess we are not altogether
clear just where this leaves us." Id. at 565.
'E.g., in Hall v. Garson, 430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1970), the court characterized
a -landlord's lien statute as authorizing unreasonable invasions of the human right
of privacy in order to avoid the "property rights" jurisdictional issue, while never
mentioning the privacy consideration in the discussion of the merits of the constitu-
tional attack on the statute.
' Compare, e.g., Euge v. Trantina, 422 F.2d 1070 (8th Cir. 1970), with Blume
v. City of Deland, 358 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1966).
'Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13. The substantive provision of this
Act is now found in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964). For a general discussion of section
1983, see Note, The Civil Rights Act of 1871: Continuing Vitality, 40 NOTRE DAME
LAw. 70 (1964).
Most courts agree that section 1343(3) is the jurisdictional companion of sec-
tion 1983. and that the two sections are coextensive, at least in the sense that
section 1343(3) will afford jurisdiction for any suit brought under section 1983.
See, e.g., AFL v. Watson, 327 U.S. 582, 590 (1946) (dictum); National Land
& Inv. Co. v. Specter, 428 F.2d 91, 93-100 (3d Cir. 1970). If sections 1343(3) and
1983 are coextensive, any restriction on section 1343(3) would also be a restriction
on the substantive section 1983. But see McCall v. Shapiro, 416 F.2d 246, 250
(2d Cir. 1969), indicating that section 1343(3) may be narrower than section 1983.
See also Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 403 (1970), and Hall v. Garson, 430
F.2d 430, 438 (5th Cir. 1970), which indicate that 28 U.S.C. § 1343(4) (1964)
affords jurisdiction for suits under section 1983.
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semination of literature concerning, and assembly for discussion of, the
National Labor Relations Act.9 In his concurring opinion,'" Justice Stone
viewed the jurisdictional issue as requiring definition of the extent of the
overlap" between the 1871 Act and the Act of 1875,"2 which had extended
general federal question jurisdiction to the lower federal courts. Justice
Stone reasoned that neither statute should be taken as abrogating the
other, and in his attempt to harmonize them he initially stated that this
was best done by construing section 1343(3) to confer "federal juris-
diction of suits brought under the Act of 1871 in which the right asserted
is inherently incapable of pecuniary valuation."' Precedent supporting
this distinction was found by comparing Holt v. Indiana Manufacturing
Co.,14 in which the Court had denied jurisdiction under section 1343 (3)
in a suit to enjoin taxation of patent rights, with Truax v. Raick, 5 in
which the Court had sustained section 1343(3) jurisdiction in an action
brought by an alien employee to enjoin enforcement against his employer
of a statute prohibiting employment of work forces comprised of more
than twenty per cent aliens.'" Had Justice Stone concluded his opinion
without more, one might logically have thought that the crucial aspect of
Truax was the discrimination against aliens. But Justice Stone pro-
ceeded to approve Crane v. Johnson, 7 in which the Court sustained
section 1343(3) jurisdiction in a suit brought by a doctor, who healed
by mental suggestion, to enjoin enforcement of a statute requiring exam-
ination for licensing. The statute was alleged to deny equal protectiorf
by exempting certain practitioners who used prayer to heal. At this
0 307 U.S. at 501-04.
" Unfortunately, there was no opinion of the Court on the jurisdictional issue,
or on the merits, for that matter. Justice Roberts, with whom Justice Black con-
curred, thought that section 1343(3) originated in the Civil Rights Act of April 9,
1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27, and that it afforded jurisdiction in suits by United States
citizens to redress deprivations of their rights, privileges, and immunities as such.
Finding a claim set out under the privileges and immunities clause of the four-
teenth amendment, Justice Roberts had little difficulty sustaining jurisdiction.
307 U.S. at 508 & n.10, 512. The dissenters did not discuss jurisdiction. Id. at
532-33.
"1307 U.S. at 529-30. Justice Stone noted that the language of the Act of 1871
extended broadly to secure to all persons-whether citizens or not-any right,
privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution, and rejected the argument that
the term "secured" in section 1343(3) means created rather than protected. Id. at
519, 525-27.
"' See note 2 supra.
307 U.S. at 530 (emphasis added).
1,176 U.S. 68 (1900).
"239 U.S. 33 (1915).
"307 U.S. at 530-31.
17242 U.S. 339 (1917).
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point one might have concluded that to Justice Stone the common de-
nominator in Crane and Truax was the right to work, which, surprisingly,
was viewed as being incapable of pecuniary valuation. However, after
citing Crane with approval Justice Stone shifted the emphasis from the
ability to assign a monetary value to the right to the personal nature of
that right; he thought it important to note that in both Crane and Truax
the right asserted was one of "personal freedom" arising under the equal
protection clause, and that "in both the gist of the cause of action was not
damage or injury to property, but unconstitutional infringement of a right
of personal liberty not susceptible of valuation in money."' 8 The shift was
completed when Justice Stone ended his opinion with the assertion that
[t]he conclusion seems inescapable that the right conferred by the
Act of 1871 to maintain a suit in equity in the federal courts to protect
the suitor against a deprivation of rights or immunities secured -by the
Constitution, has been preserved, and that whenever the right or im-
munity is one of personal liberty, not dependent for its existence upon
the infringement of property rights, there is jurisdiction in the district
courts under [section 1343(3)] to entertain it without proof [of an]
amount in controversy .... 19
Although Justice Stone's distinction has been expressly rejected in iso-
lated cases,20 and, more frequently, ignored2 or prudently circumvented,22
the majority of the lower courts have attempted to discern and follow his
principle, with the consequent expenditure of a great deal of judicial time
and energy. Unfortunately, the result is a general state of confusion flow-
ing from a basic failure to agree on what "property rights" are.2" For the
18 307 U.S. at 531.
Id. at 531-32 (emphasis added).
"oE.g., in Joe Louis Milk Co. v. Hershey, 243 F. Supp. 351 (N.D. Ill. 1965),
the court remarked that "[n]o difference in constitutional protection between prop-
erty rights and human rights is expressed in the language of § 1343 itself," and that
"[n]either logic nor policy compels the conclusion that property rights are less
deserving of protection under the Constitution and Civil Rights Act than are human
freedoms. .. ." Id. at 354.
1 E.g., Blume v. City of Deland, 358 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1966) ; Cobb v. City of
Malden, 202 F.2d 701 (1st Cir. 1953).
" E.g., McGuire v. Sadler, 337 F.2d 902 (5th Cir. 1964).
8 At least one potential issue has been resolved, for it seems settled that section
1343(3) affords jurisdiction in suits for damages as well as in those for injunctive
relief. E.g., Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970). This balm exists
despite the fact that both justice Stone's opinion in Hague and section 1343 itself
could be read as implying exclusion of damage actions. Justice Stone spoke of the
maintenance of a "suit in equity" and of rights "not susceptible of valuation in
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most part individual courts have seized upon one or the other, but not
both, of Justice Stone's apparently nonidentic initial and final formulations
of his distinction as the correct expression of the section 1343(3) juris-
dictional grant. Thus one of the two prevailing statements of the section
1343(3) test requires the right asserted to be "incapable of pecuniary
valuation,"2 and the other formulation demands that the right be one
of" 'personal liberty, not dependent for its existence upon the infringement
of property rights.' "25 In addition, differently phrased tests have been
applied,26 and the confusion is compounded by the occasional inter-
changeable use of the tests2 7 and by the tendency of courts to give the
complaint an expansive or narrow reading depending on what result seems
desirable.2"
As is to be expected, uniform results generally obtain in cases in
which the right asserted passes muster under either or neither of the two
principal tests. Thus when the action is for damages for a mere economic
loss, section 1343(3) jurisdiction is denied.9 On the other extreme,
when the suit is brought for injunctive relief against unconditional denials
of rights traditionally denominated "civil," such as the rights of free
speech and assembly involved in Hague, the courts find no difficulty in
sustaining jurisdiction."0 The midpoint is marked by the troublesome cases
in which either test may reasonably be thought to require either a finding
money." 307 U.S. at 331-32. Sections 1343(1) and (2) grant jurisdiction in suits
"to recover damages." Section 1343(4) grants jurisdiction in suits to "recover
damages or to secure equitable or other relief." But section 1343(3) affords juris-
diction in suits "to redress" deprivations of rights. 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1964).
2 Alterman Transp. Lines, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 259 F. Supp. 486, 492
(M.D. Tenn. 1966), aff'd per curiam, 386 U.S. 262 (1967).
'Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 560, 564 (2d Cir. 1969), quoting Hague v. CIO,
307 U.S. 496, 531 (1939).
" E.g., Escalera v. New York City Housing Auth., 425 F.2d 853, 864 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 39 U.S.L.W. 3149 (U.S. Oct. 13, 1970) ("civil rights"); Ream
v. Handley, 359 F.2d 728, 731 (7th Cir. 1966) (no section 1343(3) jurisdiction to
protect "property or monetary rights").7 E.g., McCall v. Shapiro, 416 F.2d 246, 249-50 (2d Cir. 1969).
28E.g., in Escalera v. New York City Housing Auth., 425 F.2d 853 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 39 U.S.L.W. 3149 (U.S. Oct. 13, 1970), a suit to enjoin eviction from
public housing, the court characterized the claim as being the deprivation of "pro-
cedural due process, a civil right, which may ultimately lead to the loss of a prop-
erty right, to wit, tenancy in public housing projects." Id. at 864.
2
'E.g., City of Boulder v. Snyder, 396 F.2d 853 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 1051 (1969) ; Ream v. Handley, 359 F.2d 728 (7th Cir. 1966).
" E.g., Schnell v. City of Chicago, 407 F.2d 1084 (7th Cir. 1969) (interference
by policemen with photographers' right to record news); Dawley v. City of
Norfolk, 260 F.2d 647 (4th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 935 (1959) (suit to
compel removal of the word "colored" from courthouse restrooms).
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or denial of jurisdiction. One example is Gold v. Lomenao,31 in which
section 1343(3) jurisdiction was sustained in an action to enjoin the
suspension of a real estate brokerage license. In Gold, Judge Friendly
remarked that "a challenge to the revocation of a license to engage in an
occupation 'can be viewed about equally well as complaining of a depriva-
tion of the personal liberty to pursue a calling of one's choice or of the
profits or emoluments deriving therefrom.' "32 Judge Friendly's state-
ment was rendered in the context of his application of the test requiring
the right asserted to be one of "personal liberty. ' 33 However, if the right
in Gold is not viewed merely as the deprivation of economic benefits, it
may be classified as incapable of monetary valuation as well as a right of
personal liberty. Some courts have aided their inquiry in close cases by
drawing a distinction according to plaintiff's purpose in bringing the
suit,3 4 although the great majority of the cases never mention that purpose,
and it has been said to be irrelevant.3 5
Notwithstanding the general confusion, results may be accurately
predicted in several specific analytical categories of cases.30 One instance
is the area of state taxation, where Justice Stone's distinction and the
result in Holt have clearly prevailed, although not wholly without re-
sistance." Since 1962, the Supreme Court has affirmed, without com-
ment, three district court decisions applying the property rights exception
to deny section 1343(3) jurisdiction in suits attacking, respectively, the
application of income taxation,38 the application of ad valorem taxation, 9
"425 F.2d 959 (2d Cir. 1970).
"Id. at 961, quoting Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 560, 565 (2d Cir. 1969).
" In Eisen v. Eastman, 421, F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1969), decided before Gold,
Judge Friendly had concluded that the proper section 1343(3) test is whether
the "right asserted is one of personal liberty." Id. at 564 & n.7 .
"E.g., Pierre v. Jordan, 333 F.2d 951, 957-58 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 974 (1965).
"Adams v. City of Colorado Springs, 308 F. Supp. 1397, 1401-02 (D. Colo.),
aff'd per curiam, 399 U.S. 901 (1970).
" Several important classes of suits other than those discussed in the text are
well settled. Thus, section 1343(3) affords jurisdiction in suits to apportion,
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); to protect the right to attend integrated
schools, McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963); and to protect the right
of residents of a federal enclave to vote, Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 (1970).
"' Chief Judge Johnson, dissenting in Hornbeak v. Hamm, 283 F. Supp. 549
(M.D. Ala. 1968), aff'd per curiam, 393 U.S. 9 (1969), felt that denying juris-
diction in an action to compel uniform assessment and valuation for ad valorem
taxation purposes was tantamount to finding that state taxation procedures are not
subject to the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 556.
" Abernathy v. Carpenter, 208 F. Supp. 793 (W.D. Mo. 1962), aff'd per curiam,
373 U.S. 241 (1963).
"' Alterman Transp. Lines, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 259 F. Supp. 486 (M.D.
Tenn. 1966), aff'd per curiam, 386 U.S. 262 (1967).
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and the administration of ad valorem taxation.40 The lower -courts, have
followed these results.
4
There is an obvious overlap between income or ,ad valoren taxation'
and a requirement of a license, purchased for a fee, as a condition precedent
to a specified activity. But there seems to be a crucial difference inthe-two
under section 1343 (3), just as there is a constitutional difference under
the commerce clause.4 2 In Douglas v. City of Jeannette,43 the Court.
sustained jurisdiction under section 1343 (3) in a suit brought by Jehovah's
Witnesses to enjoin the application to them of a license tax on door-to-
door solicitation as a denial of freedom of religion, speech, and press.
Since the license could have been purchased for money, Douglas may be
read as casting doubt on the validity of the "incapable of pecuniary val-
uation" test, and thus as lending credence to the "personal liberty" test.
On the other hand, if the rights asserted in Douglas are classified simply
as freedom of religion, speech, and press, jurisdiction would probably be
sustained under either of the two tests. Thus Douglas may also be read.
as requiring an expansive reading of the complaint in identifying the right
asserted and a disregard of the nature of the invasion of that right After
Douglas, the courts properly have had little difficulty sustaining juris-
diction in actions attacking the denial of licenses required for noncom-
mercial pursuits;44 section 1343 (3) jurisdiction also has been sustained in
the cases seeking to enjoin denials of licenses and permits required for
commerical activities.45
" Hornbeak v. Hamm, 283 F. Supp. 549 (M.D. Ala. 1968), aff'd per curiam,
393 U.S. 9 (1969).
"E.g., Bussie v. Long, 383 F.2d 766 (5th Cir. 1967); Gray V' Morgan, 371
F.2d 172 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1033 (1967).
With respect to the taxation cases, it should be remembered that ordinarily a!f
of the subject property would never'be taken. In addition, the strong policy against
interference with state taxation embodied in 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1964), must b6
considered.
Fuller v. Volk, 351 F.2d 323 (3d'Cir. 1965), raises an interestirg issue: Therein
jurisdiction was denied under section 1343(3) in a suit by taxpayers and parents
to enjoin a school board plan to eliminate de facto segregation and ti enjoin ex-
penditures to implement the plan. Would a suit brought by one who has -standing
only as a taxpayer ever nestle into section 1343 (3)?, The answer would probably
be yes in at least one situation. When the attack is under the establishment of
religion clause of the first amendment, the essence of the objection would be
the use to which the money is put, rather than the .taking of it. See, e.g.,' Walz v.
Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
" Compare Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S.
450 (1959), with Nippert v. Richmond, 327 U.S. 416 (1.946).
" 319 U.S. 157 (1943).
"E.g., Wall v. King, 206 F.2d 878 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 915
(1953) (suspension of driver's license).
"E.g., Gold v. Lomenzo, 425 F.2d 959 (2d Cir. 1970) (license for real estate
1971]
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Somewhat the same considerations obtain in the employment cases as
in those concerning permits for commercial activities. Both recognize,
impliedly or expressly,46 that the right to pursue one's chosen occupation
is not a "property right." Thus section 1343(3) jurisdiction has been
upheld in actions to compel reinstatement after alleged racial discrimina-
tion in the failure to renew employment contracts,47 and after dismissal
alleged to have denied procedural due process 8 The difference that has
been recognized at least once between dismissal and a mere reduction in
salary 9 suggests that the problem may be one of degree. However, a more
obvious distinction is that dismissal operates to preclude the income-
producing conduct itself, while a salary reduction merely makes the
conduct less economically beneficial.
Like the employment cases, the welfare cases involve loss of economic
benefits. Yet jurisdiction under section 1343(3) is uniformly upheld in
them. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has not seen fit to discuss the
scope of section 1343(3) in the recent rash of welfare cases decided by it,
other than to render an occasional general remark. In Goldberg v.
Kelly,50 the Court sustained section 1343(3) jurisdiction in an action
brought to redress the alleged denial of procedural due process in the
termination of welfare benefits. Although section 1343(3) was not dis-
cussed, the Court did take note of the potential deprivation of "essential
food, clothing, housing, and medical care," and of the fact that such
terminations "may deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by
which to live."51 In Dandridge v. Williams" the Court, without com-
ment, sustained jurisdiction in a suit attacking, on equal protection
grounds, a ceiling placed on welfare benefits without regard to actual
need or family size. Finally, in Rosado v. Wymant 3 the Court sustained
jurisdiction under section 1343 (3) in an action challenging, on equal pro-
brokerage); Parks v. Allen, 409 F.2d 210 (5th Cir. 1969) (license for operation
of a retail liquor store).
"E.g., in Penn v. Stumpf, 308 F. Supp. 1238 (N.D. Cal. 1970), the court
remarked that even if the property rights exception is accepted, "plaintiff's claim
to a denial of employment is in the nature of a right far more precious than 'mere
property' and certainly incapable of precise pecuniary measure." Id. at 1245-46.
"'Harkless v. Sweeny Indep. School Dist, 427 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 39 U.S.L.W. 3297 (U.S. Feb. 12, 1971).
Taylor v. New York City Transit Auth., 433 F.2d 665 (2d Cir. 1970).
'9 Kochhar v. Auburn Univ., 304 F. Supp. 565 (M.D. Ala. 1969).
0397 U.S. 254 (1970).
' Id. at 264.52397 U.S. 471 (1970).
58397 U.S. 397 (1970).
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tection grounds, a New York statute providing for smaller welfare pay-
ments to Nassau County residents than to New York City residents.
These cases would support the proposition that the circumstances and
probable effect of a "taking of property" are entitled to consideration in
determining section 1343(3) jurisdiction, and clearly recognize the
reality that a "taking of property" always interferes with "personal
rights" to some degree. Moreover, since Dandridge and Rosado did not
involve complete withdrawal of benefits, it is arguable that the degree of
interference is immaterial in sensitive areas such as welfare admin-
istration.
Eviction from and termination of leases in public housing are apt to
visit the same type of hardship on the plaintiff as denial of welfare
benefits, although perhaps statistically to a lesser degree. Here, too, sec-
tion 1343 (3) jurisdiction has been sustained.5"
Thus, the cases discussed, as well as others,5" indicate that one may,
with some confidence, consider plaintiff's personal circumstances in de-
termining whether plaintiff has been denied a "personal right" because of
the deprivation of a "property right." Yet the crucial issue remains: how
is it to be determined whether the right allegedly denied is a "personal"
one within the protection of section 1343 (3) ?
Obviously it is not enough that plaintiff alleges a violation of broad
and general prohibitions, such as the due process and equal protection
clauses of the fourteenth amendment. The Supreme Court has both sus-
tained and denied section 1343(3) jurisdiction when the plaintiff was
relying on the equal protection clause," and the same is true with respect
"E.g., Caulder v. Durham Housing Auth., 433 F.2d 998 (4th Cir. 1970), peti-
tion for cert. filed, 39 U.S.L.W. 3314 (U.S. Jan. 19, 1971) (No. 1227); Es-
calera v. New York City Housing Auth., 425 F.2d 853 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 39
U.S.L.W. 3149 (U.S. Oct. 13, 1970).
" E.g., in Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1969), a suit to enjoin the low-
ering of rent ceilings under a city rent control law, judge Friendly, after concluding
that the proper test was whether the "right asserted is one of personal liberty,"
id. at 564 & n.7 , held that section 1343 (3) did not afford jurisdicton because plain-
tiff had alleged only the loss of money. Id. at 566. On the other hand, in Klim v.
Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970), a suit brought by a painter to redress
the seizure of personal papers and painting implements by his landlord under an
innkeepers' lien law, the court sustained section 1343(3) jurisdiction, reasoning
that plaintiff's "claim is not for 'mere' property, but rather for property which is
his means of employment and support and hence is incapable of pecuniary measure."
Id. at 115. See also Hall v. Garson, 430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1970). But see Lynch
v. Household Finance Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1111 (D. Conn. 1970).
" Compare, e.g., Hornbeak v. Hamm, 393 U.S. 9 (1969), aff'g per curare
283 F. Supp. 549 (M.D. Ala. 1968), with Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970).
19711
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
to the due process clause.5 7 Thus, under the prevailing approach, the court
must first characterize the right asserted in terms more narrow than the
broad prohibition underlying the right, and then apply its test to determine
whether the right is one of "personal liberty" or "property."
The' difficulties attendant to such an analysis are amply illustrated by
Adams v. City of Colorado Springs.58 Therein property owners and voters
sued to enjoin a proposed annexation on the ground that the statute estab-
lishing the annexation procedure denied equal protection when it afforded
prospective annexees in certain areas a vote on the proposal but denied
it to those in other areas. Although defendants asserted that plaintiffs
were concerned only with increased taxation, the district court character-
ized the complaint as setting up the deprivation of "a substantial per-
sonal right-the right to equal treatment in the distribution of the voting
franchise," and upheld jurisdiction under section 1343(3)." Since some
persons were permitted to vote because they were property owners, the
right asserted in Adams could be characterized as the right to exercise
the incidents of ownership of property. Or, as defendants wished, it could
be described as the right not to pay increased taxes for unwanted city
services. It is obvious that in any case there is a wide range of possible
descriptions of the right involved. And in many cases that range could
include both those that seem "personal" or "incapable of pecuniary val-
uation" and those that seem to be "property rights."' Such is the present
potential for uncertainty and inconsistency.
A suggestion for avoidance of the unsatisfactory existing approach
may be found in the very origin of the problem-Justice Stone's opinion
in Hague. Unfortunately, the courts have neglected 'that portion of the
opinion in which Justice Stone discussed Truax and Crane. Arguably,
justice Stone used his phrases in the disjunctive and thought that a com-
plaint sets out "a right of personal liberty not susceptible of valuation
in money" whenever "the gist of the cause of action is not damage or
injury to property.'0 1 Adoption of the latter phrase as the section 1343 (3)
test would immediately eliminate the disparity in results due to the real or
supposed differences in the "personal liberty" and "incapable of pecuniary
valuation" tests. Moreover, by recognizing, as the welfare cases clearly
" Compare, e.g., Alterrhan Transp. Lines, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 386 U.S.
262 (1967), aff'g per curiam 259 F. Supp. 486 (M.D. Tenn. 1966), with Douglas
v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943).
308 F. Supp. 1397 (D. Colo.), aff'd per curian, 399 U.S. 901 (1970).
Id. at 1401-02.0oSee p. 824 & note 32 supra.
"' See p. 822 & note 18 supra.
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suggest, that the gist of a cause of action may be something other than
a mere wrongful reduction in plaintiff's net economic worth because of the
effect of a "taking of property,""2 this rule would offer the distinct ad-
vantage of reconciling many of the otherwise apparently inconsistent re-
sults.
It is submitted that the, rule suggested is to be preferred over the
existing state of disagreement and confusion. It is not at all clear that
Justice Stone did not have it in mind, and it should be remembered that
for the most part Justice Stone was arguing positively to sustain juris-
diction in Hague, rather than negatively to deny it." As noted earlier,
the language of section 1343(3) does not require the property rights
exception."4 Moreover, the Supreme Court has broadly interpreted 42
U.S.C. § 1983-the substantive companion of section 1343 (3) - - . to em-
brace all rights guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.6  ,]Finally, it is
arguable that the Civil Rights Acts themselves cast doubt on the property
rights exception. 67
Even the need to harmonize sections 1331 and 1343(3), which con-
cerned Justice Stone, is more apparent than real. The mostexpansive
reading of section 1343(3) would not make section 1331 superfluous,
since by its terms section 1343(3) extends only to state, not federal,
action. Moreover, the total repeal of the jurisdictional amount require-
ment in section 1331 has been forcefully advocated," since its application
is virtually limited to cases involving state action,69 for which federal
.See pp. 826-27 supra.
307 U.S. at 527-32.
a" One recent case seems to have arrived at a correct result guided solely by the
language of the statute. See Caulder v. Durham Housing Auth., 433 F.2d 998 (4th
Cir. 1970), petition for cert. filed, 39 U.S.L.W. 3314 (U.S. Jan. 19, 1971) (No.
1227).
° See note 8 supra.
'G Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171 (1961).
07 E.g., section two of the Act of 1871 specifically punished conspiracies aimed
at preventing enforcement of the Act by injuring the property or person of a United
States officer, juror, etc., charged with a duty under the Act. Act of April 20, 1871,
ch. 22, § 2, 17 Stat. 13. Therefore, section one, from which section 1343(3) is
derived and which is broader than section two, should be construed to protect prop-
erty also. For arguments that the Civil Rights Acts preclude recognition of the
property rights exception see Laufer, Hague v. C.I.O.: Mr. Justice ,Stone's Test of
Federal Jurisdiction-A Reappraisal, 19 BuFFALO L. Rnv. 547, 559-61 (1970);
Note, The "Property Rights" Exception to Civil Rights Jurisdiction--Confusion
Compounded, 43 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1208, 1211 (1968).
"3 ALl STUDY OF THE DiViSON OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL
CoURTs 489-92 (1969) ; Wright, Federal Question Jurisdiction, 17 S.C.L. REv. 660,
661-64 (1965).
"o Wright, supra note 68, at 663-64.
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courts are especially appropriate, and its elimination would have no sig-
nificant impact on the workload of the federal courts.7"
Finally, the rule suggested offers an opportunity to settle this area
of conflict quickly and with certainty. As Justice Brandeis once re-
marked, "in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule
be settled than that it be settled [correctly] .... "71 The Supreme Court
should take advantage of one of the opportunities certain to arise to
establish a definite rule. And if it fails to do so, Congress should.
R. B. TuCKER, JR.
Municipal Corporations-Public Purpose-Taxation and Revenue
Bonds to Finance Low-Income Housing
In Martin v. North Carolina Housing Corp.' the North Carolina
Supreme Court upheld the statute establishing the Housing Corporation
as a "public agency... empowered to act on behalf of the State... for
the purpose of providing residential housing 'for sale or rental to persons
and families of lower income.' "2 In so holding, the court resolved in favor
of the Housing Corporation challenges regarding public purpose, lending
of credit, creation of debt, delegation of legislative authority, and property
tax exemption, arising under various sections of the North Carolina
Constitution.'
The dissent singled out the noteworthy holdings of the case: public pur-
pose and tax exemption. In the latter regard the court in Martin upheld the
statutory tax exemption of the bonds to be issued by the Housing Corpo-
70Id.
n Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas, 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932).
1277 N.C. 29, 175 S.E.2d 665 (1970).2Id. at 34, 175 S.E2d at 667. The Housing Corporation was to issue self-
liquidating, tax-exempt revenue bonds and use the proceeds to purchase federally
insured mortgage and construction loans. The Housing Corporation would also
establish a housing development fund with grants and loans from industry, foun-
dations, and government to be used for project development loans, downpayment
assistance to needy families, and uninsured loans to builders and developers for
land development and residential construction. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 122A-1 to -23
(Supp. 1969).
'N.C. CoNsT. art. V, § 3, limiting the power of taxation to public purposes; art.
VII, § 6, limiting the power of a municipal corporation to pledge its faith; art. V.
§ 4, limiting the power of the General Assembly to lend the credit of the State; art.
I, § 8, defining the separation of the powers of government; and, art. V, § 5,
defining the scope of the exemption of property from taxation.
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ration. Article V, section 5 of the North Carolina Constitution provides
that "[p] roperty belonging to the State, counties and municipal corpora-
tions shall be exempt from taxation," and that the General Assembly may
exempt certain enumerated properties, but does not include in the list
bonds issued by the state or an agency of the state. The majority, in
finding the exemption permissible,4 simply reaffirmed State Education
Assistance Authority v. Bank of States'aille,5 in which the court had held
that the General Assembly could exempt revenue bonds from -taxation by
the state and its subdivisions "[s]ince the tax-exempt feature makes
possible a more favorable sale of revenue bonds and thereby contributes
substantially to the accomplishment of the public purpose for which they
are issued."
The dissent noted that the court previously had upheld the exemption
of state, county, and municipal bonds on the rationale that the exemption
would reduce the interest that the issuer would have to pay on the bonds
and thus achieve approximately the same effect as if the bonds were taxed
and the 'higher interest paid. Since these were revenue bonds and not
obligations of the state, the dissent argued that such reasoning did not
apply in this case.6 However, as in previous cases, 7 the promotion of the
public purpose of the organization issuing the bonds was a dispositive
factor. The court in Martin thus reinforces the exemption of bonds issued
by state agencies not merely where the savings in interest will accrue
directly to the state, but also where it serves to advance the public purpose
of the particular program.
On the issue of public purpose, the court took notice of the legis-
lative findings of a shortage of decent, safe, and sanitary housing for
low-income families, and the inability of the private sector to meet the
need ;8 it further noted the authority of the General Assembly to legislate
for "the protection of the public health, safety, morals and general welfare
of the people."" By having more decent housing, the court reasoned,
families and persons of low income, who might not otherwise obtain such
accommodations, would acquire a stake in the preservation of society and
' 277 N.C. at 57-58, 175 S.E.2d at 681-82.276 N.C. 576, 589, 174 S.E.2d 551, 560 (1970).
0 277 N.C. at 65, 175 S.E.2d at 686. See also Pullen v. Corporation Comm'n,
152 N.C. 548, 565, 68 S.E. 155, 163 (1910) (dissenting opinion).
' State Educ. Assistance Auth. v. Bank of Statesville, 276 N.C. 576, 589, 174
S.E.2d 551, 560 (1970); Webb v. Port Comm'n of Morehead City, 205 N.C. 663,
674-75, 172 S.E. 377, 383 (1934).
8277 N.C. at 49, 175 S.E.2d at 676.0Id. at 45, 175 S.E.2d at 674.
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institutional stability. On this basis the activities of the Housing Corpora-
tion were found to be for a public purpose.10
Implicit in the "spirit of American Constitutions" is the idea that the
government shall always confine itself to the proper business or function
of governiment." Thus, in finding the activities of the Housing Corpora-
tion to be within the ambit of public purpose, the court considered them
to embody a proper object of government. 12 This 'general limit on the
activities of government is defined by the scope of the three major forms of
governmental power: the power to tax for public purposes;13 specifically
limited in the North Carolina Constitution ;' the power of eminent domain
for public uses ;15 and the police power for promoting the public health,
safety, morals, and general welfare. 6 The definition of the pi'oper func-
tion of government, i dependent also upon changing times and con-
ditions.17 Since the three powers all'relate to the proper conduct of the
business of government, and are so interrelated, an evaluation of the realm
of public purpose requires an examination of the definition of govern-
inent~l function in all three areas.
T pes of activities which at some time had been held by the North
Carolina courts to embrace-a public purpose were listed by one writer in
1947 to include the'following: "aid to railroads, aid to establish a teachers
training school, railway terminal facilities, public auditorium, World War
I Veteran's Loan Fund, the state fair, a park, a municipal hospital, an
airport, port terminal facilities, public housing authority under federal
housing acts, playgrounds and recreational facilities, public libraries, and
schools."' 8 Subsequently the North Carolina Supreme Court has ruled
within the ambit of public purpose the expenditure of tax revenues by a
municipality for a policeman to attend a training course,'9 a voter-approved
sale bf munikipal bonds for the donstruction of an armory outside the
110 Id. at 49-50, 175 S.E.2d at 677.
" 38 Am. Jun. Municipal Corporations § 395 (1941).
" The North Carolina Supreme Court has held a tax to be for a public purpose
if it is f9r the support of a recognized object of government. Green v. Kitchin,
229 N.C. 450, 455, 50 S.E.2d 545, 549 (1948).
1851 Am. JuR. Taxation §§ 6, 321, 326 (1944).1
'N.C. CoNsT. art. V, § 3.
26 Am. JuR. 2d Eminent Domain § 25 (1966).
10 Siate v. Brown, 250 N.C. 54, 56, 108 S.E.2d 74, 76 (1959).
'Fawcett v. Town of Mt. Airy, 134 N.C. 125, 45 S.E. 1029 (1903). See also
Albritton v. City of Winona,, 181 Miss. 75, 178 So. 799, appeal dismissed, 303 U.S.
627 (.1938).
" Note, Municipal Corporations-Taxation--Meaning of Public Purpose, 25
N.C.L. REv. 504, 506 (1947) (numbering omitted).
19 Green v. Kitchin, 229 N.C. 450, 50 S.E.2d 545 (1948).
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corporate limits,2 0 municipal revenue bonds for the purchase of a lake and
a generating plant,21 atd a 9tate revenue-bond, issue for loans to residents
of slender means to facilitate their post-sec6ndafy education.
22
However; the court has declined to include within the scope of public
purpose activities less directly related to the function of government or
representing a greater intrusi6n into the private sector. In Nash v. Tozwz
of Tarboro2 the court rejected the levy of'tax and issue of bonds for the
construction of a hotel, feeling that such public benefits as might accrue
Would be "too incidental to jtistif the expendifuie of ptiblic ftinds." An
appropriation of municipal tax revenues to a Chaniber of Commerde to be
spent at its discretion to encourage industrial plants to locate near the city
was struck down by the court in 1923 on the ground'that the members of
the Chamber of Commerce exercise no governmetal duty.14 Nearly forty
years later the court found a sufficient public purpose in- a municipal
appropriation to the Chamber of Commerce to advertise advantages of the
city.2 5 However, the court limited its approval to the use of nontax
revenues and took emphatic note of the provisions for an advance budget
to insure that the advertising would promote the general welfare of the
city. In summary, while the court has recognized a wide range of govern-
ment functions and approved activities pursuant thereto as being for a
public purpose, ithas exerted restraint on intrusions into the private sphere
to compete with or to aid particular business ventures.
This reluctance to intrude into the private sector is reflected in
Mitchell v. North Carolina Industrial Development Financing Authority,26
relied upon by the plaintiff in Martin. The plaintiff in Mitchell had sued
to enjoin the expenditure of .the tax funds allocated to the Authority.
Asserting that "for a uie to be public . . . the ultimate net gain or ad-
tantage must be the public's as contradistinguished from that of an
0 Morgan v. Town of Spindale, 254 N.C. 304, 118 S.E.2d 913 (1961).
" Keeter v. Town of Lake Lure, ?64 N.C. 252, 141 S.E.2d- 634 (1965). The
acquisition of the property was to preserve the existence of a town that was de-
pendent upon the tourist trade attracted to the lake.
22 State Educ. Assistance Auth. v. Bank of Statesville, 276 N.C. 576, 174 S.E.2d
551 (1970).
" 227 N.C. 283, 289-90, 42 S.E.2d 209, 214 (1947.).
" Ketchie v. Hedrick, 186 N.C. 392, 119 S.E. 767 (1923).
" Dennis v. City of Raleigh, 253 N.C. 400, 116 S.E.2d 923 (1960).
2. 273 N.C. 137, 159 S.E.2d 745 (1968). The Authority was established to
promote industry, increase employment, and advance the economy by providing
facilities for private operators for industrial and research pursuits. Revenue bonds
were to be issued for particular projects and the constructed facilities were then
leased to private interests. Id. at 138-39, 159 S.E.2d at 746-47.
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individual or private entity,""7 and citing Nash for the proposition that
it is not the function of government to engage in private business, the court
in Mitchell held that the function of the Authority-acquiring sites and
equipping facilities for private industry-was not a public purpose.2 8
The scope of governmental function found in public purpose has its
counterpart in the public-use requirement for the exercise of the power
of eminent domain. In Mitchell the court acknowledged that "'[f]or
the most part the term "public purpose" is employed in the same sense in
the law of taxation and in the law of eminent domain.' "20 This view
comes in the context of two basic meanings ascribed to public use: public
employment and public advantage. While the traditional meaning of
public use has been "use by the public," the trend, as reflected in the dic-
tum in Mitchell, has been toward a liberalized view embracing "advantage
to the public."8 For example, the court has upheld a condemnation pro-
ceeding for an access road to a large private business on the basis that the
road would be used by a substantial number of people to reach their place
of work or to transact business."1 One comment writer suggests that
this holding emphasized the "public benefit" test of public use for eminent
domain. 2
Since a public "purpose" for eminent domain is generally one for
which taxes may also be levied, 3 the activities of the Housing Corpora-
tion in Martin may profitably be compared with those of housing author-
ities and redevelopment commissions whose exercise of the power of
eminent domain has been sustained. In these areas, however, the govern-
ment exercise of eminent domain power is affected by the scope of its
27 273 N.C. at 144, 159 S.E.2d at 750.
,8Id. at 159, 159 S.E.2d at 761. Contra, Albritton v. City of Winona, 181 Miss.
75, 178 So. 799 (1938), noted in 20 VAND. L. Rnv. 685 (1967). Here the plain-
tiff taxpayer objected to the issue of bonds and the levy of a tax approved by the
voters of the city for the acquisition of land and construction of plants to be leased
to new industries. The court held that the authorizing statute sought to promote the
public welfare since its aims were to create jobs, to process natural resources, and
to promote agriculture.
20273 N.C. at 158, 159 S.E.2d at 760, quoting 1 CooLEY, THE LAW oF TAXATION§ 176 (4th ed. C. Nichols 1924). See also 51 Am. JUR. Taxation § 324 (1944).
" Comment, Eminent Domain--The Meaning of the Term "Public Use"--Its
Effect on Excess Condemnation, 18 MERCER L. REv. 274, 275 (1966). See also
Note, "Public Use" as a Limitation on the Exercise of Eminent Domain Power by
Private Entities, 50 IowA L. Iv. 799, 810-12 (1965).
" State Highway Comm'n v. Thornton, 271 N.C. 227, 243-45, 156 S.E.2d 248,
260-61 (1967).
" Comment, The Public Use Doctrine: "Advance Requiem" Revisited, 1969 LAW
& Soc. ORDER 688, 694-95.
" Note, 25 N.C.L. Rnv., supra note 18, at 507.
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police power. 4 This is seen in Berman v. Parker,"5 which has been viewed
by some authorities as a "fundamental pronouncement [by the United
States Supreme Court] of the merger of the police power and eminent
domain into a single legal entity .. ."36 In Berman the plaintiff sought
to enjoin the condemnation of his property under the District of Columbia
Redevelopment Act. The Court noted a Congressional finding that the
ends sought-the elimination of conditions injurious to the public health,
safety, morals, and welfare-could not be obtained by ordinary private
operations alone but also required public participation, 7 and it concluded
that the power of eminent domain was simply a means to the end which
was for "Congress alone to determine, once the public purpose has been
established.""8 The Court further declined to restrict to public ownership
the methods of attaining the public purpose of community development
projects:39
The determination of public purpose by the court in Martin arose in
the context of its earlier decisions regarding the exercise of eminent
domain to improve housing and to redevelop cities. In Wells v. Houing
Authority,4" the court appears to have anticipated the Berman merger
of the police and eminent domain powers in upholding the public purpose
of the Housing Authorities Act to accomplish "slum clearance." This was
based on the function of government to promote the health, safety, and
morals of its citizens and the execution of this function by the elimination
of conditions conducive to disease and disorder. In Martia the court
looked also to Redevelopment Commission v. Security National Bank,
41
which upheld the condemnation of land pursuant to a redevelopment plan
to eradicate "blighted areas." The definition of governmental function
in the exercise of the merged eminent domain and police powers serves as
"The North Carolina Supreme Court has recognized the scope of the police
power to embrace the protection of the public health, safety, morals, and general
welfare. E.g., S.S. Kresge Co. v. Tomlinson, 275 N.C. 1, 165 S.E.2d 236 (1969);
Town of Wake Forest v. Medlin, 199 N.C. 83, 154 S.E. 29 (1930).
"348 U.S. 26 (1954).
06 Gormley, Urban Redevelopment to Further Aesthetic Considerations: The
Changing Constitutional Concepts of Police Power and Eminent Domain, 41 N.D.L.
Rv. 316, 317 (1965).
a7 348 U.S. at 29.
"Id. at 33.
"Id. at 35.
40213 N.C. 744, 197 S.E. 693 (1938); accord, Cox v. City of Kinston, 217
N.C. 391, 8 S.E.2d 252 (1940). Mallard v. Housing Auth., 221 N.C. 334, 20 S.E.2d
281 (1942), reaffirmed the finding of a governmental function under the police
power in the elimination of unsanitary dwellings.
"252 N.C. 595, 114 S.E.2d 688 (1960).
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a guide for the definition of governmental function for the exercise of
the taxing power in Martin since "[w]hatever is necessary for the pres-
ervation of the public health and public safety is a public purpose for which
taxes may be collected." '42  . .
Having recognized the interrelationship of the powers 'of police, em-
inent domain and taxation, the court in Martin was still faced with the
task of determining whether the activities of the Housing Corporation
were pursuant to a proper governmental function for which the taxing
power could be exercised. The two cases cited by the court had involved
the physical elimination of poor housing. The public purpose in Wells was
"slum clearance,"4 while the public purpose in Security National Bank
was'the eradication of "blighted areas."4 However, in Martin the object
was to remedy the shortage of decent, low-cost housing by fostering the
construction and financing of modest housing not otherwise available."
The" court in Mitchell had not found a public purpose in the Authority's
function of constructing and equipping facilities for private industry.40
The dissent in Martin47 considered the purpose of the Housing Corpora-
tion-assisting individuals in acquiring housing-distinguishable from
the more direct elimination of a menace to the public health and safety in
Wells and Security National Bank and indistinguishable from aiding
individuals in housing busin.esses, which Was not sustained by the court
in Mitchell. The majority in Martin, however, distinguished Mitchell as
involving the subsidizing of "particular private industries which were in
competition with other unsubsidized industries."4 Thus the presence of
a governmental function in Martin appears to turn in part on the way the
purpose of the activity is described49 and the directness of its relation to
the elimination of inadequate housing, which would be a proper exercise
of the police power."0
However, there is an additiofial element by which these cases can be
42 51 Am. JUR. Taxation § 328 (1944).
48 213 N.C. at 747, 197 S.E.2d at 695.
"252 N.C. at 604, 114 S.E.2d at 695.
" 277 N.C. at 48, 175 S.E.2d at 676.
"273 N.C. at 159, 159 S.E.2d at 761.
47 277 N.C. at 60-63, 175 S.E.2d at 683-85.
,
8 id. at 50, 175 S.E.2d at 677.
The majority view of eliminating the shortage of adequate housing is set
against the dissenting view of aiding individuals.
so The majority view of attacking the shortage of adequate housing by fostering
the planning, construction, and financing of low-cost housing is set against the
dissenting view of inadequately relating the activities of the Housing Corporation
to the elimination of slums.
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recornciled. In each the court deals with the question of the proper role
of government in relation to a private economy. How are the two to func-
tion in meeting particular problems? When is government intruding too
far and threatening private capitalism?. When is some degree of in-
trusion ever justified? It has been' suggested that the term "public pur-
pose" simply distinguishes -those things for which the government is to
provide'from those to be left to private support. The determination of what
is public or private frequently is a matter of policy and- wisdom decided
in light of the public welfare.51 Concern for the relation of governmental
and private activity is seen in Mitchell,5 where the couit cited Nash for
the proposition that it is not the function of government to engage in
private business. The court also noted the observation in Wells that the
existence of slums shows the impotency or ,unwillingness of private enter.:
prise to deal with the problem, thus impelling government to act where
community initiative has failed. The opinion likewise addresses the concern
with private activity by explicit reference to the legislative finding of the
inability of unassisted private enterprise to meet th& need for low-cost,
safe, and sanitary housing.53 Thus the finding of a governmental function
in Martin appears to be based in part on the noninterference with the
private sector by the activities of the Housing Corporation.
The concern of the dissent for the benefit accruing to the individual
homeowners resolves itself in large measure in how the activities of the
Housing Corporation are described. If taken to be for the purpose of
eliminating the shortage of adequate housing and thus promoting the
public health, safety, morals, and welfare, the activity should be sustained.
The court has held in State Education Assistance Authority v. Bank of
Statesville4 that "the fact that the individual obtains a private benefit can-
not be considered sufficient ground to defeat the execution of 'a paramount
public purpose.'" The activities of the Housing Corporation would cer-
tainly inure to the benefit of individuals, while achieving the public pur-
pose of fostering the construction of adequate housing. Individuals also
51 51 Am. JuR. Taxation § 326 (1944). See also Note, "Public Use" as a Limr-
itation on the Exercise of the Eminent Domain Power by Private Entities, 50 Iowa
L. RE V. 799, 815 (1965); Note, Industrial Revenue Bonds, 4 WILLIAMETTE L.J.
517, 521 (1967).
"= 273 N.C. at 156-58, 159 S.E.2d at 758-59'
11 277 N.C. at 49, 175 S.E.2d at 676. The court also quotes from the Act passages
indicating that many of the loans to be made by the Housing Corporation were
to be made only upon the determination that they were not otherwise available from
private lenders on reasonably equivalent terms.
'276 N.C. 576, 588, 174 S.E.2d 551, 560 (1970).
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benefit when a housing authority eliminates a slum, but this activity has
been considered a public purpose in North Carolina since Wells was de-
cided in 1938.
The dissent's concern with the indirectness of the efforts of the
Housing Corporation in eliminating inadequate housing is likewise an-
swered in part by the existing case law. The court has upheld the dis-
cretion of housing authorities in locating their projects on sites not
presently in a slum area.55 Thus the court has not insisted in every in-
stance on the most direct attack on the slum to sustain a finding of public
purpose. This view is consistent with the development of the law follow-
ing Berman whereby "[h]ousing projects for persons of low income
alone, without provisions for slum clearance, became objects for which the
power of eminent domain could be exercised."5 6 In Martin the court found
sufficient nexus between the activities of the Housing Corporation and the
elimination of the shortage of low cost housing, and such minimal in-
trusion into the private arena that the activities could be sustained as
pursuant to a proper governmental function and thus for a public purpose.
In so holding the court acted in the context of existing case law without
overruling Mitchell, which can be seen as blocking deep-seated involve-
ment in the affairs of private enterprise. Nevertheless, the analytical tools
of Martin afford the means to modify the Mitchell result should the pur-
pose sought be of sufficient social importance, the means chosen sufficiently
direct, and the degree of intrusion into the private sphere sufficiently cir-
cumscribed.
KENNETH C. DAY
Personal Jurisdiction-Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporation Based
Upon Maling a Contract in North Carolina
Courts can obtain personal jurisdiction over nonregistered foreign
corporations by the use of long-arm statutes.' International Shoe Co. v.
"E.g., Housing Auth. v. Wooten, 257 N.C. 358, 126 S.E.2d 101 (1962); In re
Housing Authority, 233 N.C. 649, 65 S.E.2d 761 (1951).
" Comment, 1969 LAw & Soc. OnDER, supra note 32, at 697.
'For a brief review of the development of the long-arm statute, see McGee v.
International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957). The important thing to re-
member about long-arm statutes is that the mere ability to fit a situation within a
statute's language does not mean that jurisdiction will always be proper. The ulti-
mate test is the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment-not the wording of
the long-arm statute. Id. at 222.
[Vol. 49
LONG-ARM STATUTES
Washington2 and cases which have followed' have expanded in personam
jurisdiction, especially over foreign corporations. However, problems
still arise out of situations involving a single contract made by a foreign
corporation within the forum state. The North Carolina Supreme Court
considered such a situation in Goldman v. Parkland of Dallas, Inc.4 Plain-
tiff Goldman, a North Carolina resident, sued Parkland, a Texas corpora-
tion, for breach of contract. Under the contract, Goldman was to serve as
manufacturer's representative for Parkland in the sale of dresses in several
Southeastern states, including North Carolina.5 The contract terms were
discussed in Atlanta, but the court found that the contract was executed
when Goldman signed an offer sent to him by Parkland and dropped it
into a mailbox in North Carolina.6 Parkland never had a representative in
North Carolina other than Goldman. The contract's connections with
North Carolina were that it was executed there, and by its terms was to be
performed there to some extent. Goldman alleged that he had performed
under this contract for several months prior to Parkland's breach, had
done most of 'his work in North Carolina, and had sold a quantity of the
dresses there.' The court found these contacts sufficient to satisfy the
long-arm statute.8
North Carolina's long-arm statute seems to provide two conditions
which can give rise to jurisdiction over foreign corporations making con-
tracts with state residents. The statute subjects them to suit in the state
on any cause of action arising "out of any contract [either] made in this'
State or to be performed in this State."9 In Goldman the court avoided
decision of a constitutional question-whether either condition alone will
2326 U.S. 310 (1945).
2
'E.g., Hanson v. Denekla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); McGee v. International Life
Ins. Co., 3,55 U.S. 220 (1957).
'277 N.C. 223, 176 S.E.2d 784 (1970).
' The terms of the contract are presented in some detail in the opinion of the
Court of Appeals, Goldman v. Parkland of Dallas, Inc., 7 N.C. App. 400, 173 S.E.2d
15 (1970).
8277 N.C. at 227, 176 S.E.2d at 787.
Id. at 229, 176 S.E.2d at 788.
Id.
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-145 (a) (1965) provides:
Every foreign corporation shall be subject to suit in this State, by a
resident of this State or by a person having a usual place of business in this
State, whether or not such foreign corporation is transacting or has trans-
acted business in this State and whether or not it is engaged exclusively in
interstate or foreign commerce, on any cause of action arising as follows:
(1) Out of any contract made in this State or to be performed in this
State....
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satisfy the requirements of due process-by declining to base jurisdiction
solely upoif the contract's being made in North Carolina.
After deciding that the contract was executed in North Carolina, the
court in Goldman turned to the issue of whether the contract had a
"iubstantial connection" with the state. That particular phrase had been
used previously to interpret the second condition of the statute: "con-
tracts to be performed in this State." In those cases in which the contracts
had been made in other states,'0 the courts needed to determine to what
extent the performance itself had to be within North Carolina before the
statute and due process were satisfied. In Byham v. National Cibo House
Corp.," the court decided that "[ilt is sufficient for the purposes of due
process if the suit is based on a contract which has substantial connection
with the forum state,"'" or in other words, is to be performed substantially
within North Carolina. Goldman seems to stand for the proposition that
whether a contract is made within the state is one of the factors to be
considered in deciding if the contract has a "substantial connection" with
the state,' 3 and thus whether due process requirements are met. The
decision merges execution and performance into factors of a single test,
rather than considering them separate tests as a reading of the statute
might suggest.
The Goldman opinion is not particularly illuminating as to how the
factors making up a "substantial connection" are to be weighed. As
noted above, the North Carolina statute allows jurisdiction based upon
contracts which were not made within the state.'4 But it is not a logical
step to say that the court would allow jurisdiction based upon a contract
o "E.g. Bowman v. Curt G. Joa, Inc., 361 F.2d 706 (4th Cir. 1966) ; 1lyham v.
National Cibo House Corp., 265 N.C. 50, 143 S.E.2d 225 (1965).
"265 N.C. 50, 143 S.E.2d 225 (1965).12Id. at 57, 143 S.E.2d at 232.
"The Supreme Court, in McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220,
223 (1957), used the phrase "'substantial connection" in describing all aspects of the
contract's connection with the forum state. The language in the Goldwan opinion
indicates the term is used broadly:
In the instant case the contract in question clearly met the requirement
of "substantial connection" with North Carolina. It was made in this State.
Plaintiff, under the terms of the contract, solicited business in thirty or more
North Carolina cities and towns . . . . He devoted a larger part of his
time to promoting defendant's business in North Carolina than in any other
state and did in fact sell a quantity of dresses manufactured by the de-
fendant to customers within this State.
277 N.C- at 229, 176 S.E.2d at 788.
" See note 10 and accompanying text supra.
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wAich was made in North Carolina but not to be performed there, since
t e requirements of due process read additional standards into the statute.-
There is, as yet, no North Carolina decision concerned with whether'
the making of a contract within the state is, in itself, a sufficient connection
to subject the foreign corporation to suit there. 5 A somewhat similar
problem was before the United States Supreme Court in McGee v. In-
ternational Life I-nsurance Corp.,6 where the Court allowed California
to exercise personal jurisdiction over an Arizona insurance company
which had solicited a California resident's business by mail. But McGee
cannot be cited for the proposition that the making of any commercial
contract within a forum state is sufficient to satisfy the minimum contacts
required for due process, because, as the Court stressed in Hanson v.
Denckla,'7 insurance is "an activity that the State treats as exceptional and
subjects to special regulation."'18 Indeed, in Hanson the Court stated that
"it is a mistake to assume that this trend [toward relaxation of minimum
contacts requirements] heralds the eventual demise of all restrictions on
the personal jurisdictions of state courts.""9 Minimal contacts are still a
prerequisite.
The touchstone case involving the North Carolina long-arm statute
is Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc.2" There the contract
was made in New York and called for a single shipment of goods from
New York to North Carolina. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that the requisite minimum contacts were not present in this situation.
In the course of its opinion, the court discussed21 Compania de Astral,
"' The Goldman opinion is elusive on this point. Although the court is careful
to set out the extent of the performance (both actual and contemplated) within
North Carolina, the point is made that
clearly the North Carolina Legislature, by the express words of the statute
authorizing such service on a foreign corporation when the contract was
made in North Carolina, sought to give its courts the power to assert juris-
diction over nonresident defendants to the full extent permitted by the due
process amendment.
277 N.C. at 229-30, 176 S.E.2d at 788-89 (emphasis added). This latent ambiguity
may allow the case to be cited as a chameleon precedent-assuming the color either
of an argument that a contract alone is enough, or that more is required.
10355 U.S. 220 (1957).
17 357 U.S. 235 (1958).81d. at 252. The discussion of McGee in Goldmn does not explicitly recog-
nize this distinction. Jurisdiction based upon a single contract may turn on a
number of factors. See Annot., 23 A.L.R.3d 551 (1969).
19 357 U.S. at 251.
20239 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1956).21Id. at 508.
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S.A. v. Boston Metals Co.,2 2 which had been cited by the plaintiff for the
proposition that the mere making of a contract within the forum state is
a sufficient basis for jurisdiction when the long-arm statute so allows. In
Erlanger the court said that Astral does not rest on that basis." The
inference would seem to be that the court would not be impressed simply
by the execution of a contract within the state without more. The Erlanger
court, in explaining its holding, said:
The orderly and fair administration of the laws throughout the nation
is a highly important factor to consider. We cannot shut our eyes to
the disorder and unfairness likely to follow from sustaining jurisdiction
in a case like this. It might require corporations from coast to coast
having the most indirect, casual and tenuous connection with a State to
answer frivolous law suits in its courts. To permit this could seriously
impair the guarantees which due process seeks to secure. 24
Does it make sense to say that the connections with North Carolina would
be substantially less "indirect, casual and tenuous" if the Erlanger con-
tract had been made in the state upon its deposit into a mailbox? To base
a decision on that ground would be to ignore the reasons behind the
requirement of minimal contacts with the forum state. Contracts with
foreign corporations would involve "battles of the forms" in which the
out-of-stater would design its paperwork so that the last act would have
to be done in its own state.25
Byham v. National Cibo House Corp.28 is very similar to Goldman
on its facts. In Byham, a North Carolina resident sued a foreign corpora-
tion on a cause of action arising from a franchise contract. The contract
was made in Tennessee and authorized a pizza house in North Carolina
under the defendant's franchise. The defendant sent a representative to
-205 Md. 237, 107 A.2d 357 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 943 (1955). A
dissenting opinion is found at 108 A.2d 372 (1954).
21 239 F.2d at 508 n.4. In Astral the Maryland court allowed personal juris-
diction, pursuant to its statute, over a Panamanian corporation. The suit was based
on the breach of a contract made in Maryland for the sale of three ships. However,
to find jurisdiction, the court did not look just to the fact that the contract was
made there. Instead, it also noted that the ships in question were in Maryland
and that the funds for the purchase were held in escrow in Baltimore. It concluded
that there was "considerable contact with this State and considerable reliance upon
its laws and the protection which they afforded." 205 Md. at 261-62, 107 A.2d at
367.
"21239 F.2d at 507 (citations omitted).
"See Golden Belt Mfg. Co. v. Janler Plastic Mold Corp., 281 F. Supp. 368
(M.D.N.C. 1967), affd per curiam, 391 F.2d 266 (4th Cir. 1968).
" 265 N.C. 50, 143 S.E.2d 225 (1965).
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help find a location for the business. The court found a "substantial con-
nection" with North Carolina on these facts."' In Goldman the contract
was made within the state but no representative entered. Parkland's
activities in the state came about through the actions of its agent, Gold-
man. At first blush it appears that Goldman, by his own actions, created
personal jurisdiction over Parkland. But this was done pursuant to an
agreement with the foreign corporation, which was the beneficiary of the
activities. And the agreement (just as the one in Byham) contemplated
a continuing relationship between the parties, not just a single trans-
action as in Erlanger. Considering the two cases together, it is unrealistic
to say that just the making of a contract within the state in Goldman takes
the place of the temporary entry of a representative in Byha;n to supply
the substantial connection. This area of the law depends heavily on a case
by case analysis and does not lend itself to facile comparisons. ]But it seems
apparent that the North Carolina court views the place of the contract's
completion as only one factor to be considered in finding a substantial
connection between the contract (and thus the foreign corporation) and
the state. The inference from Goldman and the other cases discussed here-
in seems to be that the mere fact that the contract on which the cause of
action arises was made within the state is not enough by itself to sustain
jurisdiction over a foreign corporation.28
ELMER LISTON BisnoP, III
Professional Responsibility-Canon 6 and the Lender's Attorney
An ethical problem recently arose in a situation in which an attorney
was employed by a lending institution to make a title search and close a
secured loan. The transaction was completed and the note and deed of trust
27Id. at 61, 143 S.E.2d at 234.
8 holding that execution in North Carolina is alone sufficient for jurisdictioi
would be inconsistent with the other phrase of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-145 (a) (1)
(1965), which subjects foreign corporations to suit within the state on causes of
action based on contracts "to be performed in this State." See note 9 and accom-
panying text supra. This has been construed to mean performance to a sub-
stantial degree. Bowman v. Curt G. Joa, Inc., 361 F.2d 706 (4th Cir. 1966);
accord, Golden Belt Mfg. Co. v. Janler Plastic Mold Corp., 281 F. Supp. 368
(M.D.N.C. 1967), aff'd per curiam, 391 F.2d 266 (4th Cir. 1968). It would be
anomalous for the court to allow the mere fact of execution in North Carolina,
no matter how fortuitous the circumstances, to be a sufficient basis for jurisdiction
while insisting that otherwise a substantial degree of performance within the state
must be shown.
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were assigned. After several years, the assignee of the note foreclosed
on the securing deed of trust. This action prompted the borrower to
request an investigation by the Consumer Protection Division of the
North Carolina Attorney General's office as to possible usury. The in-
vestigation was initiated and inquiries were directed to the attorney who
had handled the original transaction. Unsure of the nature of his relation-
ship to the parties, he requested advice from the Council of the North Car-
olina State Bar as to what course of action he should pursue in response
to the inquiries.
The answer to this request was supplied by Ethics Opinion 715,1 in
which the Council held that the attorney was employed by the lending
institution to search the title to the land which was to secure the proposed
loan, and therefore he could not disclose the possibility of usurious interest
rates to the borrower. The basis for the holding was that such a disclosure
by the attomej would be a violation of Canon 37 of the Canons of Pro-
fessional Ethics, because it would breach the "Confidences of a Client,"2
the lending institution.
Thus the Council affirmatively held, despite some unreconciled prior
language to the'contrary,3 that the attorney who is employed by the lender
to search title incident to a secured loan transaction represents the lender
and not the borrower even though the usual practice is for the borrower
to pay the attorney's fee. The lender's practice of using its attorney to
search title and requiring that his fee be paid by the borrower has been
upheld as not unethical in a series of opinions by the Council of the North
Carolina State Bar.4 The rationale of these opinions is not given, but
there are at least two alternatives. One is that only the lending institution
1N.C. STATE BAR COUNCIL, OPINIONS, No. 715 (1970), reported, 17 THE
NORTH CAROLINA BAR no. 3 at 11 (1970) [hereinafter cited as N.C. BAR].2 N.C. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 37, reported, THE NORTH CAR-
OLINA STATE BAR, STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS, CANONS OF ETHICS AND
OPINIONS VI-67 (Melott ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as Melott].
IN.C. STATE BAR COUNCIL, OPINIONS, No. 395 (1962), reported, Melott 11-95,
is cast in ferms of "duty to the borrower." This opinion is more fully explored at
notes 8-10 infra.
'N.C. STATE BAR COUNCIL, OPINIONS, No. 370 (1962); No. 291 (1959); No.
153 (1955); No. 43 (1947), respectively reported, Melott 11-85, -64, -27, -7. In
these opinions the central ethical question involved the impact of Canon 6 of the
Canons of Professional Ethics in the secured loan situation. Canon 6, reported,
Melott VI-8, is entitled "Adverse Influences and Conflicting Interests," and states
in pertinent part: "It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by
express consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts."
The ABA Committee on Professional Ethics has also considered, and found no
impropriety in, the identical practice. See ABA CoMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS,
OPINIONS, No. 837 (INFoRMAL).
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is the client and that the attorney does not represent the borrower.' If this
is the position taken, then the holdings indicate that Canon 6, which
proscribes representation of conflicting interests,6 does not apply in the
secured loan situation, for -that Canon contemplates representation of two
interests by the same attorney. Another possible rationale for these
opinions is that the attorney is representing both the lender and the
borrower, but that since each has the same interest in ascertaining title
to the land there is no actual conflict of interest.' Under this theory Canon
6 applies but is not violated. Since none of these opinions involved an
actual conflict of interest, it was unnecessary for the Council to clarify the
basis of its holdings.
In Opinion 3958 such a conflict was present. There the attorney
searching title for a lender discovered that the proposed loan would be
usurious and requested advice as to the extent of his duty to the borrower.
The Council held that he had discharged his duty to the borrower by
furnishing him, upon request, a disbursement sheet which disclosed on
its face the usurious interest rates.9 By speaking in terms of duty to
the borrower the Council apparently rejected the theory that the bor-
rower is not represented. Had this theory been the basis of the prior
'N.C. STATE BAR COUNCIL, OPINIONs, No. 42 (1947), reported, Melott 11-7,
states: "There is nothing improper in Banks [sic] ezploying counsel in title matters
connected with loans made by it, his fee being paid by the borrower" (emphasis
added). This language seems to regard the lender (Bank) as the client.
a N.C. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICs No. 6, reported, Melott VI-8. See note
4 supra.
More recently the Council has recognized, in N.C. STATE BAR COUNCIL,
OPINIONS, No. 712 (1970), reported, N.C. BAR at 9, that the mere potential for
conflict may be sufficient to find a violation of Canon 6. The Council said:
There are few situations in which a lawyer would be justified in repre-
senting in litigation multiple clients with potentially differing interests. This
is so because when the interests move from being potentially differing to
actually differing, the attorney is required to withdraw from employment
which might well result in a hardship and burden on the client.
See note 10 infra for a related opinion.
However, Opinion 712 deals with litigation. The Council may be reluctant to
extend its reasoning to the secured loan transaction, either because it feels that there
is a fundamental difference in representation during litigation and representation
in the course of ordinary business affairs, or because it is willing to tolerate po-
tential conflict in the secured loan situation since it views that potentiality as an
inevitable result of a necessary method of handling the transaction.8 N.C. STATE ]BAR COUNCIL, OPINIONS, No. 395 (1962), reporfed, Melott 11-95.
0 In practical effect the duty to the borrower recognized here is more apparent
than real because the disbursement sheet normally would have been furnished to
the borrower as an incident of the transaction. In fact, even after it is furnished
the borrower most likely remains uninformed as to the ultimate interest rate. Only
extended calculation would reveal this figure, and even if the borrower made a
correct determination he probably would be unaware that it is usurious.
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opinions, the holding in Opinion 395 would have been that there was 1to
duty to the borrower since no duty is owed by an attorney to one who is
not his client. However, although seemingly rejecting the one alternative,
the Council did not fully espouse the other. Had the basis of the prior
holdings been that the attorney represents both parties, the Council would
have ordered his withdrawal in the instant situation since Canon 6 pre-
cludes further representation of either party once a conflict has arisen
between their separate interests.10 Thus the holding in Opinion 395 seems
to indicate that there is a primary duty to the lender, with only a secondary
duty to the borrower. Whatever it may say about the scope of this duty
to the borrower, it does indicate that he is represented to some extent.
Opinion 715, without reconciling Opinion 395, denied any role for
Canon 6 in this situation. Its holding that information as to usury is
privileged between the lender and its attorney is clearly based on the
premise that only the lender is the client. Thus, the Council found no
duty of disclosure to the borrower, and, moreover, that voluntary dis-
closure would violate Canon 37. This holding leaves the borrower com-
pletely unprotected" despite the fact that he pays the fee and as a result
may well believe that his interests are represented.' 2 Such a belief would
be erroneous at present but nothing in the opinions requires that the error
be brought to the borrower's attention.
However, by holding that only the lender is the client, the Council
properly rejected the alternative holding that both the lender and the
borrower are represented. In doing so, it avoided the application of Canon
10 See N.C. STATE BAR COUNcIL, OPINIONS, No. 558 (1967), reported, Melott
11-149, This opinion allows representation of two clients after full disclosure as
long as no conflict exists or arises between them, but requires withdrawal if con-
flict does arise. See also N.C. STATE BAR CoUNCIL, OPINIoNs, No. 712 (1970),
reported, N.C. BAR at 9; No. 709 (1970), reported, N.C. BAR at 11.
I Although the ruling in Opinion 395 afforded only minimal affirmative pro-
tection, it did not preclude further action on the borrower's behalf by the at-
torney; the opinion required merely that the attorney furnish a disbursement
sheet upon request, but did not forbid him to do more if his conscience dictated that
he must. However, under Opinion 715, even if the attorney feels morally obligated
further to protect the borrower he cannot.
" Whether borrowers routinely make this assumption is a question this writer
is unprepared to answer. Informal talks with practicing attorneys and real estate
brokers have revealed that on occasion borrowers have done so. One attorney
commendably noted that as a matter of personal feeling he routinely makes certain
that the borrower is not misled even though he is not required to do so. It is
doubtful whether all attorneys feel a similar obligation. Therefore, if only one
borrower is misled and thereby damaged, both he and the whole legal profession
suffer. The possibility of reliance is sufficient to call for ameliorative measures,
whatever the actual incidence may be.
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6 and therefore did not confront the central difficulty faced in Opinion
395-the necessity of choosing among the unpalatable remedies available
for a violation of that canon.'3
But was the Council justified in refusing to find that since there is a
possibility of reliance the borrower is the client? In theory, the result of
such a hypothetical holding would be that only the borrower would be
protected in the event of actual conflict. The practical result, however,
probably would be an immediate change in the handling of the secured
loan transaction. Since the problem originally arose only because there
was no understanding between the parties as to who was the client, if the
lender were to reach an agreement with the borrower that the attorney
represented only the lender, this consent by the borrower would remove
the situation from the arnbit of the hypothetical ruling. By obtaining such
consent, the lender would easily vitiate this attempt to protect the bor-
rower from injury occuring as a result of an actual conflict. However, as
a fortuitous consequence of such an informed consent the borrower would
be able to protect himself from the possibility of such conflict. After the
disclosure the borrower would be aware that he was unrepresented, and,
therefore, presumably cognizant of the risk that he would be running in
remaining so-the risk that the loan is in any manner unfavorable to him.
Thus he would be able to make a knowledgeable choice as to whether to
hire his own attorney,"' or to save the additional fee and assume the risk of
an unfavorable loan. Since the duties of a second attorney would be only
to check the abstract of title and approve the terms of the loan, his fee
should be minimal. In sum, although a holding that the borrower is the
client probably would not achieve its intended result of full protection for
the borrower, 5 it would bring about the more practical result of insuring
-because of the full disclosure and consent-that the borrower is not
misled into believing that he is represented.
Thus, it might seem that it would have been preferable to find the bor-
"
8These alternatives include the burdensome remedy of withdrawal, see notes
7 & 10 supra, and the anomalous principle of permitting unequal representation of
conflicting interests, see N.C. STATE. BAR CouNcr., OPINIONs, No. 395 (1962),
reported, Melott 11-95, discussed pp. 845-46 smpra.
" Under the current practice, the borrower clearly has a right to hire an addi-
tional attorney. See, e.g., ABA Comm. ON PROFESSiONAL ETHrICS, O1INIONs, No.
837 (INFORMAL). However, since he is not made aware that he is unprotected,
he is also unaware of the possibility that he may need such an attorney. Therefore,
this right is meaningless because he has no reason to know that he may need to
exercise it.
" Such full protection probably could not be achieved without the economically
wasteful expedident of requiring each party to retain an attorney.
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rower to be the client in order to protect him from the possibility of mis-
taken reliance. Such a finding would be more attractive than the present
situation. Yet there may be an alternative even more appealing than this
proposal. Since the protection afforded therein would be only a proximate-
ly caused consequence of such a holding, and not an ethically required
result, the Council would be resolving an ethical problem simply by sanc-
tioning that choice of practices which would tend to produce an ethical
result. Ideally, the Council should require an ethical result, not merely
structure the situation so that such a result would rationally follow.
The additional alternative would be to continue to hold that the lender
is the client but to require that this fact be made absolutely clear to the
borrower. Some sort of knowledgeable consent must be required; the
borrower must be made aware that he is not the client' 6 even though he is
paying for the attorney and is receiving incidental benefits therefrom in the
form of a title search. The present holdings not only leave the borrower
unprotected, but also unaware that he is unprotected; yet the nature of
present practices may well mislead him into the opposite belief. The
proposed warnings would insure that every borrower be able to choose
whether to assume the risk of an unfavorable loan. Probably many would
choose to assume that risk rather than pay the additional fee, but this
infrequency is no argument against disclosure, since the burden of that
disclosure is only negligible.
Perhaps an even more desirable alternative would be to require not
only that this initial disclosure be made, but also that the lender pass the
attorney's fees along to the buyer in the form of a built-in cost of the loan.
Including the fee in the cost of the loan would render the borrower un-
aware that he is paying it, thus further removing the possibility that he
will be mislead into believing that he is fully represented.
In conclusion, the Ethics Opinions of the Council of the North Car-
olina State Bar now leave the secured-loan borrower in a deceptively un-
protected position. It is strongly urged that the Council adopt at least
" In N.C. STATE BAR COUNCIL., OPINONS, No. 709 (1970), reported, N.C.
STATE BAR at 11, the council held that an attorney employed by an insurance com-
pany to defend its insured could also represent the insured in his counterclaim.
However, the attorney was required to make a full disclosure to the insured of the
effect that an exercise of the insurance company's right to settle the suit would
have on the counterclaim. The council added that if it appeared that the insurance
company might desire to settle, the attorney should not represent the insured in his
counterclaim.
Though not strictly analogous because it deals with the litigation situation, the
opinion does lend some support to a full disclosure argument in a non-litigious
context.
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one of the proposed alternatives-preferably the latter-to insure that no
borrower be unfairly misled.
W. LUNS'oRD LONG, III
Uniform Commercial Code-Protection for the Purchase Money
Secured Party Under Section 9-312
The basic section of the Uniform Commercial Code dealing with the
problem of priorities among conflicting security interests in the same
collateral is section 9-312. Subsection (4) extends special protection to
purchase money security interests in collateral other than inventory by
giving such an interest priority over a conflicting security interest "if the
purchase money security interest is perfected at the time the debtor receives
possession of the collateral or within ten days thereafter." In the recent
case of Brodie Hotel Supply, IRc. v. United States,1 the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit has unduly extended the scope of this protection.
In 1959 Brodie sold some restaurant equipment to a company that
later went bankrupt. Brodie repossessed the equipment but left it in the
restaurant. On June 1, 1964, Lyon took possession of the restaurant and
equipment and began operating the restaurant while negotiating the price
and terms under which he would purchase the equipment from Brodie.
On November 2, 1964, Lyon borrowed seventeen thousand dollars from
the National Bank of Alaska and gave the bank as security a chattel mort-
gage on the equipment. The bank assigned the mortgage to the Small
Business Association (SBA), and on November 4, 1964, filed a financing
statement showing the SBA as assignee. On November 12, 1964, Brodie
gave to Lyon a bill of sale for the equipment, and Lyon gave Brodie a
chattel mortgage on the equipment to secure the unpaid purchase price.
Brodie filed a financing statement on November 23, 1964.2 Thus the
crucial dates in the case are the following: June 1, when Lyon took pos-
session of the equipment; November 4, when the bank filed; November 12,
when the debtor-creditor relationship was entered into by Brodie and
Lyon; and November 23, when Brodie filed. Subsequently, the SBA sold
the equipment to satisfy its mortgage,' and Brodie sued to determine
-431 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1970). The court in this case applied the Alaska
version of the Code. However, for ease of discussion, the general Code provisions,
rather than the Alaska enumeration thereof, will be cited.
'All of the above facts are set forth in the opinion.
'Brief for Appellant at 2, Brodie Hotel Supply, Inc. v. United States, 431 F.2d
1316 (9th Cir. 1970).
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whether it or the SBA should have priority over the proceeds of the sale.4
The district court granted summary judgment without opinion for Brodie,6
and the United States appealed."
The court of appeals, in affirming the summary judgment, held that
where a party obtains possession of goods before becoming a debtor in a
security agreement covering the goods, the ten-day period in section
9-312(4) dates from the time of the creation of the debtor-creditor rela-
tionship rather than from the time the debtor actually comes into pos-
session. The court based its opinion on two grounds. First, it read into
section 9-312(4) the code definition of "debtor ' 17 and held that Lyon was
not a "debtor" within the meaning of section 9-312(4) until November
12 ;8 therefore, the filing by Brodie was within the ten-day period. 9 Second,
the court recognized the "specially favored position"'" given by the Code
to the holder of a purchase money security interest and concluded:
The protection which the Code confers upon a purchase-money in-
terest in non-inventory collateral is not unduly extended by a decision
giving priority to Brodie's interest. Although it is true that Brodie
could have filed a financing statement as soon as Lyon went into
possession and thus protected itself, it is also true that the bank, SBA's
assignor, could have protected itself by inquiring into Lyon's interest
in the equipment before accepting his chattel mortgage. Due to the
favored status given by the Code to the holder of a purchase-money
interest in non-inventory collateral, we are not convinced that the
trial court erred in refusing to impose this burden on Brodie."I
In short, the court seemed to feel that its decision was based both on sound
statutory interpretation and on a sound reading of the policies underlying
the Uniform Commercial Code. The contention of this note is that the
court improperly read section 9-312(4) and that, in so doing, it gave too
'Id.5Id. at 5.0Id.T UNiFORm COmmERCilA. Conn § 9-105(1) (d) defines "debtor," in part, as "the
person who owes payment or other performance of the obligation secured...
8 431 F.2d at 1319.9Id. There are eleven days between November 12 and November 23. However,
ALASKA STAT. § 01.10.080 (1964) provides that in computing time, the first day is
excluded and the last day is included unless the last day is a holiday, in which
case it is excluded. Apparently the filing was timely under this statute.
20 431 F.2d at 1319. For a detailed treatment of purchase money interest priority,
see II G. GiLmore, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY §§ 28.1-.7 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as GnmoRE].
1' 431 F.2d at 1319.
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much protection to, and imposed too little responsibility upon, a secured
party with a purchase money security interest.
In fairness to the court, it should be noted that the language of section
9-312(4) is ambiguous since it refers to the "time the debtor receives
possession."' It is not clear whether "debtor" is used merely to identify
the party or whether it is also used to establish the time at which the ten-
day period begins to run. However, the Code itself calls for construction
of language so as to "promote its underlying purposes and policies."1
In attempting properly to construe section 9-312 (4), therefore, it will be
helpful to look first at the purposes and policies embodied by the sedtion.
A long-standing problem in the area of chattel security law has been
the possibility that a debtor could continue to get credit on property that
he apparently owned but which, in fact, was subject to other security in-
terests.14 Over the years, the development has been away from secrecy in
secured transactions and toward a system providing notice to possible later
creditors."5 "The modern tendency is to require formal public notice in an
increasing number of situations, but there is a current relaxation in the
requirements of formality in the notice given . . . ."" The fact that this
modem trend is embodied in the Code was recognized in National Cash
Register Co. v. Firestone & Co.,' 7 in which the court said, "The framers
of the Uniform Commercial Code, by adopting the 'notice filing' system,
had the purpose to recommend a method of protecting security interests
which at the same time would give subsequent potential creditors ...
information and procedures adequate to enable the ascertainment of the
facts they needed to know."' 8 In most cases this method involves with-
holding "perfected" status from security interests until a financing state-
ment has been filed.' 9 However, in the case of purchase money security
interests in non-inventory collateral, the Code in section 9-312(4) allows
Emphasis added.UuFom COmmmciAL CODE § 1-102. The ensuing comment reiterates this
point and adds that "the application of the language should be construed narrowly
or broadly, as the case may be, in conformity with the purposes and policies in-
volved."
" Coogan, A Suggested Analytical Approach to Article 9 of the Uniform Corn-
inercial Code, 63 CoLum. L. Rnv. 1, 19 (1963).
" Coogan, Public Notice Under the Uniform Commercial Code and Other
Recent Chattel Security Laws, Including "Notice Filing," 47 IowA. L. Rtv. 289-
90 (1962).
'o Id. at 290.
17346 Mass. 255, 191 N.E.2d 471 (1963).
'8 Id. at 261, 191 N.E.2d at 474.1 9UIFoRAL COmmERCiAL CODE § 9-303.
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ten additional days during which the secured party may perfect. In his
treatise on secured transactions, Professor Gilmore points out that this
grace period was included in pre-1956 drafts, omitted in the 1956 draft,
and then restored in the 1958 and subsequent drafts.20 The reason for
finally including the grace period, according to Gilmore, was to enable
the purchase money financer to keep his priority even where the debtor-
purchaser demands delivery of the goods immediately.2 '
Under the Code, filing may be done at any time2 -- even before a
security agreement is in existenceL-and the filing requirement may be
met with an extremely simple financing statement.24 Brodie could easily
have filed a statement at any time after June 1, and this would have pro-
tected it against a subsequent creditor. Because of Brodie's failure to file,
the bank had no notice of the existence of Brodie's interest. Furthermore,
since the collateral consisted of some 159 separate types of items, ranging
from a refrigerator and a dishwasher to spoons, forks, cups, ladles, pots,
and other small items,25 there was nothing the bank could have done to de-
termine with absolute certainty whether Lyon was the owner of the items.
Surely this is a ludicrously difficult burden of risk to place upon a party
when the other party could both protect itself and give notice to later
parties by the simple expedient of filing a statement.
Nevertheless, the court maintains that the bank "could have pro-
tected itself by inquiring into Lyon's interest,"20 but it does not consider
the difficulty-if not the impossibility-of such an inquiry and does not
weigh against such an inquiry the ease with which the opposing party
could have avoided the conflict in the first place. In addition, the court
does not consider the purpose of the section stated by Gilmore-allowing
for immediate delivery. This purpose is quite easily served by giving the
seller ten days in which to file, but it hardly requires allowing the seller-
as the court did here-more than four months in which to file, especially
when the public, during this period, has no notice of the seller's interest
in the goods.
The court's decision creates a considerable degree of unnecessary un-
certainty with respect to all personal property. A potential secured party
0 GILMORE § 29.5.
21 Id.
"
2 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-402(1).
23 Id.
21 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-402 requires only the signature and address
of the debtor and secured party and the types of property covered by the statement.
25 431 F.2d at 1318.
2
" Id. at 1319.
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cannot be certain--either through -the _possession of the goods by the
potential -debtor or- through notice given him by .a filed financing state-
ment-that the goods are not subject to an arrangement that could later
mature into a debtor-creditor relationship defeating the priority that the
potential secured party would expect for his interest: It would seem, then,
that the purposes and policies of the Code would better have been served
by beginning the ten:day period on June 1 when Lyon took possession of
the equipment rather than at the time~the debtor-creditor relationship was
entered into.
Even disregarding the Code policies, it is not at all clear that the
court was correct in its reading of the actual language. The court ignored
the fact that section 9-402(1), which sets forth the requirements for
financing statements, also uses the term "debtor"; and its use of the
term makes it clear that it is used solely for purposes of identification and
not for any timing purposes. If the court were to read the Code definition
of "debtor""7 into section 9-402(1) as it did into section 9-312(4), it
would mean that a financing statement would not be valid until a debtor-
creditor relationship had been established. This reading of section
9-402(1) is clearly negated by the section itself, which contains a pro-
vision that a statement may be filed "before a security agreement is made
or a security interest otherwise attaches."2 In section 9-402 (1) it would
appear that the term "debtor" merely refers to a person who expects to
become a debtor, at least where the financing statement is filed before a
security agreement is entered into. And the same meaning can just as well
be applied to the term in section 9-312(4). Gilmore apparently agrees
with the reading of "debtor" as merely a word of identification, since
he states that "receives possession" in section 9-312 (4) "is evidently meant
to refer to the moment when the goods are physically delivered at the
debtor's place of business . ..."'
One commentator has written:
A history of chattel security could well be written in terms of the
400-year struggle by debtors and their secured creditors to create
security interests of various sorts in the debtor's property without
affording notice to buyers or other creditors, and the attendant demands
ZT See note 7 supra.
8This view is reinforced by UNIFORM COMMERcIAL CODE § 9-312(5) (a), which
states that priority between conflicting security interests in the same collateral shall
be "in the order of filing if both are perfected by filing, regardless of which security
interest attached first.., and whether it attached before or after filing."
" GILmoRE § 29.3.
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by unsecured creditors generally for some kind of notice when all or
part of the debtor's assets become subject to security interests. The
parties favoring secrecy have, for the most part, been the losers .... 80
In Brodie the party favoring-or at least practicing-secrecy emerged
as the winner despite the fact that by a simple step he could have prevented
the litigation from ever arising. In allowing this result, the court un-
necessarily creates for a potential secured party an uncertainty that is
difficult to justify either by the language or by the underlying policies of
the Code.
Louis W. PAYNE, JR.
o CooGAN, s=pra note 15, at 289.
